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A B S T R A C T
This dissertation consists of three essays in the intersection of macroe-
conomics and international trade.
The first essay studies the causes and consequences of the differences
in the use of outsourcing across countries. I start by observing that
there is considerable variation in outsourcing intensity across countries.
I then show that this pattern can be rationalized in a theoretical
framework that combines a Coase-Williamson view of the firm with
Kiyotaki-Moore-Manova view of financial friction. The model pins
down the intensity of outsourcing and shows how it varies with
the financial characteristics of the suppliers. Econometric evidence
reveals that the model is consistent with the features of both sectoral-
level and firm-level data. The model also clarifies two conflicting
mechanisms of outsourcing on productivity. Quantitative analysis
reveals that both mechanisms are quantitatively significant so that the
net effect on aggregate productivity is modest. My study implies that
outsourcing is unlikely a significant source of cross-country differences
in productivity.
In the second essay, I examine how heterogeneous market power
affects the quantification of resources misallocation within sector. I
extend the Hsieh-Klenow framework of misallocation to allow for
heterogeneous market power and use the model to study the impact
of resources misallocation on India’s aggregate productivity. Quantita-
tive results show that heterogeneous market power has a large impact
on the quantification of misallocation. In particular, in the presence of
heterogeneous market power, the impact of tax-related distortions on
aggregate productivity is about one-seventh of the effect found by pre-
vious literature. My study implies that increasing market competition
is an effective way to reduce market power and enhance aggregate
productivity.
The third essay studies how factors of different quality are allocated
to the production chain. The essay starts by unveiling two systematic
patterns in factor inputs and factor rewards along production chains.
I then show that these patterns can be rationalized in a theoretical
framework with heterogeneous factors. In the model, products be-
come increasingly complex as they move along the production chain.
Downstream firms hire skilled workers to process complex products.
To the extent that skill is strongly complementary to the quality of
physical capital, downstream firms also employ high quality capital
goods. The analysis sheds light on the organization of factors along
production chains.
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1
T H E I M PA C T O F F I N A N C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T O N
O U T S O U R C I N G A N D A G G R E G AT E P R O D U C T I V I T Y
This paper highlights a novel channel through which financial devel-
opment affects aggregate productivity, namely endogenous changes
in the extent to which firms outsource production of intermediate
inputs. I present a multi-sector general equilibrium model of out-
sourcing with heterogeneous firms, and clarify the role of financial
development in shaping outsourcing, entry, prices, and productivity. I
then empirically test the key implication that financial development
increases outsourcing, especially when suppliers are highly dependent
on external finance and have fewer tangible assets. This implication
is strongly supported by both cross-country sectoral input-output
data and firm-level data. Finally, I structurally estimate the model
and perform counterfactual experiments. Quantitative analysis shows
that financial development has a sizable impact on outsourcing, but
its effect on aggregate productivity is relatively modest. Outsourcing
implies a more efficient use of resources, but transaction costs generate
a powerful negative effect through prices, offsetting the majority of
productivity gains.
1
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1.1 introduction
An important question in macroeconomics concerns how financial
development affects real activity. Most research focuses on how finan-
cial development affects the production decisions of the firm.1 While
this channel is clearly important, it does not exhaust all the available
channels for financial development to influence real activity. In this
paper, I show that financial development is an important determinant
of any firm’s sourcing decisions.
To get a sense of how these two concepts are related, Figure 1.1
provides some suggestive evidence at the country level. It plots the
share of intermediate purchases in gross output against an index
of financial development, the ratio of private credit to GDP.2 The
diagram clearly shows that firms in countries with higher levels of
financial development tend to purchase more products and services
from outside suppliers (outsourcing) rather than produce them in-
house (vertical integration).
Outsourcing has become an important business strategy, whereby
productive efficiency may be gained when products and services are
produced at lower cost by outside suppliers.3 From a social perspec-
tive, further allocative efficiency may be gained when the resources
conserved by outsourcing are devoted to the creation of new or more
products and services, leading to higher aggregate productivity.4 In
this paper, I present a simple model to formalize these arguments,
confront the model with data, and quantitatively assess the impact of
financial development on aggregate productivity.
The central finding is that financial development has a large im-
pact on outsourcing, but net productivity gains are relatively modest.
Quantitative analysis shows that setting financial development to the
U.S. level would increase outsourcing by more than 10 percentage
points, if all countries are weighted equally. Yet despite the ubiquitous
reorganization of production, aggregate productivity gains are rela-
tively modest: only about 0.3 percent on average. Outsourcing implies
a more efficient use of resources, but it also entails costs of market
transactions. The transaction costs generate a powerful negative effect
through prices, which offsets the majority of productivity gains. If
1 See, for example, B. S. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), B. Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Townsend (1979), and subsequent works by
their followers.
2 The share of intermediate purchases in gross output is calculated from the cross-
country sectoral input-output tables from GTAP 9 Database. The ratio of private credit
to GDP is a proxy for financial development initially developed by Beck, Demirg, and
Levine (2010). The slope (0.054) is precisely estimated at less than 1% level.
3 The important benefit of outsourcing is consistent with the transaction cost economics
pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1971, 1979, 1985). By contrast, the benefit
of vertical integration is that it reduces the costs of transactions, adaptation, and
opportunism.
4 Since the seminal work of R.Krugman (1979), product variety has played an important
role in theoretical models of growth (G. M. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer,
1990) and trade (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and G. I. P. Ottaviano, 2008). New varieties are
important sources of economic growth (Bils and Klenow, 2001) and welfare gains
from trade (Broda and Weinstein, 2006).
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Figure 1.1: Total intermediate purchases and financial development
ALB
ARGARM
AUS
AUT
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BHR
BOL
BRA
BRN
BWA
CAN
CHECHLCIV
CMR
COL
CRI
CYP
CZE
GER
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FRA
GBR
GEO
GHA
GRCGTM
HKG
HND
HRVHUN
IDNIND
IRL
IRN
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KOR
KWT
LAO
LKA
LTULVA
MAR
MDG
MEX
MLT
MNG
MOZ
MUS
MWI
MYS
NGA
NLD
NOR
NPL
NZL
OMN
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRY
QAT
ROM
RUS
RWA
SAU
SEN
SGP
SLV
SVK
SVN
SWE
TGO
THA
TTO
TUN
TUR
TZA
UGA
URY USA
VEN
VNM
ZAFZMB
20
30
40
50
60
70
To
ta
l i
nt
er
m
ed
ia
te
 s
ha
re
 in
 G
ro
ss
 o
ut
pu
t (%
)
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Private credit / GDP (Beck et al)
there were no such negative price effects, the net productivity gains
would be fivefold (about 1.5 percent on average). Hence, in evaluat-
ing the impact of outsourcing related policies, it is not sufficient to
measure changes in the prevalence of outsourcing; one must take into
account the effect through prices.
My contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, I highlight a
channel for financial development to affect aggregate productivity
that has received relatively little attention in the literature, namely en-
dogenous changes in outsourcing. Financial development can induce
a reorganization of production that enhances aggregate productiv-
ity. My theoretical work clarifies the role of financial development
in shaping outsourcing, entry, price and productivity. I further show
how the effects on these individual components together create the
impact on aggregate productivity. My analysis also sheds light on
how resources are being reallocated both within and across sectors
as financial markets develop. The reallocation of resources further
elevates aggregate productivity.
Second, I test the main implication of the model with both sector-
level and firm-level data. My model predicts that financial devel-
opment increases outsourcing, especially when suppliers are highly
dependent on external finance and have fewer tangible assets. I first
confront the model with cross-country sectoral input-output data. The
empirical results strongly support the view that financial development
disproportionately increases a sector’s outsourcing from sectors char-
acterized by high dependence on external finance and fewer tangible
assets. To further inspect the mechanism, I complement the sector-
level regressions with firm-level regressions. Specifically, I examine
the impact of the contraction in credit supply on the intensity of out-
sourcing of UK firms using data from Orbis. To establish causal effect,
I exploit the 2008 financial crisis as a source of exogenous variation in
credit supply of banks.5 My results confirm that a large contraction in
5 There is also anecdotal evidence that credit shortages reduce demand because firms
are discouraged from applying for finance or become cautious about business
prospects in an uncertain economic environment (Schans, 2012). However, over-
whelming evidence suggests that there is continued tightening in the supply of credit
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
1.1 introduction 4
credit reduces outsourcing disproportionately in firms which rely on
suppliers that are highly dependent on external finance or having few
tangible assets. Furthermore, the results show that credit shocks affect
both the intensive and extensive margins of outsourcing, consistent
with the prediction of my model.
Third, I structurally estimate the model and perform counterfactuals
to quantify the impact of financial development on aggregate produc-
tivity. The quantitative analysis shows that financial development has
a sizable impact on outsourcing. Setting financial development to the
U.S. level for all countries would increase the prevalence of outsourc-
ing from an average of 60 percent to more than 70 percent. Consistent
with the arguments set out at the beginning of the paper, outsourcing
implies a more efficient use of resources, thereby elevating aggregate
productivity by about 1.5 percent on average. However, outsourcing
also incurs transaction costs, which generate a powerful negative effect
through prices. Taken together, the net productivity gains are relatively
modest (about 0.3 percent on average). The results point to product
price as an important factor for aggregate productivity.
How does financial development affect the sourcing decisions of the
firm? The proposed explanation is best motivated by a simple example.
Suppose a firm has two options to acquire an intermediate input:
either manufacturing it in-house, or outsourcing it to a specialized
supplier. Outsourcing is more cost efficient, but the supplier may hold
up investment when contracts are incomplete. The firm, therefore,
chooses sourcing modes by balancing the cost and benefit. When there
are financial frictions, additional complications may arise. Outsourcing
not only purchases inputs from the supplier, but also transfers the
responsibility of production and the associated technology to the
supplier, in exchange for an upfront payment.6 The supplier’s lack
of access to finance may hinder its ability to make upfront payments,
and induce the firm to inefficiently retain production in-house.7
I build a multi-sector, general equilibrium, transaction cost model of
outsourcing to generalize this example. My model incorporates firm
heterogeneity and financial frictions into the industry equilibrium
model of G. M. Grossman and Helpman (2002). To provide a close link
between theory and empirics, I model financial frictions à la Manova
(2013) on the supplier side.8 Specifically, the supplier has to borrow a
since the 2008 crisis (Armstrong et al., 2013). Moreover, the presence of demand
factors means that I underestimate the effect of credit supply.
6 The empirical counterpart to the upfront payment is royalties and licences. Royalties
and licences is the second most important category in UK trade in services, accounting
for 22.6% of service imports and 26.1% of service exports (Breinlich and Criscuolo,
2011).
7 Having the downstream firm supply the technology on credit does not change the
results. The firm, acting the same as banks, would require its lending break even.
The only difference may be that the firm can monitor its supplier more efficiently
and recover more from collaterals in the event of supplier default. In my model,
this means a change of values in two parameters, monitoring efficiency and asset
tangibility. See section 1.2.1 for more details.
8 My model differs from Manova’s in three important ways. First, I focus on financial
frictions on the supplier rather than the firm. Second, in Manova’s model, financial
frictions have a limited impact on the intensive margin of exports, as productive
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fraction of the upfront payment (external-finance dependence) against
its collateral. The supplier repays when the bank monitors it effectively
(financial development), and defaults otherwise. In the event of default,
the bank can recover a fraction of the collateral value (asset tangibility).
My model predicts that financial development increases outsourcing,
especially when the supplier is highly dependent on external finance
and has fewer tangible assets.
I further analyse the role of financial development in shaping sec-
toral entry, price, and productivity. My model predicts that financial
development fosters new firm formation, reduces sector price, and
enhances sector productivity.9 Furthermore, financial development
improves allocative efficiency across sectors by reallocating resources
to sectors that are highly dependent on external finance or have few
tangible assets.10 Hence, financial development elevates aggregate
productivity by improving allocative efficiency both within and across
sectors.
Having characterized the model, I confront it with data. First, I test
the model implication with cross-country sectoral input-output tables
from the GTAP 9 database. My baseline specification is a differences-
in-differences regression with fixed effects, which focuses on the in-
teraction of financial development and the financial characteristics
(external-finance dependence and asset tangibility) of upstream (sup-
plier) sectors. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), I use the ratio
of private credit to GDP as a proxy for financial development, and
calculate external-finance dependence and asset tangibility from the
U.S. Compustat database. The results strongly support the prediction
of the model. The baseline results are robust with regard to (1) ex-
cluding intermediates purchased from within the sector, (2) restricting
the sample to domestic intermediates, (3) restricting the sample to
service intermediate inputs, (4) exploiting variations of intermediate
purchases over time, and (5) using credit information index as an
alternative measure of financial development.11
exporters are unaffected by credit constraints. My model emphasizes both intensive
and extensive margin of outsourcing. Third, Manova analysed the effect of financial
frictions on exports in a partial equilibrium setting. I characterize how financial
development induces the reorganization of production both within and across sectors
in general equilibrium.
9 More precisely, my model predicts that financial development always increases the
mass of entrants. When adjustment at the extensive margin dominates the intensive
margin, financial development reduces sector price and elevates sector productivity
unambiguously.
10 One way to understand why resources are reallocated across sectors is to compare
my model with a competitive model. In a competitive model with Cobb-Douglas
preference, a change in sector productivity does not induce resource reallocation
across sectors, because the effect of higher productivity is offset by the effect of lower
product price. For this to be true, revenue productivity must be the same across
sectors. In my model, financial development disproportionately reduces revenue
productivity in financial vulnerable sectors, inducing resources reallocation to those
sectors.
11 The credit information index is from the World Bank. This index measures rules
affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through
public and private credit registries. Higher values indicate the availability of more
credit information to facilitate lending decisions.
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Second, I confront the model with firm-level data from the Or-
bis database. My baseline regression is based on the differences-in-
differences framework. I test the hypothesis that after the crisis, when
credit was scarcer, firms that source from more external-finance depen-
dent industries outsource less, while firms that source from industries
with more tangible assets outsource more. To measure the financial
characteristics of suppliers, I link the primary industry of the firm
to industries in the U.S. input-output table, and calculate the aver-
age financial characteristics of firms’ upstream industries. My results
strongly support the view that a large contraction in credit reduces
outsourcing disproportionately in firms which rely on suppliers that
are highly dependent on external finance or having few tangible assets.
The baseline results are robust with regard to (1) including additional
controls, and (2) restricting the sample to the balanced panel.
Having empirically tested the model, I analyse the quantitative
importance of the sourcing channel. I ask: How much do countries
benefit from further development of their financial markets to the U.S.
level? To provide an answer, I first estimate the structural parameters
of the model. My estimation strategy proceeds in two stages, with
each stage featuring a non-linear Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood
(PML) estimator with high-dimensional fixed effects.12 I then use the
model to perform counterfactuals. The experiment shows that financial
development has a sizable impact on outsourcing, but its effect on ag-
gregate productivity is relatively modest. The majority of productivity
gain comes from the reallocation of resources within sectors. Financial
development also induces resource reallocation across sectors, but
with a limited impact on aggregate productivity.
1.1.1 Related Literature
There is a large body of theoretical literature that studies the bound-
aries of the firm. Many theories of the firm suggest that integration,
while costly, reduces transaction costs and enhances profitability.13
Consistent with this view, I build firm boundaries on the transaction
cost theory of the firm pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson
(1985). However, the novel channel for financial development to im-
prove allocative efficiency applies well to the property rights approach
of the firm (Antràs, 2003; S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, 1986; O. D.
Hart, 1995; O. Hart and Moore, 1990).14 I embed this channel in a
multi-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, and
fully characterize the impact of financial development on outsourcing
and aggregate productivity.
My paper is closely related to a large body of empirical literature
on the determinant of vertical integration. The propensity for firms to
12 Poisson PML estimators are particularly suitable for non-linear conditional means
with multiplicative forms (see Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
13 See Gibbons (2005) for a survey.
14 See Appendix A.2.2 for an alternative exposition based on the property rights ap-
proach. It is worth noting that the two approaches have distinct predictions regarding
differences in contracting institutions.
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integrate varies systematically with technology intensity (Acemoglu,
Aghion, et al., 2010), factor intensity (Antràs, 2003), product mar-
ket competition (Aghion, Griffith, and Howitt, 2006; Bloom, Sadun,
and Reenen, 2010), product price (Alfaro, Conconi, et al., 2016), and
institutions (Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Boehm, 2015;
Macchiavello, 2012).15 I contribute to this literature by highlighting
a novel channel for financial development to affect a firm’s vertical
integration decisions, namely supplier access to finance. Empirical
results strongly support the view that supplier access to finance is a
key determinant of vertical integration.
There is also a large body of empirical literature that studies the
role of financial market imperfections in economic development. Early
contributions are by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), King and Levine (1993), and Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and Braun (2003). See Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and Levine
(2005) for recent surveys. I contribute to this literature by proposing
a new channel for financial development to affect economic develop-
ment, namely firms’ outsourcing decisions.
My paper also adds to the growing body of work on financial
market imperfections on trade. Previous work has shown that credit
constraints distort trade flows by impeding a firm’s export opera-
tions (Carluccio and Fally, 2012; Chan and Manova, 2015; Chor and
Manova, 2012; Feenstra, Li, and Yu, 2014; Manova, 2013). More re-
cently, scholars have explored exogenous shocks to a firm’s access to
finance to establish a causal effect of credit constraints on trade (Amiti
and Weinstein, 2011; Bricongne et al., 2012; Manova, Wei, and Zhang,
2015; Paravisini et al., 2015). My contribution to this literature is using
a novel source of identification: credit contraction during the 2008
financial crisis combined with the variation in financial characteristics
of input suppliers.
My paper is also related to the branch of literature that studies the
impact of resource misallocation on aggregate productivity. Misallo-
cation of resources can occur both across sectors (Jones, 2011, 2013)
and within sectors (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson, 2008), potentially reducing aggregate productivity (Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). While various
frictions can generate misallocation, the most relevant source of misal-
location to my study is financial frictions (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013;
Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Moll, 2014).16 I contribute to this literature by
highlighting a novel channel for financial frictions to affect resource
misallocation both within and across sectors, namely endogenous
changes in outsourcing. Empirical evidence provides strong support
for this channel.
15 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a survey of early contributions.
16 The potential sources of misallocation include tax and regulations (Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008), capital adjustment costs (Asker, Collard-
Wexler, and Loecker, 2014), information frictions (David, H. A. Hopenhayn, and
Venkateswaran, 2016), heterogeneous markups (Dhingra and Morrow, 2016; Peters,
2013), and financial frictions (as cited in the main text).
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In terms of focus, my paper is closely related and complementary to
Boehm (2015). Boehm studied how contract enforcement costs affect a
firm’s sourcing decisions and aggregate productivity. My paper differs
from his in three dimensions. First, while Boehm emphasized the role
of contract enforcement costs in shaping buyer-seller relationships, I
focus on the role of financial development. Second, Boehm’s theory
builds on the Ricardian trade model, in which contract enforcement
costs lower a supplier’s prospect of supplying inputs, but do not
affect the prices charged by the supplier.17 In my model, the hold-
up problem induces the supplier to lower the scale of production
and raise the product price, offsetting most of the productivity gains.
Third, while Boehm investigated the impact of institutional changes
that reduce transaction costs, I focus on institutional changes that
improve allocative efficiency holding fixed the transaction costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents
the model and derives the main propositions of the paper. Section 1.3
tests the main predictions of the model with cross-country sectoral
input-output table data. Section 1.4 further examines the proposed
mechanism with firm-level data. Section 1.5 estimates the structural
parameters and performs counterfactual experiments. Section 1.6 con-
cludes. Proofs of the propositions are provided in Appendix A.1.
1.2 a model of financial frictions and outsourcing
In this section, I develop a model of outsourcing under financial
frictions. Two features characterize the model. The first feature is
that investments are relationship specific. Parties are partially locked
into the bilateral relationship, and are likely to withhold investments.
Firms choose to outsource or internalize production to minimize the
transaction costs the hold-up problem generates. The second feature is
that financial markets are imperfect. Financial frictions interfere with
firms’ choices of ownership structures, which reduce the efficiency at
which production is carried out. I first introduce the basic environment,
and then explore various aggregate implications of the model.
1.2.1 Basic Environment
Consider an economy with L consumers, each supplying one unit
of labor. Preferences are defined over final goods from N sectors,
U = ∏Nn=1 Y
θn
n , where ∑Nn=1 θn = 1. The final good Yn is produced
by combining intermediates Yni with a Cobb-Douglas production
technology:
Yn =
N
∏
i=1
Yγnini , where
N
∑
i=1
γni = 1.
17 Put differently, external suppliers (outsourcing) overcome their cost disadvantage by
selling a smaller range of inputs, exactly to the point at which the distribution of
prices for what they sell to the firm is the same as the distribution of prices offered
by internal suppliers (integration).
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
1.2 a model of financial frictions and outsourcing 9
Here, Yni represents the intermediate goods from upstream sector i.
The intermediate Yni in turn is a CES aggregate of a continuum of
differentiated products,18
Yni =
(∫ 1
0
yni (j)
α dj
)1/α
.
Inputs are imperfect substitutes, with an elasticity of substitution
1/ (1− α). Firms supplying differentiated inputs therefore face a de-
mand yni (j) = Ani pni (j)
−1/(1−α), where Ani = P
α/(1−α)
ni θnγniPY is an
aggregate demand shifter. Here, Y = ∏Nn,i=1 Y
θnγni
ni refers to the ag-
gregate output and P = ∏Nn,i=1 (Pni/θnγni)
θnγni represents the ideal
aggregate price index. In what follows, whenever there is no ambigu-
ity, I shall focus on a particular product and omit the index n, i, and
j.
Firm F can transform input x into product y with productivity z,
y = zx. The firm can build the input in-house with constant marginal
(labor) cost c > 1, or buy it from a specialised supplier S, who can
produce it at constant unity marginal cost. The former organizational
form is vertical integration and the latter is outsourcing. Setting up an
integrating firm also requires a fixed (labor) cost f V , which is assumed
to be higher than the fixed cost for an outsourcing firm, f . Assume
firms can freely enter the market by paying an entry (labor) cost f e.
After the entry cost is sunk, firms draw their productivities from a
common distribution G (z).
An integrating firm chooses input x to maximize its profit,
piV (z) = maxx A
1−αzαxα − cx− fV .
This delivers a profit function piV (z) = ψVz
α
1−α − fV , where ψV =
(1− α) A (c/α)− α1−α . An outsourcing firm F can be paired with a spe-
cialised supplier S who builds the input. The firm supplies technologi-
cal information z to the supplier, in exchange for a lump-sum upfront
payment T (z). Assume ex-ante the firm faces a perfect elastic supply
of suppliers. It would demand the upfront payment to ensure the sup-
plier participates at minimum cost. Once the relationship is formed,
however, the supplier has an incentive to renegotiate the division of
sales revenue. Assume the two parties engage in Nash bargaining.
The firm, with a bargaining power 0 < β < 1, obtains a share β of the
revenue; the supplier obtains the rest. The supplier, anticipating only
a share 1− β of the sales revenue, would withhold the investment in
input x. This can be clearly seen from the supplier’s problem:
piS (z) = maxx (1− β) A
1−αzαxα − x− T (z) .
18 An example of this is the production of computers. One can think of Yn as the final
good computers, Yni as the components of a computer, power supply, motherboard,
microprocessor, memory, storage devices etc. Focus on one of the components, say,
the microprocessor. The product yni (j) can be thought of as semiconductors, gold,
copper, aluminum, silicon and various plastics. Alternative, one can view yni (j) as
tasks, such as exposure, washing, etching, planting, wiring, slicing, packaging etc.
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Under-investment occurs as the marginal product of input exceeds the
unity marginal cost.
The under-investment problem can be mitigated by allowing the
firm to choose the amount of transfer, and to switch to integration alto-
gether. The only additional complication is that financial markets are
imperfect; therefore, the suppliers may not be able to borrow enough
funds to make the transfer. Specifically, assume that the supplier must
borrow a fraction 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of the upfront payment from an external
financier, and can finance the rest by internal funds. The supplier,
however, cannot promise to repay with certainty. With probability
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 the supplier repays F in full, otherwise it defaults. In the
event of default, the financier can seize a fraction 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 of the
collateral. The supplier would need to replenish the collateral in order
to continue production in future. To maintain the tractability of the
model, assume the amount of collateral equals the entry cost f e.19
With financial frictions, the supplier’s problem becomes:
piS (z) = max
x,F(z)
(1− β) A1−αzαxα − x− (1− δ) T (z)− λF (z)− (1− λ) µ f e
s.t. (1− β) A1−αzαxα − x− (1− δ) T (z) ≥ F (z) ,
λF (z) + (1− λ) µ f e ≥ dT (z) .
The first constraint states that the amount of repayment F (z) must
be feasible. The second requires that external financiers break even
in expectation. The most important parameters in this model are the
probability of repayment (financial development) λ, and supplier’s
external-finance dependence δ and collateralizability of assets (asset
tangibility) µ.
An implication of financial friction is that it imposes an upper
bound on the amount of upfront payment. In addition to ensuring the
supplier would participate at minimum cost, the amount of upfront
payment must also ensure the supplier can borrow funds from an
external financier. Hence the firm faces an additional credit constraint:
T (z) ≤
(1− α) (1− β) A
(
1
α(1−β)
)− α1−α z α1−α
1+ δ
( 1−λ
λ
) + ( 1−λλ ) µ f e
1+ δ
( 1−λ
λ
)
If there were no financial frictions (λ = 1), the firm would de-
mand an amount of transfer equal to the supplier’s ex-post oper-
ating profit, which is the numerator in the first term of the credit
upper bound. When there are financial frictions (λ < 1), external
finance is more costly to obtain than internal funds. The price of
internal funds is unity, while the price of external funds is 1/λ.
Hence the average price of funds is 1 + δ
( 1−λ
λ
)
, which is the de-
nominator of the credit upper bound. Financial frictions require low-
ering the amount of upfront payment to respect the price of funds.
Nonetheless, financial frictions are not all bad news for the firm.
The fact that the supplier needs to replenish the collateral after de-
fault effectively lowers its outside option below zero, allowing the
19 The settings of financial frictions are similar to those in Manova (2013).
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firm to extract more rents from the relationship. This is reflected in
the second term of the credit upper bound. When the credit con-
straint binds, the firm’s profit function is piO (z) = ψOz
α
1−α − fO, where
ψO =
(
β+ (1−α)(1−β)
1+δ( 1−λλ )
)
A
(
1
α(1−β)
)−α/(1−α)
, and fO = f − (
1−λ
λ )µ f e
1+δ( 1−λλ )
.
The assumptions of the model can now be stated. The first assump-
tion is motivated by two empirical facts. First, outsourcing and vertical
integration coexist even in the most financially developed country, the
United States.20 Second, vertically integrated firms tend to be larger
and more productive (Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson, 2014). To ac-
count for these facts, I assume that integration is more profitable than
outsourcing at the expense of higher fixed cost.
Assumption 1.1. Integration is more profitable than outsourcing at the
expense of higher overhead costs. That is, fVf >
1−α
1−α(1−β) (c (1− β))−
α
1−α >
1.
The second assumption concerns the credit constraints. Depending
on parameter values, the participation constraint can be more binding
than the credit constraint. Since the purpose of the paper is to study
the effect of financial development, I focus on a more interesting case
in which the credit constraint is more stringent than the participation
constraint.
Assumption 1.2. Credit constraint is binding for all producing firms, f
e
f <
δ
µ
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α(1−β) .
Intuitively, this condition says that in the worst case scenario, in
which the level of financial development is zero (λ = 0), the supplier’s
share of the revenue (1−α)(1−β)1−α(1−β) f , exceeds the amount of upfront pay-
ment to the firm µδ f
e. The second assumption ensures that all suppliers,
given the chance, would participate in production.
The last assumption bounds firm’s bargaining power from below. It
requires that the firm’s share of revenue exceeds that of the supplier
under outsourcing.
Assumption 1.3. The firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently high, β >
(1− α) (1− β).
Bargaining power governs the outsourcing firm’s trade-off between
under-investment and rent extraction. A high bargaining power ex-
acerbates the supplier’s hold-up problem, by lowering its perceived
revenue. This is clearly seen from the marginal product of input,
1/ (1− β), which exceeds the unity marginal cost. A low bargaining
power aggravates the rent extraction problem by placing the firm
in a weak position. In the worst case scenario, in which the level of
financial development is zero (λ = 0), the firm is left with a fraction
β of the revenue. The last assumption ensures that financial frictions
do not dominate contracting frictions in all circumstances. That is,
the marginal product of input (hold-up problem) exceeds the relative
20 Data on value added reveal that, in the United States, transactions that occur in the
firm are roughly equal in value to those that occur in markets. See also figure 1.1.
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revenue shares between integration and outsourcing (rent extraction),
1
1−β >
1−α
β . The last assumption therefore maintains the most essential
feature of the transaction cost model at all times. This completes the
description of the model.
1.2.2 Aggregate Implications
It is now possible to determine the equilibrium of the model. I proceed
as follows. First, I derive an expression for the prevalence of different
organizational forms. I then combine the free entry condition with
labor market equilibrium to solve for the mass of entrants. Finally,
I combine the aggregate demand for labor in each sector with the
allocation of aggregate expenditure across sectors to determine the
allocation of labor across sectors. To simplify the analysis, I use a
specific parameterization of the productivity distribution. I assume
that the productivity z follows a Pareto distribution with lower bound
b and shape parameter θ ≥ 1,
G (z) = 1−
(
b
z
)θ
, where z ∈ [b,∞) .
How does the prevalence of different organizational forms respond
to changes in financial developments? First, I need to define what I
mean by the “prevalence of organizational forms”. I use the fraction
of firms that choose a specific organizational form as the measure
of prevalence. By assumption 1.1, high productivity firms vertically
integrate while low productivity firms outsource. It follows that the
prevalence of integrating firms is σ = (1− G (zV)) / (1− G (zO)),
where zO is the cutoff productivity for the marginal entrant, and
zV > zO is the cutoff productivity for the marginal organizational
switcher. Note that the prevalence measure is independent of the
mass of entrants. Under Pareto distribution, the prevalence of vertical
integration admits a close-form solution:21
σ =
[
ψV − ψO
ψO
fO
fV − fO
]θ(1−α)/α
. (1.1)
After totally differentiating this equation, I derive an expression for
the percentage change in the prevalence of integration,
σˆ = −ϑ1λˆ+ ϑ2δˆ− ϑ3µˆ,
where the ϑ’s collect the terms that multiply dλ/λ, dδ/δ and dµ/µ
respectively. Hence an improvement in financial markets would in-
duce integrating firms to switch to outsourcing. Intuitively, better
financial institutions lower the cost of external finance, making the
organizational form that relies on external finance more attractive. The
following proposition summarizes the results.
21 An alternative measure of prevalence is the fraction of sales captured by each organi-
zational form, σR =
[
ψV−ψO
ψO
fO
fV− fO
]θ(1−α)/α−1
. All results concerning σ go through if
swiching to σR instead.
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Proposition 1.1. The prevalence of vertical integration σ decreases in fi-
nancial development λ, increases in external financial dependence δ, and
decreases in asset tangibility µ. Furthermore, the prevalence of vertical inte-
gration σ is log-supermodular in λ and µ, ∂
2 ln σ
∂µ∂λ > 0, and is log-submodular
in λ and d, ∂
2 ln σ
∂δ∂λ < 0.
The proposition also summarizes the interaction effects between
financial development and the financial characteristics of the supplier.
In particular, it states that financial development increases outsourcing,
especially when supplier is highly dependent on external finance and
has fewer tangible assets. The intuition is straightforward. Financial de-
velopment disproportionately benefits those suppliers that are highly
dependent on external finance or have fewer tangible assets to serve
as collateral. These testable implications will be closely examined in
subsequent sections.
Next, I solve for the mass of entrants Me. First, using the zero cutoff
condition for marginal entrants and the free entry condition, I derive
an expression for the equilibrium cutoff productivity zO:
f e
fO
=
(
b
zO
)θ [( z
zO
) α
1−α
− f
fO
]
,
where z and f are proportional to the average profit and fixed cost for
of producing firms.22 Further combining with labor market equilib-
rium gives an expression for the mass of entrants:
Me =
L
f e
(
α(1−β)
φO
Ωp/Ω+ 1
) (
1+ f
Ω fO− f
) . (1.2)
Here, Ωp and Ω are two multiplying factors summarizing the compo-
sition effect of different organizations on average labor demand and
profit.23 By assumption, integrating firms are more profitable; thus, an
increase in the number of integrating firms would raise average profit.
Nonetheless, integrating firms are less efficient in production cost;
therefore, the composition effect on average labor demand is greater
than that on average profit, Ωp > Ω. Together with the composition
effect on fixed cost, f , these multiplying factors determine the effect
of financial development on the number of entrants in equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the effects.
Proposition 1.2. The mass of entrants Me increases in financial develop-
ment λ, decreases in external financial dependence δ, and increases in asset
tangibility µ.
22 The expression for average profit fixed cost is f = (1− σ) fO + σ fV , and for average
profit productivity is z =
(
V (zO) +
(
φV
φO
(c (1− β))− α1−α − 1
)
σV (zV)
) 1−α
α , where
φV = 1− α, φO = β+ (1−α)(1−β)1+δ( 1−λλ ) , and V (y) =
∫ ∞
y z
α
1−α g(z)
1−G(z) dz.
23 The expression for the two multiplying factors are
Ω = θθ− α1−α
[
1+
(
φV
φO
(c (1− β))− α1−α − 1
)
σR
]
, and Ωp =
θ
θ− α1−α
[
1+
(
α
α(1−β) (c (1− β))−
α
1−α − 1
)
σR
]
.
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Intuitively, integrating firms generate more profits at the expense
of higher production costs. Financial development induces fewer inte-
grating firms, freeing up more labor resources for the creation of new
firms. Across sectors, those sectors relying more on external finance
attract smaller cohorts of entrants. The reason is that external finance
is costlier to obtain than internal funds. Sectors more reliant on ex-
ternal finance divert more labor resources away from firm creations.
Conversely, sectors with ample tangible assets tend to attract a large
cohorts of entrants. Tangible assets, by serving as collateral, could re-
duce the cost of external finance. This, in turn, allows more resources
to be devoted to the creation of firms.
Having solved for the mass of entrants, I now derive an expression
for the aggregate sector price:
P =
(
1
α (1− β)
)
M−
1−α
α z˜−1. (1.3)
Here, M = Me
(
b
zO
)θ
is the mass of producing firms, and z˜ is propor-
tional to their average productivity.24 The expression for sector price is
intuitive. It is the price charged by an average firm as if it is operating
under outsourcing. Unlike the mass of entrants, the effect of financial
development on sector price can be ambiguous. The reason is that,
while financial development induces more producing firms (exten-
sive margin), by so doing, it also reduces the average productivity of
those firms (intensive margin). When adjustment at the extensive mar-
gin dominates intensive margin, sector price unambiguously declines
with financial development. The following proposition summarizes
the findings.
Proposition 1.3. When φV > φO, aggregate sector price P decreases in
financial development λ, increases in external financial dependence d, and
decreases in asset tangibility µ, where φV = 1− α, φO = β+ (1−α)(1−β)1+δ( 1−λλ ) .
The condition requires that the ex-post revenue share of an integrat-
ing firm is greater than that of an outsourcing firm. When this happens,
the integrating firm’s profitability is much greater than that of the
outsourcing firm. As financial development takes place, adjustment
of the firms can occur at two margins. First, marginal low productiv-
ity firms enter the market and operate under outsourcing. Second,
marginal integrating firms switch to outsourcing as it becomes more
profitable. When integration is much more profitable than outsourcing,
adjustment along the second margin may be limited. Most adjustment
occurs at the first margin. This means the quantity effect (the mass
of producing firms) on sector price dominates the composition effect
(average productivity of the firms). Hence sector price unambiguously
falls with financial development. It should be noted that this condition
is a sufficient condition. In practice, the quantity effect is likely to
dominate the composition effect, as shown in later sections.
24 The expression for average productivity is z˜ =(
V (zO) +
(
(c (1− β))− α1−α − 1
)
σV (zV)
) 1−α
α .
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Now an expression for sector TFP can be derived. First, I aggregate
the revenue and labor demand from individual firms, and obtain an
expression for sector revenue TFP:
TFPR =
R
L
=
Ω˜
α (1− β)Ωp + φOΩ
. (1.4)
where Ω˜ is a multiplying factor that captures the composition effect
of different organizations on average productivity.25 Note that if there
were no financial frictions and there was only one type of organi-
zational form, φO would become 1− α (1− β), all of these Ω’s, and
hence TFPR, would equal to one. The direct effect of financial frictions
can be seen by setting all Ω’s to unity. TFPR is above one because
φO falls below 1− α (1− β). This implies that the sector as a whole
is underinvesting in labor resources. The indirect effect can be seen
by setting φO in the denominator to 1− α (1− β), while leaving Ω’s
unchanged. It is easy to verify that TFPR is once again above unity,
implying under-investment for the sector as a whole. Furthermore,
both effects increase in the severity of financial frictions.
Armed with the TFPR expression, I now obtain an expression for
sector physical productivity:
TFP =
Y
L
=
α (1− β) Ω˜
α (1− β)Ωp + φOΩ
M
1−α
α z˜. (1.5)
Of particular interest is how financial development affects sector TFP.
The following proposition summarizes the effects.
Proposition 1.4. When φV > φO, aggregate sector TFP increases in fi-
nancial development λ, decreases in external financial dependence d, and
increases in asset tangibility µ.
Under the sufficient condition, sector TFPR rises with financial de-
velopment while sector price falls with it. Hence sector TFP, defined
as the ratio of sector TFPR to sector price, unambiguously rises with
financial development. Why does sector TFPR comove positively with
financial development? The reason is that financial development re-
duces all three multiplying factors representing the composition effects
on productivity (Ω˜), labor demand (Ωp), and profit (Ω). Nonetheless,
the composition effects on labor demand and profit are more respon-
sive than the composition effect on productivity. Hence the overall
effect of financial development on TFPR is positive. This, together with
the negative effect on sector price, implies that financial development
enhances sector TFP.
I have discussed various aggregate implications at the sector (pair)
level. To close the model, it remains to determine the allocation of
labor across sectors. I now resume the indices for downstream sector
n and upstream sector i. I combine the aggregate demand for labor in
25 The expression for the multiplying factor is Ω˜ =
θ
θ− α1−α
[
1+
(
(c (1− β))− α1−α − 1
)
σR
]
.
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each sector with the allocation of aggregate expenditure across sectors
to obtain an expression for labor allocation:
Lni = L
θnγni/TFPRni
∑Nm,k=1 θmγmk/TFPRnk
.
Note that if there were no financial frictions, the share of labor in
each sector would be equal to its share of aggregate expenditure.
Under financial frictions, the market allocates labor away from sectors
more exposed to financial problems to sector sectors less exposed to
financial problems. Since the mass of entrants is proportional to labor,
financially vulnerable sectors attract fewer entrants and therefore have
lower sector TFP. This is the general equilibrium effect of financial
frictions.
The central question of this paper is: how does financial develop-
ment affect aggregate productivity? Using the Cobb-Douglas aggrega-
tor and the allocation of labor across sectors, I derive an expression
for aggregate productivity (TFP):
TFP =
N
∏
n,i=1
(
TFPni
θnγni/TFPRni
∑Nm,k=1 θmγmk/TFPRmk
)θnγni
. (1.6)
This expression makes it clear that financial development has dual
effects on aggregate productivity. Not only does it directly enhance
the productivity in financially vulnerable sectors, but in the process, it
also allocates more labor resources to those sectors. Both effects tend
to enhance aggregate productivity. Finally, notice that preferences are
defined over final goods; hence, social welfare W is equal to aggregate
productivity, W = U = Y/L = TFP.
We have completed the discussion of the model. The key finding is
that financial development affects organizational forms, through which
it also affects aggregate productivity. How plausible is the model and
its assumptions? One testable implication is given by Proposition
1.1. Namely, financial development increases outsourcing, especially
when supplier is highly dependent on external finance and has fewer
tangible assets. The following two sections test this implication with
both sector-level and firm-level data.
1.3 sector-level evidence
1.3.1 Data
The primary source of data is the GTAP 9 Data Base coordinated by
the Center for Global Trade Analysis at Purdue University. GTAP
provides a consistent global input-output table that covers 57 sectors
in 129 countries and regions. The database describes bilateral trade
flows, production, consumption and intermediate use of commodi-
ties and services. GTAP sectors are defined by reference to Central
Product Classification (CPC) and the International Standard Industry
Classification (ISIC). Using the GTAP data, I can compute the share of
intermediate purchases in gross output at both the sector-pair level
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Figure 1.2: External financial dependence and asset tangibility
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and the sector level, which are used as the dependent variables in the
reduced-form regressions.
To proceed with the regressions, I need a country measure of fi-
nancial development and two industry measures of external financial
dependence and asset tangibility. The measure of financial develop-
ment is the share of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, compiled
by the World Bank. The construction of industry measures of external
financial dependence and tangibility follows Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Braun (2003). Each industry’s external financial dependence and
tangibility is calculated as the median of all U.S. based firms in the
industry, as contained in Compustat’s annual Fundamental Annual
files for the 1997 – 2006 period. External financial dependence is de-
fined as the investment needs that cannot be met by cash flows from
operations. Cash flow from operations is broadly defined as cash flow
from operations plus decreases in inventory, decreases in account
receivables, and increases in account payables. Investment need is
broadly defined as capital expenditure plus increases in investment
and acquisitions. Tangibility is defined as the share of net property,
plant, and equipment in the book value of assets. Since the industry
segments are different in Compustat and GTAP, the former is mapped
to the latter using a correspondence between 1987 US SIC to GTAP sec-
toral classification (GSC2). The summary statistics of these measures
are given in Table 1.1.
Before proceeding with regressions, it is instructive to inspect the
level effects of these industrial measures. Figure 1.2a plots the input
expenditure share of the U.S. motor vehicle and parts industry against
the external financial dependence of upstream industries. The diagram
illustrates that U.S. motor vehicle producers tend to source more inputs
from financially vulnerable sectors. A fixed effect regression using
input expenditure share for all U.S. downstream sectors confirms that
the positive correlation is statistically significant (coefficient is 0.003
and is significant at less than 1% level). By contrast, Figure 1.2b reveals
that U.S. motor vehicle producers tend to source fewer inputs from
those sectors endowed with more tangible assets. A similar fixed effect
regression using data from U.S. input-output tables confirms that the
negative correlation is statistically significant (coefficient is -0.012 and
is significant at less than 10% level).
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for regression variables
Mean Median S.D. Min Max N
Country Characteristics
Private credit / GDP 0.594 0.416 0.476 0.025 2.063 117
Contract enforcement cost 0.371 0.321 0.245 0.114 1.508 114
Log human capital index 0.912 0.976 0.276 0.128 1.297 114
Log capital per worker 11.166 11.372 1.353 7.659 13.023 119
Resource abundance 0.077 0.028 0.104 0.000 0.498 118
Industry Characteristics
External financial dependence -0.055 -0.057 1.080 -3.237 3.503 34
Asset tangibility 0.347 0.314 0.229 0.006 0.834 34
Contract intensity 0.225 0.185 0.227 0.019 1.099 34
Skill intensity 0.345 0.308 0.152 0.141 0.628 34
Capital intensity 0.143 0.103 0.150 0.010 0.860 35
Resource intensity 0.114 0.000 0.323 0.000 1.000 35
Dependent Variables
Intermediate purchases 0.017 0.002 0.057 0.000 0.999 171,500
Outside intermediates 0.014 0.001 0.049 0.000 0.999 166,600
Domestic intermediates 0.011 0.001 0.041 0.000 0.999 171,500
Service intermediates 0.018 0.003 0.051 0.000 0.999 73,500
Notes: Private credit to GDP ratio and resource abundance are obtained from the
World Development Indicators as compiled by the World Bank (Beck, Demirg, and
Levine, 2010). Private credit to GDP ratio is defined as the domestic credit provided
to the private sector as a share of GDP; resource abundance is defined as the total
natural resources rents as a share of GDP. Contract enforcement cost is calculated
using the Doing Business survey from the World Bank. It is defined as the monetary
cost plus the interest foregone during the proceedings (assuming a three percent
annual interest rate). Log human capital index and log capital per worker are obtained
from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0. Each sector’s financial characteristics variables
are calculated as the median of all U.S. based firms in the sector, as contained in
Compustat’s annual Fundamental Annual files for the period from 1996 to 2005.
External financial dependence is defined as the investment needs that could not be
met by cash flows from operations. Cash flow from operations is broadly defined
as cash flow from operations, plus decreases in inventory, decreases in account
receivables, and increases in account payables. Investment need is broadly defined
capital expenditures, plus increases in investment and acquisitions. Tangibility is
defined as the share of net property, plant, and equipment in the book value of assets.
Each sector’s contract intensity is obtained from Boehm (2015), defined as the average
enforcement intensity (the number of court cases between a pair of sectors) across
all downstream sectors. Factor intensities (skill, capital, and resource intensity) and
dependent variables are obtained from the GTAP 9 database (with reference year 2007).
Factor intensity is defined as the share of factor rent in gross output. Intermediate
purchase refers to the share of expenditure on intermediate inputs in gross output.
Outside intermediate refers to the expenditure on inputs purchased from all upstream
sectors except for the sector itself. Domestic intermediate is the expenditure on inputs
sourced from domestic suppliers rather than from abroad. Service intermediate refers
to the services (including the distributional service) purchased from upstream sectors.
All values are evaluated at market prices.
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Overall, these diagrams confirm that the input expenditure share
varies systematically, and it comoves with the two industry measures
in the expected directions. Since theory emphasizes the differential
effects of financial development on sectors with different financial
characteristics, I will now turn to the main specification of regressions.
1.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main prediction is that financial development increases outsourc-
ing, especially when supplier is highly dependent on external finance
and has fewer tangible assets. This prediction can be examined with
the following specification:
Xnic
Xnc
= αni + αnc + β1PCcExtFinDepi + β2PCcTangi + Zicγ+ enic.
Here, Xnic/Xnc is the share of intermediate purchases in gross output
specific to sector-pair ni in country c. PCc is the measure of private
credit to GDP in country c, ExtFinDepi and Tangi are the measures
of external financial dependence and asset tangibility in upstream
sector i. Zic is a vector of the additional interaction terms of country
and industry characteristics. It includes the interactions of contract
enforcement cost and contract intensity, skill abundance and skill in-
tensity, capital abundance and capital intensity, resource abundance
and resource intensity. The sector-pair fixed effect αni controls for
the technological requirements of the usage of intermediates in the
production of final goods. The downstream-country fixed effect αnc
captures unobservable supply and demand shocks hitting the down-
stream sector in a particular country. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level to account for potential correlation of errors at
various levels within the country.
Table 1.2 reports the results of the baseline specifications. Column
(1) is the basic regression with dual fixed effects. It shows that firms
tend to source more inputs from financially dependent sectors as
financial development takes place. Since the regression relies on a
generalized difference-in-difference approach, one can get a sense of
the economic magnitude of this effect as follows. In the dataset, the
country at the 25th percentile of financial development is Nigeria, and
at the 75th percentile is Singapore. The industry at the 25th percentile
of external financial dependence is textiles, and at the 75th percentile
is coal. A firm would purchase 0.1 percentage points more inputs from
coal suppliers than from textile suppliers if it moved from Nigeria to
Singapore. To put the number in perspective, the average intermediate
share is 1.7 percentage points. This means that the firm would increase
outsourcing by about 6 percent. Meanwhile, the regression shows that
the firm would purchase 0.3 percentage points fewer inputs from the
75th percentile tangible suppliers (air transport) than from the 25th
percentile tangible suppliers (plastic) should it move from Nigeria to
Singapore. Equivalently, the firm would increase outsourcing by about
12 percent. The pattern of coefficients is consistent with the prediction
in Proposition 1.1.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
1.3 sector-level evidence 20
Table 1.2: Baseline results: Interaction effects at sector-pair level
Dependent variable: ln (Xnic/Xnc)
(1) (2)
PCcExtFinDepi 0.00184∗∗∗ 0.00204∗∗∗
(0.000406) (0.000391)
PCcTangi -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.00932∗∗∗
(0.00228) (0.00289)
Contract interaction 0.0102
(0.00848)
Skill interaction 0.0353∗∗∗
(0.00835)
Capital interaction -0.00315
(0.00389)
Resource interaction 0.0192∗∗∗
(0.00604)
Downstream-country FE αnc Yes Yes
Sector-pair FE αni Yes Yes
N 139230 128520
R2 0.444 0.452
Notes: The sample includes the intermediates purchased by all downstream sectors
from all upstream sectors in all countries for the year 2007. The dependent variable
is the share of intermediate purchases in gross output specific to sector-pair ni in
country c. PCc is an index for financial development, referring to the private credit to
GDP ratio in country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of external-finance dependence
of upstream sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateralizability of upstream sector
i, defined as the share of tangible assets in total assets. In column 2, contract (skil-
l/capital/resource) interaction is the interaction between contract enforcement cost
(skill/capital/resource intensity) of country c and contract intensity of upstream
sector i. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the
country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
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The difference-in-difference approach was designed to mitigate
the omitted variable bias problem. Nonetheless, country-dependent
variables measured at the upstream sector level may still be a source
of omitted variable bias. To address this concern, I add a vector of
covariates to the basic regression in column (2). The first covariate is the
interaction of national contract enforcement cost and contract intensity
of the upstream sector.26 It controls for the comparative advantage
arising from the quality of contracting institutions. That is, countries
with better contracting institutions may foster input markets that are
particularly reliant on contracts. Analogously, I add further interaction
terms to the basic regression: skill abundance and skill intensity, capital
abundance and capital intensity, resource abundance and resource
intensity.27 The summary statistics of these covariates are given in
Table 1.1. After adding all these covariates, the interaction terms
of interest preserve the correct signs and remain highly statistically
significant. Hence, the concern about omitted variables is well-placed,
but does not fundamentally change the results of the basic regression.
1.3.3 Robustness
Having examined the baseline results, I look at five robustness checks.
First, I exclude intermediates purchased from within the same indus-
try. Second, I change the dependent variable to shares of domestic
intermediate purchases in gross outputs. Third, I restrict the sample
to service intermediates. Fourth, I exploit time variation with panel
regressions. Finally, I use credit information index as an alternative
measure for financial development.
1.3.3.1 Outside Intermediates
In the baseline regressions, I include the intermediate shares for all
pairs of sectors. However, it is well known that firms tend to pur-
chase more inputs from inside the sector. Put differently, the diagonal
elements tend to be greater than other elements in a typical input
output table. This raises the question of whether the baseline results
are affected by these diagonal elements. In this robustness check, I ex-
clude these diagonal elements from the sample and rerun the baseline
regressions. The results are then reported in Table 1.3. The coeffi-
cients of the main interaction terms preserve their correct signs and
26 Contract enforcement cost is constructed from the World Bank Doing Business survey.
Following Boehm (2015), I measure enforcement cost as the sum of monetary cost
(the fraction of value of the claim) and opportunity cost (interest forgone during the
proceedings). The measure of contract intensity is taken from Boehm (2015). It is the
enforcement intensity of an upstream sector, averaged across downstream sectors.
The interaction term is not statistically significant. However, it is worth noting that
the channel here is different from the channel in his paper.
27 Skill and capital abundance are construct from the Penn World Table 9.0 (PWT). Skill
intensity is defined as the log of human capital intex in the PWT. Capital intensity
is defined as the log of capital stock per worker. Resource abundance is the total
resource rents as a share of GDP in the World Development Indicators from World
Bank. Skill intensity, capital intensity, and resource intensity are constructed from the
GTAP data, defined as their respective shares in the gross output.
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Table 1.3: Robustness: Intermediates purchased from outside the sector
Dependent variable: ln (Xnic/Xnc)
(1) (2)
PCcExtFinDepi 0.00167∗∗∗ 0.00177∗∗∗
(0.000366) (0.000351)
PCcTangi -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.00939∗∗∗
(0.00227) (0.00288)
Contract interaction 0.00842
(0.00690)
Skill interaction 0.0341∗∗∗
(0.00855)
Capital interaction -0.000298
(0.00364)
Resource interaction 0.0132∗∗
(0.00566)
Downstream-country FE αnc Yes Yes
Sector-pair FE αni Yes Yes
N 135252 124848
R2 0.403 0.410
Notes: The sample includes the intermediates purchased by all downstream sectors
from all upstream sectors except for the downstream sector itself for the year 2007.
The dependent variable is the share of intermediate purchases in gross output specific
to sector-pair ni in country c. PCc is an index for financial development, referring to
the private credit to GDP ratio in country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of external-
finance dependence of upstream sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateralizability of
upstream sector i, defined as the share of tangible assets in total assets. In column 2,
contract (skill/capital/resource) interaction is the interaction between contract en-
forcement cost (skill/capital/resource intensity) of country c and contract intensity of
upstream sector i. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation
at the country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
remain highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitudes of
these coefficients are similar to the baseline results. This reassures me
that the baseline results are not driven by the inclusion of diagonal
elements.
1.3.3.2 Domestic Intermediates
Another concern might be that, while theory focuses on domestic
financial development, the baseline regressions use all intermediates
regardless of whether they are purchased domestically or abroad.
In light of the recent development of global production, one might
worry that the baseline results are affected by foreign intermediates.
Fortunately, the GTAP data report domestic and overseas purchases
separately. This allows me to examine the interaction effects on do-
mestic intermediates only. Table 1.4 reports the results. It is clear that
all results in the baseline regressions go through. The magnitudes of
the coefficients are also similar to those in the previous regressions.
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Table 1.4: Robustness: Domestic intermediates only
Dependent variable: ln (Xnic/Xnc)
(1) (2)
PCcExtFinDepi 0.00191∗∗∗ 0.00208∗∗∗
(0.000368) (0.000353)
PCcTangi -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.00603∗∗
(0.00202) (0.00276)
Contract interaction 0.0116
(0.00809)
Skill interaction 0.0393∗∗∗
(0.00728)
Capital interaction -0.0108∗∗∗
(0.00358)
Resource interaction 0.0294∗∗∗
(0.00554)
Downstream-country FE αnc Yes Yes
Sector-pair FE αni Yes Yes
N 139230 128520
R2 0.327 0.336
Notes: The sample includes the domestic intermediates purchased by all downstream
sectors in all countries for the year 2007. The dependent variable is the share of
intermediate purchases in gross output specific to sector-pair ni in country c. PCc is
an index for financial development, referring to the private credit to GDP ratio in
country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of external-finance dependence of upstream
sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateralizability of upstream sector i, defined as the
share of tangible assets in total assets. In column 2, contract (skill/capital/resource)
interaction is the interaction between contract enforcement cost (skill/capital/resource
intensity) of country c and contract intensity of upstream sector i. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the country level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
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The baseline results, therefore, are robust to the exclusion of foreign
intermediates.
1.3.3.3 Service Intermediates
Following the IO literature, I measure outsourcing as the share of inter-
mediate purchases in gross outputs. One might worry that there could
be potential mismeasurement problems. Large firms, for example, may
have subsidiaries in the upstream sectors. Transactions between these
firms and their suppliers would then show up as outsourcing in my
measure. Could this fundamentally affect the baseline results?28 To
address this concern, I re-run the baseline regressions using interme-
diate purchases from service sectors only. Unlike intermediate goods,
services performed within the boundaries of the firm are less likely
to be priced, and therefore, they would not appear in the manufactur-
ing surveys on which input-output tables are constructed. Table 1.5
reports the results. It is clear that all baseline results still go through
when restricted to service intermediates. This reassures me that the
potential mismeasurement problem does not fundamentally change
the results.
1.3.3.4 Time Variation
One of the advantages of the GTAP 9 database is that it provides data
with three reference years: 2004, 2007, and 2011. For each reference
year, the input-output tables are updated and reconciled using macroe-
conomic data set and a variety of international data sets on trade,
protection, and energy. The regional data bases are then assembled
to construct the panel of globally consistent input-output tables. This
short panel spans the period of the recent 2008 financial crisis, a rare
event in which financial markets are interrupted on a global scale.
If the proposed mechanism is at work, the variation of input-output
data should pick up the effect of the credit crunch on the sourcing
decisions of the firm. In this section, I exploit the time variation with
the following specification:
Xnict
Xnct
= αnit + αnct + αnic + β1PCctExtFinDepi + β2PCctTangi + enict.
The regression includes sector-pair-time fixed effects, αnit, which
control for all unobserved (time-varying) heterogeneity in technologi-
cal requirements across pairs of sectors. It also includes a full set of
downstream-sector-country-time dummies, αnct, which control for all
unobserved (time-varying) heterogeneity in the demand of interme-
diate inputs. Finally, it includes the sector-pair-country fixed effects,
αnic, which account for all unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity
in the supply and demand of intermediate goods. I am interesting in
28 Recent researches may help alleviate this concern. Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson
(2014) find that roughly one-half of upstream establishments report no shipments
to downstream establishments within the same firm. Ramondoa, Rappoport, and
Ruhl (2016) find that the input-output coefficient linking the parent’s and affiliate’s
industry of operation is unrelated to a corresponding intrafirm flow of goods.
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Table 1.5: Robustness: Service intermediates only
Dependent variable: ln (Xnic/Xnc)
(1) (2)
PCcExtFinDepi 0.00305∗∗∗ 0.00362∗∗∗
(0.000841) (0.000839)
PCcTangi -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗
(0.00374) (0.00458)
Contract interaction 0.0116
(0.00763)
Skill interaction 0.0558∗∗∗
(0.0145)
Capital interaction -0.0115∗∗
(0.00484)
Downstream-country FE αnc Yes Yes
Sector-pair FE αni Yes Yes
N 57330 52920
R2 0.297 0.304
Notes: The sample includes the service intermediates purchased by all downstream
sectors in all countries for the year 2007. The dependent variable is the share of
intermediate purchases in gross output specific to sector-pair ni in country c. PCc is
an index for financial development, referring to the private credit to GDP ratio in
country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of external-finance dependence of upstream
sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateralizability of upstream sector i, defined as the
share of tangible assets in total assets. In column 2, contract (skill/capital) interaction
is the interaction between contract enforcement cost (skill/capital intensity) of country
c and contract intensity of upstream sector i. Resource interaction is omitted due
to lack of variation in resource intensity across upstream service sectors. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the country level.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: Robustness: Time Variation
Dependent variable: ln (Xnict/Xnct)
(1) (2) (3)
PCctExtFinDepi 0.000368∗∗∗ 0.000405∗∗∗ 0.000607∗∗∗
(0.000113) (0.000106) (0.000211)
PCctTangi -0.00380∗ -0.00375∗ -0.00593∗
(0.00223) (0.00221) (0.00316)
Downstream-country-time FE αnct Yes Yes Yes
Sector-pair-time FE αnit Yes Yes Yes
Sector-pair-country FE αnic Yes Yes Yes
N 412930 401132 170030
R2 0.964 0.961 0.962
Notes: The sample includes the intermediates purchased by all downstream sectors
from all upstream sectors in all countries for the year 2004, 2007, and 2011. The
dependent variable is the share of intermediate purchases in gross output specific
to sector-pair ni in country c. PCc is an index for financial development, referring to
the private credit to GDP ratio in country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of external-
finance dependence of upstream sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateralizability
of upstream sector i, defined as the share of tangible assets in total assets. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the upstream sector
and country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
the residual variation that captures sector-pair-specific supply hetero-
geneity over time. The interaction terms measure the differentiated
response to changes in credit supply across upstream sectors. In all the
regressions, I adjust the standard errors for clustering at the upstream
sector and country level to account for the fact that the intermediate
purchase Xnict/Xnct is constant for an upstream-sector-country-time
triplet.
Table 1.6 spells out the results. Column (1) presents the baseline
results based on the full sample. As in the cross-section regressions,
firms tend to source more inputs from financially dependent sectors
as credit become more abundant; they tend to source less inputs from
sectors with more tangible assets at the same time. The difference is
that, the cross-section regressions control for observable characteristic
at the upstream sector and country level. One may concern that the
set of covariates do not exhaust all sources of variation that may
be relevant to firms’ sourcing decisions. Here, the panel regressions
alleviate the concern by accounting for all unobservable characteristics
at the upstream sector and country level. The next two columns
show that the baseline results are robust with regard to (a) excluding
intermediate purchases from within the sector (column 2), and (b)
restricting the sample to service intermediate inputs (column 3).29
29 Due to data constraints, I do not exploit the variation in domestic intermediate
purchases. The reason is that the underlying domestic input-output tables are the
same across years. These input-output tables are updated to incorporate information
mainly from the international trade data sets. Hence, variation in domestic input
purchases over time most likely reflects the adjustment processes based on trade
changes.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Depth of credit information
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The pattern of coefficients is also similar, with the coefficients for
asset tangibility greater than those for external financial dependence.
Moreover, restricting to service inputs almost doubles the interaction
effects in the baseline results. The results reassure me that focusing on
cross-section regressions is without loss of generality.
1.3.3.5 Alternative measure of financial development
The measure of financial development has been used extensively in
the previous literature, but one may (rightly) worry whether private
credit captures the aspect of financial development appropriately. The
prosperity of credit markets certainly depends on the quality of other
aspects of institutions, such as the quality of laws, and the effective-
ness of corporate governance. As an imperfect attempt to address
this concern, I use an index of the depth of credit information from
the World Bank Doing Business survey as an alternative measure for
financial development. This index measures the scope and accessibil-
ity of credit information available through credit reporting service
providers such as credit bureaus or credit registries. It ranges from 0 to
6, with 6 indicating the greatest accessibility. Unlike private credit, the
accessibility of credit information is a direct measure of the strength
of financial markets. It therefore helps relieve the concern that private
credit may pick up the quality of other institutions.
Figure 1.3a shows the distribution of this index in 2007 for the
subset of countries in the sample. It shows that apart from a group
of underdeveloped countries, the distribution is slightly skewed to
the right. The depth of credit information is also statistically highly
correlated with the depth of private credit (coefficient is 0.103 and is
significant at less than 1% level). Meanwhile, Figure 1.3b shows the
distribution of (absolute) changes in the index over the decade 2005-
2014. The figure shows that the depth of credit information is relatively
stable over time. About 45 percent of countries have no changes at all
over a decade. Furthermore, about 70 percent of countries maintain
their values within a band of 3 levels. This is more stable than the
private credit which changes frequently year by year. The stability of
this index means that it is likely to capture the long run development
of financial markets.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
1.3 sector-level evidence 28
Table 1.7: Robustness: Credit Information
Dependent variable: ln (Xnic/Xnc)
(1) (2)
HighCIcExtFinDepi 0.00245∗∗∗ 0.00241∗∗∗
(0.000450) (0.000455)
HighCIcTangi -0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0100∗∗∗
(0.00313) (0.00378)
Contract interaction 0.0102
(0.00850)
Skill interaction 0.0359∗∗∗
(0.00829)
Capital interaction -0.00360
(0.00367)
Resource interaction 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00628)
Downstream-country FE αnc Yes Yes
Sector-pair FE αni Yes Yes
N 135660 129710
R2 0.445 0.450
Notes: The sample includes the intermediates purchased by all downstream sectors
from all upstream sectors in all countries for the year 2007. The dependent variable
is the share of intermediate purchases in gross output specific to sector-pair ni in
country c. HighCIc is a dummy for financial development, indicating that there is a
high level of credit information available in country c. ExtFinDepi is the intensity of
external-finance dependence of upstream sector i. Tangi is a proxy for the collateral-
izability of upstream sector i, defined as the share of tangible assets in total assets.
In column 2, contract (skill/capital/resource) interaction is the interaction between
contract enforcement cost (skill/capital/resource intensity) of country c and contract
intensity of upstream sector i. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for
correlation at the country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
To exploit the variation in credit information, I divide countries into
two groups by the median of credit information index: a group with
high credit information and the other with low credit information. I
then examine the main prediction with the following specification:
Xnic
Xnc
= αni + αnc + β1HighCIcExtFinDepi + β2HighCIcTangi +Zicγ+ enic.
Here, HighCIc is a dummy indicating that there is a high level of credit
information available in country c. As in the baseline regressions, αni is
a sector-pair fixed effect, αnc is a downstream-country fixed effect, and
Zic is a vector of additional interaction terms of country and industry
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to
account for potential correlation of errors at various levels within the
country.
Table 1.7 reports the results. The results confirm that more credit in-
formation encourages more outsourcing, especially when the supplier
sector is highly dependent on external finance or have fewer tangible
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assets. Moreover, the magnitudes of these coefficients are greater than
their counterparts in the baseline regressions. This is consistent with
the view that private credit is an imperfect proxy for financial devel-
opment, and the associated measurement errors lead to attenuation
bias in the baseline regressions. Nonetheless, the consistent results
reassure me that private credit, while imperfect, is a reasonably good
proxy for financial development.
In summary, I have showed that the prediction of the model is con-
sistent with the sector-level data. Specifically, financial development
has differential effects on outsourcing depending on the characteristics
of upstream sectors. When upstream suppliers are more dependent
on external finance, financial development induces more firms to
engage in outsourcing. Conversely, when suppliers have more collat-
eralizable assets, financial development induces more firms to switch
to integration. These patterns are consistent with the reduced-form
evidence.
1.4 firm-level evidence
The main testable implication of the model is that financial develop-
ment increases outsourcing, especially when the supplier is highly
dependent on external finance and has fewer tangible assets. The in-
teraction effects have been confirmed by cross-country sectoral input-
output data. In this section, I further provide firm-level evidence on
the impact of credit supply shocks on firms’ sourcing decisions in the
United Kingdom. My aim is to examine the impact of the contraction
in credit supply following the 2008 financial crisis on the intensity of
outsourcing of UK firms. For this purpose, I employ the difference-
in-difference approach and exploit the financial crisis as a source of
exogenous variation in credit supply of banks.
1.4.1 Data
The core firm-level dataset is the Orbis database provided by Bureau
van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD). The Orbis database provides
information on firms’ financial and productive activities from balance
sheets and income statements for over 200 million companies across
more than 100 countries and regions. One of the advantages of Orbis
is therefore the inclusion of a wide set of countries at different levels
of development. Nonetheless, the purpose here is not to conduct a full
cross-country firm-level study, but to assess the validity of the novel
channel proposed in this paper. For this purpose, I focus on UK firms
for the period of 2007-2011. I exploit the recent financial crisis as a
source of exogenous credit variation, and examine how firms’ input
sourcing decisions respond to changes in credit supply.
The unit of observation in Orbis is the firm, for which Orbis reports
one or more financial statements. Most of the large firms report either
consolidated accounts or unconsolidated accounts, although some
firms report both. To avoid double counting, I restrict the sample
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to firms reporting unconsolidated accounts. I first calculate a firm’s
value added as the sum of net income, taxation, cost of employees,
depreciation, and interest paid. Following the IO literature, I then
calculate the measure of outsourced inputs as one minus the share
of value-added in operating revenue. Finally, I exclude (outlier) firms
whose measure of outsourcing fall outside the unit interval. This leaves
me with 231,965 distinct firms in the sample. The summary statistics
for all variables are reported in Table 1.8.
The Orbis database provides information on the 4-digit NAICS
code of the firm’s primary industry. To determine which upstream
industries are important for the firm, I combine the above with infor-
mation from U.S. Input-Output (IO) Tables. The IO data are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). I use the Use of Commodities
by Industries after Redefinitions 2007 (Purchasers’ Prices) tables. To
the extent that U.S. financial markets are highly developed, the U.S.
IO tables should be informative about input flows across industries
driven by technological requirements. Using the U.S. IO tables also
helps alleviate the concern that input-output tables are endogenously
determined by financial development, as predicted in my model. The
2007 IO accounts provide a level of industry detail at the 6-digit IO
industry codes, with a total of 389 IO industries. The BEA provides a
concordance from IO industries to 2007 NAICS codes. Readers familiar
with these tables will be aware that the concordance is not one-to-one.
However, by aggregating the IO industries to 4-digit level, I was able
to develop a many-to-one concordance from 4-digit NAICS codes to
4-digit IO codes.30 This concordance maps 305 NAICS into 199 IO
industries. It will be used in subsequent analysis.
To measure the financial characteristics of the industries, I use the
Compustat database as explained in the main text. Besides the 4-digit
SIC codes, Compustat also provides information on the 4-digit NAICS
code of the firm’s primary industry, which will be used in the current
analysis. As before, each industry’s external financial dependence and
tangibility is calculated as the median of all U.S. based firms in the
industry, as contained in Compustat’s annual Fundamental Annual
files for the period from 1997 – 2006. External financial dependence is
defined as the investment needs that could not be met by cash flows
from operations. Tangibility is defined as the share of net property,
plant, and equipment in the book value of assets. With the data
explained above, I can identify the primary NAICS industry for each
firm in Orbis, along with its upstream NAICS industries, and the
financial characteristics of these upstream industries. This information
provides the basis for the subsequent analysis.
30 The only exception is two IO industries (23 Construction, 531 Real Estates), which
cannot be disaggregated to 4-digit level. Hence I keep these two IO industries at
2-digit and 3-digit level respectively. The correspondence is available upon request.
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics for firm-level regression variables
Mean Median S.D. Min Max N
Firm-level Variables
Log Net income 10.240 10.246 2.450 0.000 22.800 536,005
Log Taxation 9.165 9.070 2.438 0.000 22.065 424,478
Log Costs of employees 12.333 12.502 2.741 0.000 22.335 260,087
Log Depreciation 8.815 8.469 2.771 0.000 20.950 448,784
Log Interest paid 8.775 8.815 3.331 0.000 21.090 251,041
Log Value added 11.143 10.889 2.825 0.000 22.929 625,755
Log Operating revenue 12.581 12.114 2.638 0.000 25.289 626,941
Outsourcing 0.618 0.674 0.283 0.000 1.000 626,941
Industry-level Variables
External financial dependence 0.139 -0.074 1.345 -3.254 9.061 172
Asset tangibility 0.312 0.271 0.198 0.003 0.866 172
Ave External financial dependence -0.321 -0.238 0.439 -2.004 1.158 178
Ave Tangibility 0.268 0.281 0.114 0.046 0.532 178
Ave Number of firms 1,894 1,909 1,444 189 5,943 890
Notes: All firm-level variables are obtained from the Orbis UK database by Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). Net income, taxation, costs of employees, depreciation, interest paid,
and operating revenue are reported in the profit and loss statement of the firm. Value
added is defined as the sum of net income, taxation, costs of employees, depreciation,
and interest paid. Outsourcing is defined as unity minus the share of value-added
in operating revenue. Industry level variables are obtained from the Compustat’s
annual Fundamental Annual files for the period from 1997 – 2006. External financial
dependence is defined as the investment needs that could not be met by cash flows
from operations. Cash flow from operations is broadly defined as cash flow from
operations, plus decreases in inventory, decreases in account receivables, and increases
in account payables. Investment need is broadly defined capital expenditures, plus
increases in investment and acquisitions. Tangibility is defined as the share of net
property, plant, and equipment in the book value of assets. Average external financial
dependence is defined as a simple average of the external financial dependence
of the top 10 upstream industries, as ranked by input flows according to the 2007
U.S. Input-Output (IO) tables. Similarly, average tangibility and average number of
suppliers are defined as simple averages of the asset tangibility and the number of
suppliers of the top 10 upstream industries. All industry-level measures except for
the average number of suppliers are time-invariant.
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1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
Having explained the data, I turn now to the empirical strategy. The
aim is to examine whether UK firms actively adjust sourcing decisions
in response to changes in credit supply. For this purpose, I use the
difference-in-difference framework and exploit the latest financial
crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the credit supply of banks.
The UK is particularly suitable for the study, because it is heavily
dependent on banks and it suffered a relatively large credit shock.
Unlike the United States, UK firms are highly dependent on banks as
a source of external finance. Bank loans account for about two-thirds
of the corporate debt in the UK, as compared to about one-quarter
in the US. The reason is that the vast majority of UK firms are small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).31 Lending to SMEs is generally
riskier as they are often young businesses and are less transparent due
to low reporting requirements. Banks, therefore, have a comparative
advantage over equity markets in screening and monitoring the bor-
rowers. It is typical that only large firms have access to equity markets
while SMEs primarily rely on bank financing.32 Since the model of
this paper focuses on debt financing, it provides a more appropriate
account for an economy that principally relies on bank financing.
Furthermore, UK banks were hit hard following the financial crisis.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was intense pressure on UK
banks to recapitalise. The major four banks – Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds
Banking Group (LBG), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) – had
started to issue equity in order to improve their capital positions,
which they did not need to do before and after the crisis. As a result of
the financial stress, banks started to cut back on lending. The corporate
lending fell accordingly, by 20 percent between 2007 and 2008, after
it had been growing at an average rate of roughly 10% a year in the
previous decade. The contraction of credit supply is also apparent
at the aggregate level. Figure 1.4 plots the stock of private credit (as
a share of GDP) in the UK during the last six decades. The stock of
private credit had been growing steadily until 2008, reaching a peak
in 2009, and has been declining at an average rate of about 10% a
year ever since.33 The credit supply shock should be large enough to
incentivise the firms to revise their sourcing strategies.
In Appendix A.2.3, I develop a variant of the baseline model, in
which the firm chooses the intensity of outsourcing. One testable im-
plication of the model is that firms adjust their sourcing decisions
according to the abundance of credit supply. After the financial cri-
sis, when credit became scarcer, firms that source from industries
which are more reliant on external finance should lower the inten-
31 According to the Business Population Estimates 2013, at the start of 2013 there were
4.9 million SMEs forming 99.9 percent of all private sector firms, accounting for about
60 percent of private sector employment and nearly a half of private sector turnover.
32 According to a 2012 Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) report, half
of all SMEs have used financial institutions to obtain finance, while less than one
percent of all SMEs have used equity finance (Schans 2012).
33 The delay of the peak is because private credit is a stock, which reflects both the
repayment of old debts and the issuance of new debts.
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Figure 1.4: Time series of private credit as a share of GDP for the UK
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sity of outsourcing, whilst firms that source from industries which
are equipped with more collateralizable assets should increase the
intensity of outsourcing. I test these predictions with the following
specification:
Outsourcingjnt = β1Postt AveExtFinDepn + β2Postt AveTangn +Xjntγ+ αj + αt + ejnt
Here, Outsourcingjnt is the outsourcing intensity of firm j from in-
dustry n in year t, Postt is a dummy that switches on after the 2008
financial crisis. AveExtFinDepn is a simple average of the external
financial dependence of the top 10 upstream industries excluding
the industry in which the firm operates. This covariate measures,
on average, how much the suppliers of the firm rely on external fi-
nance. I use a simple average instead of a weighted mean to avoid
this measure being cofounded by technological requirements. I further
exclude the industry of the firm to ensure this measure reflects the
financial characteristics of the suppliers but not those of the firm. The
firm’s financial characteristics are included separately in the vector
of covariates instead. Analogously I construct the measure AveTangn
as a simple average of the asset tangibility of the top 10 upstream
industries excluding the industry of the firm. The covariate vector
Xjnt includes the average number of suppliers in the top 10 upstream
industries, and the financial characteristics of the firm. The average
number of suppliers is a simple average of the numbers of suppliers
in the top 10 upstream industries excluding the industry of the firm.
The financial characteristics of the firm includes its external financial
dependence and asset tangibility. The summary statistics for these
measures are reported in Table 1.8.
As in the classic difference-in-difference framework, the baseline
specification includes a firm fixed effect and a time fixed effect. The
former fixed effect accounts for any time-invariant, unobservable
characteristics of the firm. The latter fixed effect controls any supply
and demand shocks that are common to all firms. To account for
potential correlation of the shocks within the same industry, standard
errors are clustered at the industry level.
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Table 1.9: Baseline firm-level results
Dependent variable: Outsourcingjnt
(1) All firms (2) Balanced panel
Postt AveExtFinDepn -0.00990∗∗ -0.0109∗∗
(0.00459) (0.00454)
Postt AveTangn 0.0753∗∗ 0.0789∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0307)
Firm FE αj Yes Yes
Year FE αt Yes Yes
N 609,019 222,545
R2 0.861 0.849
Notes: In column 1, the sample includes all active UK firms as reported in the Orbis
database for the period of 2007 – 2011. In column 2, the sample is restricted to firms
who stay active in the whole period from 2007 to 2011. The dependent variable is
the measure of outsourcing, as defined as unity minus the share of value-added in
operating revenue. Postt is a dummy indicating the post-crisis period 2009 – 2011.
AveExtFinDepn is a simple average of the external financial dependence of the top
10 upstream industries of industry n. AveTangn is a simple average of the external
financial dependence of the top 10 upstream industries of industry n. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the industry level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
1.4.3 Results
Table 1.9 sets out the baseline results, for both the unbalanced and
balanced sample. Column (1) reports the results for the full sample.
The OLS estimate of the first interaction term (between post and the
average external financial dependence) is negative and statistically
significant. This implies that as credit became scarcer following the
financial crisis, firms with more external-finance dependent suppliers
engage less in outsourcing. The OLS coefficient of the second interac-
tion term (between post and the average asset tangibility) is positive
and statistically significant, telling us that firms whose suppliers are
equipped with more tangible assets engage more in outsourcing when
credit supply is tightened. The coefficients of interest (the two interac-
tion terms) have the correct signs as predicted by the model, and both
are estimated precisely. This reassures me that the proposed channel
is indeed at work. An outstanding question is whether the results are
driven by firm entry and exit, or by incumbent firms who actively ad-
just their sourcing strategy in response to a change in credit supply. To
examine this, I construct a balanced panel which consists of the firms
that report the variables of interests in all years. Column (2) reports
the results for the balanced sample. The coefficients have the same
signs and similar magnitudes as those for the unbalanced sample.
This implies that incumbent firms have indeed actively adjusted their
outsourcing intensity in response to the contraction of credit supply
following the 2008 financial crisis.
Table 1.10 reports the results with additional covariates. The co-
variates are motivated as follows. In the model, I have made two
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simplifying assumptions. First, financial frictions apply only to the
suppliers but not to the firms. This assumption allows me to focus
on the main mechanism of the model while remaining agnostic about
the effect of financial frictions on the firm. Would the contraction of
credit supply directly affect firms’ sourcing capability? Column (1)
examines this possibility by examining the interaction term between
post and the financial characteristics of the firm. The coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable from zero. At first sight, this may seem
surprising; why do financial frictions have no effect on firms’ sourcing
capability? Upon reflection, however, there are at least two reasons as
to why this is the case. First, the dependent variable is the share of
outsourcing instead of the level of outsourced activities. As long as
the firms do not systematically drop products whose inputs are more
suitable for outsourcing, there is no obvious reason to believe that the
credit shortage directly affects the intensity of outsourcing. Second,
previous literature has found that credit supply has an insignificant
effect on outsourcing.34 The reason, as the authors argued, is that fi-
nancial development has opposite effects on outsourcing. More credit
supply may allow for more suppliers to enter the market, thereby in-
creasing the probability of the firm to engage in outsourcing. However,
to the extent that mergers and acquisitions require external finance,
more credit supply also makes vertical integration more possible. The
insignificance of coefficients here echoes the findings of the previous
literature.
Another simplifying assumption is that there is a large pool of
potential suppliers. The firm can always match with one supplier
should it want to do so. In reality, however, the number of suppliers
may affect the outcome of outsourcing as well. All else equal, the
probability of finding a suitable match should be higher when the
number of potential suppliers increases, and so does the intensity
of outsourcing. Column (2) explores this possibility. Since I do not
observe the number of potential suppliers, I use the actual number
of suppliers as a proxy for it.35 To arrive at a metric at the firm level,
I calculate the average number of suppliers in the top 10 industries
of the firm. The regression then examines the impact of the average
number of suppliers on the intensity of outsourcing. As expected,
more suppliers are indeed associated with a higher probability of
outsourcing.
Column (3) incorporates the additional covariates into the baseline
regression. It shows that the interaction terms of interest preserve the
right signs and remain statistically significant. The magnitudes of the
coefficients are similar to those in the baseline results. This reassures
me that the baseline results are not affected by the inclusion of addi-
tional covariates. Interestingly, the coefficient of the average number of
34 See, for instance, Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and Mitton (2009) found that the interaction
between financial development and firms’ external-finance dependence is not robustly
significant across different specifications. Macchiavello (2012) found that the interac-
tion term is not significant unless industry heterogeneity in firm size distribution is
taken into account.
35 In theory, the actual number of suppliers is proportional to the number of potential
suppliers (entrants).
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Table 1.10: Additional firm-level results
Dependent variable: Outsourcingjnt
All firms Balanced panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Postt AveExtFinDepn -0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
(0.00404) (0.00394)
Postt AveTangn 0.0680∗∗ 0.0742∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0331)
PosttExtFinDepn -0.00207 -0.000785 -0.00101
(0.00258) (0.00195) (0.00182)
PosttTangn 0.0154 0.00424 0.00703
(0.0117) (0.00824) (0.00669)
Ave#Suppliersnt 0.0000169∗∗∗ 0.00000673 0.00000162
(0.00000640) (0.00000804) (0.00000738)
Firm FE αj Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE αt Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 570,937 609,019 570,937 215,650
R2 0.863 0.861 0.864 0.850
Notes: In column 1-3, the sample includes all active UK firms as reported in the
Orbis database for the period of 2007 – 2011. In column 4, the sample is restricted
to firms who stay active in the whole period from 2007 to 2011. The dependent
variable is the measure of outsourcing, as defined as unity minus the share of value-
added in operating revenue. Postt is a dummy indicating the post-crisis period 2009
– 2011. AveExtFinDepn is a simple average of the external financial dependence
of the top 10 upstream industries of industry n. AveTangn is a simple average of
the external financial dependence of the top 10 upstream industries of industry n.
ExtFinDepn is the measure of external financial dependence for the industry to which
the firm belong. Tangn is the measure of asset tangibility for the industry of the firm.
Ave#Suppliersnt is the average number of suppliers in the top 10 upstream industries
of industry n. All industry-level measures except for the average number of suppliers
are time-invariant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation
at the industry level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
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suppliers becomes insignificant. The loss of significance suggests that
it may be appropriate to maintain the assumption of a perfectly elastic
supply of potential sub-contractors. The reason is as follows. The
contraction of credit supply may have shifted the (horizontal) supply
curve upwards, leading to a smaller number of suppliers observed in
equilibrium. However, once the factors shifting the supply curve (the
interaction terms of interest) have been accounted for, the equilibrium
number of suppliers yields no additional information, and therefore
becomes insignificant. Column (4) shows the OLS estimates for the
balanced sample. The results are broadly similar. The coefficients of
interest are of similar magnitudes as those for the unbalanced sample,
and they remain highly statistically significant. When used on its
own, the number of average suppliers is positively and statistically
significant (not shown); however, it becomes insignificant when a full
set of covariates is included. Finally, the interaction terms between
post and the financial characteristics of the firm remain statistically
insignificant.
In brief, I have confronted the input-level model with firm-level data
from Orbis. I have employed the difference-in-difference approach and
exploited the recent financial crisis as a source of exogenous variation
in credit supply. The results of reduced-form regressions broadly
confirmed the predictions of my model. Taken together, the reduced-
form evidence supports the hypothesis that firms actively revise their
sourcing strategies in response to a change in credit supply. We can
therefore rely on the model to answer policy questions. Since theory
predicts that organizational changes have an impact on aggregate
productivity, a natural question then is: how big is the impact? To
answer this question, I turn to counterfactual experiments in the
following section.
1.5 quantitative analysis
Financial development has an impact on aggregate productivity through
outsourcing. This section utilizes the model to answer the question:
how much? Specifically, how much do countries benefit from setting
their financial development to the U.S. level? The purpose of this exer-
cise is to quantify the impact of financial development on aggregate
productivity while focusing exclusively on the outsourcing channel.
I proceed as follows. First, I outline a procedure to estimate model
parameters. I then discuss the design of a counterfactual experiment.
Next, I present the results from the estimation and the experiment.
Finally, I discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis.
1.5.1 Estimation
Before explaining the estimation procedure, I need to specify how the
parameters vary according to country and sector. I assume that the
preference parameter α, the firm’s bargaining power β, (the inverse of)
productivity dispersion θ, and cost disadvantages of integration c and
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fV/ f are country and sector independent. The intermediate demand
parameter γni is independent of the country. The overhead cost fn
and fixed entry cost f en depend on the sector but not on the country.
The sector composition parameter θnc, and the location parameter of
productivity distribution bnc are both country and sector dependent.
The estimation procedure can now be described. The share of inter-
mediate purchases conveys valuable information on outsourcing. It
is therefore the natural starting point for estimation. With the nested
CES preference, the model admits a simple expression for the share of
intermediate purchases:
Xnic
Xnc
= γni (1− σRnic) .
Here, γni is the aggregate demand for sector-pair ni intermediate
goods, and σRnic is the share of demand captured by integrating firms.
The expression for σRnic is given by:36
σRnic =
[
ψV − ψOic
ψOic
fOnic
fVn − fOnic
]θ(1−α)/α−1
.
These closed-form expressions serve as the basis for estimation.
My estimation strategy involves two stages. First, I need to obtain
estimates of the demand parameter γni and the revenue share of
integrating firms σRnic. Second, using the estimates of revenue share, I
obtain estimates of the structural parameters of the model.
I now turn to the first stage estimation. In light of the multiplicative
form, I use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PML) estimator
as proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). To ensure the revenue shares
fall into the unit interval, I assume it can be approximated by an
inverse logit function. The inverse logit function takes two arguments:
the upstream-sector-country fixed effect αic and the downstream-sector
fixed effect αn. Taking these together gives the following conditional
mean:
E (Xnic/Xnc|data) = γni 11+ exp (αic + αn) .
To maintain the Cobb-Douglas assumption, I estimate this conditional
mean function with restrictions ∑i γni = 1 for all n.
In the second stage, I estimate the structural parameters of the
model from the first-step estimates σˆRnic. To keep the estimation work
transparent, I calibrate some of the parameters and estimate the rest
of them. I set the elasticity of substitution between firm products
to 1/ (1− α) = 3.5. Estimates of the substitutability of competing
products typically range from three to ten. These estimates are based
on industry level products. Since the model concerns sector level
products, an elasticity of substitution of 3.5 seems appropriate. Later,
I consider higher values for 1/ (1− α) as robustness checks. I set the
36 The expression for the profitability of outsourcing is ψOic = β+
(1−α)(1−β)
1+δi( 1−λcλc )
, and for
the fixed cost of outsourcing is fOnic = fn − (
1−λc
λc )µi
1+δi( 1−λcλc )
f en.
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bargaining power of the firm to β = 0.5. I have in mind the null
hypothesis that neither party has an advantage in negotiations under
outsourcing. I also set the fixed cost disadvantage for integration to
fV/ f = 1.2. This means that integration requires 20 percent more of
overhead costs. Since existing literature provides little guidance on
how these two parameters should be calibrated, I choose their values
conservatively. Later, I experiment with different values for these two
parameters as sensitivity checks.
The calibration leaves me with two main parameters: the produc-
tivity dispersion θ and the marginal cost disadvantage of integration
c. I obtain estimates of these parameters using another Poisson PML
estimator with the conditional mean:
E (σˆRnic|data) =
[(
b1
1+ x1,ic
− 1
)(
b2
1− x2,icαn − 1
)−1]b3
.
Here, the constant b1 contains parameter c, b2 equals the fixed cost
disadvantage, and b3 contains parameter θ. The downstream-sector
fixed effect αn also requires estimation. The independent variables
x1,ic and x2,ic are constructed from the share of private credit to GDP,
and the two industry measures of external financial dependence and
asset tangibility.37 This completes the description of the estimation
procedure.
1.5.2 Counterfactual Experiment
The purpose of this experiment is to compare the aggregate produc-
tivity of a country c at the current level of financial development,
TFPc, and at the hypothetical level of financial development, ˇTFPc.
Aggregate productivity gain is defined as
( ˇTFPc/TFPc − 1) × 100.
The hypothetical level of financial development is the current U.S.
level of financial development.
To calculate productivity gains, I proceed as follows. For each sector
pair, I calculate the ratio of hypothetical sector TFP (1.5) to actual
sector TFP, and the levels of hypothetical sector TFPR (1.4) and actual
sector TFPR, and then aggregate these values across sector pairs using
the Cobb-Douglas aggregators:
ˇTFPc
TFPc
=
N
∏
n,i=1
( ˇTFPnic
TFPnic
· ˇTFPRc/ ˇTFPRnic
TFPRc/TFPRnic
)θncγni
,
where TFPRc =
[
∑Nm,k=1 θmcγmk/TFPRmkc
]−1
is the aggregate TFPR.
37 The expressions for the constants are b1 =
(
1−α
β
)
(c (1− β))− α1−α , b2 = fVn/ fn, and
b3 =
θ(1−α)
α − 1. The expression for the fixed cost is αn = f en/ fn. The expressions for
the two independent variables are x1,ic =
(1−α)(1−β)
β
(
1+ δi
(
1−λc
λc
))−1
and x2,ic =
µi
(
1−λc
λc
) (
1+ δi
(
1−λc
λc
))−1
. The variable λc corresponds to the share of domestic
credit to private sector to GDP. The variables δi and µi correspond to the industry
measures of external financial dependence and asset tangibility. I rescale λc and δi to
unit interval range by logit transformations.
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The productivity gains can be decomposed as follows. Recall that
financial development has dual effects on aggregate productivity. The
first term of the preceding equation refers to the direct effect of fi-
nancial development on sector TFP. The second term represents the
indirect effect of financial development through the reallocation of
resources across sectors. Using the identify TFPnic = TFPRnic/Pnic,
I further decompose the direct TFP effect into two components: the
effect on sector revenue productivity and the effect on sector price.
For the impact on sector price, the most important component is the
effect of financial development on the entry of firms, which reflects the
reallocation of resources within sectors. I will report the counterfactual
productivity gain, along with its decomposition as outlined above.38
1.5.3 Results
Having explained the estimation procedure and experimental design, I
now present the results in order. The first step estimation recovers the
share of outsourcing from data using a Poisson PML estimator. Since
this step involves only fixed effects, I therefore report the predicted
values for the share of outsourcing. The summary statistics of the
predicted shares are given in Table 1.11. It shows that the average
sector purchases about 60 percent of inputs from upstream suppliers.
The distribution of the shares is slightly skewed to the right, with
the median slightly higher than the mean. Furthermore, it is worth
mentioning that the R-squared (0.568) is higher than the reduced-form
regressions. This means the Poisson estimator performs better than
OLS in capturing systematic variations.
The second step estimation backs out key parameters (productivity
dispersion, cost disadvantage of integration) from the predicted values
for the share of outsourcing. Table 1.12 reports the results. The point
estimate for the productivity dispersion θ is 4.678. This parameter is
comparable to the trade elasticity in the international trade literature.
Estimates of elasticities of trade in this literature typically range from
three to eight. The estimate of θ falls well within this range. The point
estimate for the cost disadvantage of integration is 1.427, implying
that integration is about 40 percent less cost efficient than outsourcing.
Both point estimates are statistically highly significant.
With these point estimates, I can now perform counterfactual cal-
culations. The summary statistics for the counterfactual variables are
given in Table 1.11. Figure 1.5a shows the percentage change in the
prevalence of outsourcing. From the diagram, it is clear that the preva-
lence of outsourcing increases in the vast majority of sectors. The
average increase of outsourcing is 13 percentage points, bringing up
38 The direct TFP effect is defined as
( ˇDTFPc/DTFPc − 1) × 100, where
ˇDTFPc
DTFPc = ∏
N
n,i=1
(
ˇTFPnic
TFPnic
)θncγni
. The indirect effect through resource realloca-
tion across sectors is defined as
( ˇIDTFPc/IDTFPc − 1) × 100, where ˇIDTFPcIDTFPc =
∏Nn,i=1
(
ˇTFPRc/ ˇTFPRnic
TFPRc/TFPRnic
)θncγni
. The revenue productivity and price effect can be de-
fined analogously by noting that TFPnic = TFPRnic/Pnic. The entry effect is defined
similarly by noting Pnic ∝
(
Menic
)−α/(1−α).
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Table 1.11: Summary statistics for estimation and counterfactuals
Mean Median S.D. Min Max N
First stage
Prevalence of outsourcing 0.613 0.639 0.297 0.000 1.000 135,252
Second Stage
Change in outsourcing (p.p.) 13.079 11.836 8.737 -8.191 46.712 135,252
Change in mass of entrants (%) 9.060 9.420 4.423 -0.100 18.891 135,252
Change in sector price (%) -0.585 -0.632 1.069 -2.159 17.460 135,252
Change in sector TFP (%) 0.274 0.306 1.134 -16.464 2.255 135,252
Aggregate productivity gain (%) 0.276 0.317 0.273 -1.163 0.789 117
Decomposition of productivity gains
TFP effect (%) 0.276 0.317 0.273 -1.164 0.788 117
Reallocation effect (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 117
Price effect (%) 0.592 0.607 0.304 -0.569 1.162 117
TFPR effect (%) -0.314 -0.350 0.110 -0.598 0.000 117
Entry effect (%) 1.832 2.086 0.653 0.000 2.633 117
Notes: All variables are estimated/inferred using the GTAP 9 database with reference
year 2007. Prevalence of outsourcing refers to predicted value for the revenue share of
integrating firms from the first stage estimation. Values are reported for each pair of
sectors and each country. Change in outsourcing, mass of entrant/sector price/sector
TFP, and aggregate productivity gains are inferred from the second stage estimation.
Change in mass of entrants is the percentage change of the mass of entrants for each
pair of sector after setting financial development to the U.S. level for all countries.
Analogously, change in sector price (TFP) is the percentage change of the sector price
index (TFP) for each pair of sectors after setting financial development to the U.S.
level. Aggregate productivity gain is defined as the percentage change of productivity
for each country when switching to the U.S. level of financial development. Aggregate
productivity gains can be decomposed into two components: the direct TFP effect
and the indirect effect through resource reallocation across sectors. The direct TFP
effect can be further decomposed into two effects: the effect on revenue productivity
and the effect on sector price. The effect on sector price can be decomposed into
three components: entry effect, the effect on surviving probability, and the effect on
the composition of organizational forms. The most important component (the entry
effect) is reported here.
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Table 1.12: Baseline result of second step estimation
Dependent variable: σˆRnic
(1)
Productivity dispersion θ 4.678∗∗∗
(0.0567)
Cost disadvantage c 1.427∗∗∗
(.000977)
Downstream FE αn Yes
N 135252
R2 0.0242
Notes: The sample includes the prevalence of integration for all pair of sectors in all
countries for the year 2007. The dependent variable is the prevalence of integration
specific to sector pair ni and country c, as obtained from the first stage estimation.
Productivity dispersion θ refers to (the inverse of) the dispersion of productivity
drawn from the Pareto distribution. Cost disadvantage c refers to the higher marginal
cost for integration as compared to the unity marginal cost for outsourcing. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for correlation at the country level.
***p<0.01, **p<0.5, and *p<0.1.
the mean of outsourcing from about 60 to more than 70 percentage
points. This is consistent with the prediction in Proposition 1.1. Of spe-
cial interest is the change in the mass of entrants. Figure 1.5b shows
that the mass of entrants increases in all but a few sectors (pairs).
The average sector attracts 9 percent more entrants. The reason is
that outsourcing requires fewer labor resources, freeing up labor for
the creation of new firms. This is consistent with the prediction in
Proposition 1.2.
How do sector prices respond to the increase in financial develop-
ment? Figure 1.5c plots the distribution of percentage changes in sector
price. As expected, price rises and falls coexist. The assumed reason
for price rises is that integration is more profitable. Integrating firms
can generate more profits by charging lower markups and lower prices.
Financial development induces integrating firms to switch to outsourc-
ing, thereby causing sector prices to rise. The reason for price falls is
that outsourcing is more cost efficient. It allows more resources to be
devoted to the creation of new products. More products mean lower
sector prices. Although price rises and falls occur at the same time,
they are not evenly distributed. Prices fall in about 85% of all sectors
(pairs), implying that aggregate prices are likely to fall. Meanwhile,
Figure 1.5d plots the distribution of percentage changes in sector (pair)
TFP. The changes in sector TFP mirror the changes in sector prices.
TFP rises and falls coexist, with TFP rises occurring more often than
TFP falls. The average increase of TFP of all sectors is about 0.3%. This
is an important channel of productivity gains.
Aggregate productivity gains can now be discussed. Table 1.11
shows the summary statistics for the productivity gains of 107 coun-
tries in the sample. Setting financial development to the U.S. level
would increase aggregate productivity by about 0.3% on average.
However, countries do not equally benefit from further financial devel-
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Figure 1.5: Counterfactual: The response of key variables in counterfactuals
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opment. Figure 1.6 shows the cross-country differences in productivity
gains. In this diagram, I plot productivity gains against the current
level of financial development. The diagram shows that, as expected,
countries with a low level of financial development are more likely
to benefit from setting their financial development to the U.S. level.
However, countries with the same level of financial development do
not necessarily enjoy the same productivity gains. There are a few
economies that actually lose from further financial development. The
reason is that price rises in more sectors than price falls in those
economies.39 The productivity gains for an average country are about
0.3%, which is roughly the same as the average sectoral TFP gains.
This suggests that the direct effect of financial development on sector
TFP is the primary source of productivity gains. The indirect effect of
resource reallocation across sectors has a limited impact on aggregate
productivity.
This intuition is confirmed by the decomposition of productivity
gains. The direct TFP effect is almost the same as the net productiv-
ity gains; the indirect effect from resource reallocation across sectors
is virtually zero. Furthermore, the productivity gains from falling
sector prices (about 0.6 percent) are about twofold of the net pro-
ductivity gains. The average productivity gain from entry (about 1.8
percent), which represents a more efficient use of resources, is nearly
sevenfold of the net productivity gain. The missing productivity gains
(1.8-0.6=1.2 percent) are due to the changes in composition of orga-
nizations. By assumption, integrating firms are more profitable as
they charge lower product prices and sell more products. Financial
development induces more outsourcing firms, and thereby (ceteris
39 Since by assumption neither organizational form dominates the other, productivity
loses are theoretically possible in this model.
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Figure 1.6: Counterfactual: Aggregate productivity gains from financial de-
velopment
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Table 1.13: Sensitivity analysis: The role of bargaining power and fixed cost
disadvantage
Fixed cost fV/ f
Bargaining power β 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0.3 -0.080 0.998 1.192 1.230
0.5 0.276 0.484 0.562 0.630
0.7 0.009 0.043 0.298 0.456
Notes: The table shows the mean value of cross-country productivity gains in counter-
factuals when fixed production cost and bargaining power are calibrated to different
values. Aggregate productivity gain is calculated as the percentage change in aggre-
gate productivity when moving from the current equilibrium to the hypothetical
equilibrium. In the hypothetical equilibrium, the level of financial development was
set to the U.S. level for all countries.
paribus) raises sector price index. This assumed price effect offsets
most of the productivity gains from improved allocative efficiency.
1.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Having presented the results, I discuss how sensitive the results are to
the calibrated parameters. In the previous section, I set the bargaining
power of the firm to β = 0.5. This amounts to the null hypothesis that
neither party has an advantage during the negotiation. The alternative
hypothesis is that one party has greater bargaining power over the
other. I therefore consider a lower value 0.3 and a higher value 0.7
as robustness checks. Meanwhile, I set the fixed cost disadvantage of
integration to fV/ f = 1.2. This means integration requires 20 percent
more of overhead cost than outsourcing. This is a conservative number;
hence, I entertain three higher values of 1.4, 1.6, and 1.8. Of course,
these are still arbitrary numbers, so my purpose is to ascertain whether
the productivity gains are sensitive to changes in parameter values.
The results are reported in Table 1.13. The results show that (the
mean) productivity gains fall with bargaining power. Intuitively, a
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higher bargaining power means the firm can retain a bigger fraction
of revenue; the concern for rent extraction is therefore less important.
Hence, the potential scope of productivity gains from financial de-
velopment is limited. On a technical level, a high bargaining power
aggravates the underinvestment problem, making outsourcing less
attractive. To generate a pattern of outsourcing that is consistent with
real data, the estimator therefore infers that the cost disadvantage
for integration should also increase. A higher cost disadvantage en-
courages more marginal integrating firms to switch to outsourcing as
financial development takes place. Adjustments along the intensive
margin (organizational switch) tend to suppress productivity gains,
because outsourcing firms are more likely to charge higher prices.
Meanwhile, the estimator infers that the (inverse of) productivity dis-
persion θ should also increase. This means the relative number of low
productivity firms increases, and the productivity distribution is more
concentrated at these low productivity levels. As financial develop-
ment occurs, adjustment along the extensive margin (entry and the
surviving probability post entry) tends to enhance productivity gains.
Productivity gains fall with bargaining power since the effect at the
intensive margin dominates the effect at the extensive margin.
By contrast, productivity gains rise with the fixed cost disadvantage
fV/ f . The intuition is straightforward. A higher fixed cost disadvan-
tage implies a greater scope for productivity gains from improving
allocative efficiency. Hence as financial development takes place, pro-
ductivity gains become bigger. On a technical level, as the fixed cost
disadvantage increases, integration becomes less attractive. To main-
tain the relative attractiveness of integration, the estimator infers that
the marginal cost disadvantage for integration should be lower. The
lower marginal cost disadvantage discourages marginal integrating
firms from switching to outsourcing. This tends to suppress adjust-
ments along the extensive margin. The estimator further infers that
the (inverse of) productivity dispersion should be higher as well. As
the productivity distribution becomes more concentrated at the lower
productivity levels, productivity gains become higher, for adjustments
along the extensive margin become more important. Unlike bargaining
power, however, the two effects tend to work in the same direction. It
follows that productivity gains rise with the fixed cost disadvantage.
Overall, the estimated productivity gains remain within the narrow
interval between -0.1 and 1.2. Hence the benchmark productivity gains
are not very sensitive to these two parameters.
I also set the elasticity of substitution between firm products to
1/ (1− α) = 3.5. Estimates of substitutability of competing products
in the trade literature typically range from three to ten, depending on
the level of disaggregation. Since I have in mind products at the sector
level, the elasticity of substitution is likely to fall into the interval
between three and five. I therefore experiment with a variety of values
within this range. The role of elasticity of substitution is relatively well
known. As the substitutability between competing products becomes
higher, productivity gains from variety become smaller. Furthermore,
as consumer demands become less elastic, the profitabilities of dif-
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Table 1.14: Sensitivity analysis: The role of elasticity of substitution
Elasticity of substitution 1/ (1− α) 3 3.5 4 5
Aggregate productivity gains (%) 0.310 0.276 0.224 0.121
Notes: The table shows the mean value of cross-country productivity gains in counter-
factuals when the elasticity of substitution is calibrated to different values. Aggregate
productivity gain is calculated as the percentage change in aggregate productivity
when moving from the current equilibrium to the hypothetical equilibrium. In the
hypothetical equilibrium, the level of financial development was set to the U.S. level
for all countries.
ferent organizational forms become more similar. This means that
productivity gains from choosing efficient organizational forms be-
come smaller. Hence productivity gains should fall with the elasticity
of substitution. Table 1.14 reports the results. As expected, productiv-
ity gains decline as competing products become more substitutable.
However, the changes in productivity gains remain small.
I have experimented with a variety of values for the calibrated
parameters. Aggregate productivity gains are more responsive to
changes in the bargaining power and the elasticity of substitution.
They are less responsive to changes in the fixed cost disadvantage.
Nonetheless, the absolute changes in aggregate productivity gains
remain small. They remain within the narrow interval between 0.12
and 0.34. The baseline productivity gains (0.3 percent) fall in the
middle of this interval. I conclude that the baseline results are not
sensitive to the calibrated parameters.
1.6 conclusion
There is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature that studies
the organizational choice of the firm.40 Nonetheless, its effect on aggre-
gate productivity and the underlying mechanisms are not well under-
stood. A recent paper of Boehm (2015) argued that an improvement of
contracting institutions reduces the costs of market transactions. Firms,
driven by transaction cost rewards, alter the boundary of an organiza-
tion and outsource internal activities to outside suppliers. Through
this channel, contracting institutions have been shown to have a large
impact on outsourcing and aggregate productivity. How outsourcing
40 On the theory side, numerous explanations have been advanced to understand the
boundary of the firm. Firms alter the boundary of organization to reduce transaction
costs (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1985), to align
control and incentives (S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, 1986; O. D. Hart, 1995; O. Hart
and Moore, 1990), to provide multi-tasking incentives (Holmström, 1999; Holmström
and Milgrom, 1991, 1994; Holmström and Tirole, 1991), and to facilitate adaptive
decision-making (Klein, 1996, 2000; Klein and Murphy, 1988, 1997; Williamson, 1971,
1973, 1975, 1991). See Gibbons (2005) for a survey. On the empirical side, numerous
studies have studied the determinants of vertical integration. The propensity for firms
to integrate varies systematically with technology intensity (Acemoglu, Aghion, et al.,
2010), factor intensity (Antràs, 2003), product market competition (Aghion, Griffith,
and Howitt, 2006; Bloom, Sadun, and Reenen, 2010), product price (Alfaro, Conconi,
et al., 2016), contracting institutions (Boehm, 2015), and financial development (Ace-
moglu, S. Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Macchiavello, 2012). See Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) for a survey of early contributions.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
1.6 conclusion 47
per se affects aggregate productivity is less clear. Distinguishing the
two aspects is important. The former (reduction of transaction cost)
resembles technological progress, while the latter (reorganization of
production) is related to productive and allocative efficiency.
In this paper, I highlight a channel for financial development to
affect outsourcing without affecting the underlying transaction costs.
I show that even in the absence of cost reduction, financial develop-
ment may still induce a reorganization of production that enhances
aggregate productivity. With outsourcing, productive efficiency may
be gained when products and services are produced more efficiently
by outside suppliers. From the social perspective, further allocative
efficiency may be gained when the resources conserved by outsourcing
are devoted to the creation of new products and services. I structurally
estimate the model and perform counterfactuals to quantify the im-
pact of this channel. Perhaps surprisingly, quantitative analysis shows
that financial development has a sizable impact on outsourcing, but
its effect on aggregate productivity is relatively modest. Outsourcing
implies a more efficient use of resources, but it also entails costs of
market transactions. The transaction costs generate a powerful nega-
tive effect through prices, which offsets the majority of productivity
gains.
What policy implications can we draw from this study? First, in light
of the preceding discussion, policymakers should take into account the
negative price effect when evaluating the impact of outsourcing-related
policies on aggregate productivity. Second, financial development im-
proves the allocative efficiency of input markets. A better functioning
input market enhances aggregate productivity and social welfare. De-
veloping financial markets are especially beneficial for less-developed
and developing countries, as the costs are likely to be lower. Financial
development can be achieved by a variety of policies. For instance,
policies that facilitate the access of credit information and strengthen
the legal rights of the borrowing will improve the financial market
and eventually the allocative efficiency. Third, while it is important to
enhance universal credit access, it is especially important to ensure
access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. A lack of
access to finance is more likely to cause small businesses to exit and
medium-sized businesses to switch organization inefficiently. This
issue is particularly acute following the 2008 financial crisis.41
A number of areas are left for future research. Many extensions
of the baseline model can be considered to assess the full impact
of financial development on aggregate productivity. First, the model
assumes that financial development does not affect the underlying
transaction costs. It would be interesting to extend the model to allow
for financial development to reduce transaction costs (Boehm, 2015).
Second, the model abstracts from input-output linkages. It would be
interesting to extend the model by incorporating network production
(Acemoglu, Carvalho, et al., 2012; Baqaee, 2017), roundabout produc-
41 A recent report from the Department for Business Innovation & Skills confirmed that
small and medium-sized businesses in the UK are facing ongoing tight credit since
2008 (Armstrong et al 2013).
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tion (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Jones, 2013; Krugman and Venables,
1995), or sequential production (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Melitz and
Redding, 2014). Introducing inter-sector linkages may substantially
increase productivity gains, as efficiency gain in one sector may have
implications for productivity in other sectors. Third, the model focuses
on static gains from resource reallocation. It would be interesting
to bring in a dynamic dimension. It has been shown that financial
development fosters entry. If entry is related to innovation and tech-
nology adoption, financial development may have a persistent effect
on growth. The potential growth effect is likely to be greater than
the static effect as reported here (Peters, 2013). These extensions will
bring together a quantitative framework for a full evaluation of the
productivity impact of financial development.
Another area for future research is to investigate the relationship
between outsourcing and product prices. This subject has long been
a source of controversy among economists and policy makers.42 In
this paper, I have shown that transaction costs generate a powerful
negative effect through prices, offsetting the majority of productivity
gains from outsourcing. This result hinges on a key model property
that integration leads to lower product prices. Several studies have
found that vertical integration is associated with higher product prices
(Alfaro, Conconi, et al., 2016; Ford and Jackson, 1997). If this is the
case, efficiency loss from the transaction costs of outsourcing may be
lower than the high product price of vertical integration. Financial
development may induce more outsourcing, reducing the product
prices and reinforcing the productivity gains. Extending the model by
relaxing the CES assumption (Melitz and G. I. P. Ottaviano, 2008) or
incorporating richer contractual arrangements (Bernard and Dhingra,
2016) can generate a positive relationship between integration and
product prices.
42 Early evidence for the view that integration reduces prices includes McBride (1983),
Muris, Scheffman, and Spiller (1992), and Shepard (1993), whilst evidence against
it includes Ford and Jackson (1997). See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for further
discussion. More recently, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) investigated the U.S. cement
industry and concluded that more integration leads to lower product prices. Alfaro,
Conconi, et al. (2016) addressed the opposite direction of causality and found that
higher product prices generate more integration.
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This paper studies the effect of variable markups on misallocation
and aggregate productivity using the manufacturing data from In-
dia. Three main findings are presented. First, markup dispersion is
an important source of misallocation. Such dispersion accounts for
approximately one third of the misallocation observed in the econ-
omy. Due to the endogenous response of markups, removing non-
markup distortions has only a modest impact on misallocation and
aggregate productivity. Second, models with CES preferences and
constant markups substantially overstate productivity gains. TFP gain
implied by a CES model is nearly six times the TFP gain when vari-
able markups are taken into account. Third, competition policies that
reduce barriers of entry can reduce markup distortions and enhance
aggregate productivity.
49
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2.1 introduction
Resource misallocation can lower aggregate total factor productivity
(TFP). Understanding the sources of misallocation has becoming an
important research agenda for macroeconomists. Research on this
agenda has largely focused on the Dixit-Stiglitz CES preferences, im-
plying that all firms have the same market power and charge the same
markup. This is a strong simplifying assumption. This paper studies
the impact of variable markups by relaxing the CES assumption.
My main contribution is to demonstrate that variable markups
are an important source of misallocation. When firms charge differ-
ing markups, resources will be reallocated away from high- to low-
markup firms. If additionally, markups systematically correlate with
firm productivity, variable markups would lead to systematic resource
misallocation, causing substantial losses in aggregate productivity.
The study of India’s manufacturing data reveals that this channel
is quantitatively significant. First, the raw data suggest that variable
markup, in its static form, accounts for about one third of the observed
misallocation (as measured by the dispersion in revenue TFP), while
non-markup exogenous distortions (government restrictions, taxes and
subsidies) account for the remaining two thirds. Second, removing
non-markup distortions has only a modest effect on misallocation and
aggregate productivity, despite the fact that these distortions are sub-
stantial. The reason is the endogenous response of markups: removal
of distortions, which tax productive firms and subsidize unproductive
ones, leads to more dispersion in effective firm productivity and hence
greater dispersion in markups, offsetting the direct effect of removing
distortions. Third, I show that increasing market competition by reduc-
ing entry barriers has a significant effect on resource allocation and
aggregate productivity because tougher competition reduces markups
across the board and hence the dispersion of revenue TFP.
My second contribution is to caution against the use of CES prefer-
ences (with constant markups) in the context of studying misallocation.
The reason is that a significant portion of variation in the data will be
misinterpreted as non-markup distortions. In addition, models based
on CES preferences ignore the endogenous response of markups to
changes in distortions. Taken together, CES models would significantly
overstate the TFP gains. The study shows that TFP gain predicted by
a CES model is nearly six times the effect when variable markups
are taken into account. Hence, studies based on CES preferences may
provide misleading results.
The first step of the analysis is to separately identify markups from
other types of distortions. In principle, it is difficult to distinguish
markups from output taxes and subsidies given standard data for
wage bills, capital, and value added. This approach leads to previous
studies either interpreting the relevant variation as output distortions
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) or as markups
(De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012; Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu, 2015;
Peters, 2016). To make progress, I use a profit measure to back out
markups from data in a separate stage. Plausibility checks show that
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the recovered markups systematically correlate with other firm-level
measures in ways that are consistent with the theory.
Since markups endogenously respond to changes in the economy,
I need a model to fully assess the impact of variable markups on
misallocation and aggregate productivity. I therefore build a quantita-
tive model on the quasi-linear demand model by Melitz and G. I. P.
Ottaviano (2008). An important feature of the model is that productive
firms produce more but also charge higher markups, which implies
that variable markups would cause systematic resource misallocation
across firms. Another important feature of the model is that demand-
side heterogeneity across sectors is summarized in a sufficient statistic,
namely the sector-specific choke price at which consumer demand
vanishes. This approach allows me to focus on the estimation of
supply-side parameters, which significantly simplifies the policy ex-
periments.
In the first policy experiment, I ask: How much gains in aggregate
productivity can be achieved by removing exogenous distortions? I
find that removing distortions has only a modest effect on resource
misallocation and aggregate productivity. In particular, after remov-
ing non-markup distortions, approximately 80% of the dispersion in
revenue TFP (a measure for the degree of misallocation) still remains
in the market. To the extent that productivity gains come from im-
provements in misallocation, removing non-markup distortions has a
small effect on aggregate productivity (about 14%). By contrast, a CES
model significantly overstates the productivity gain (more than 80%).
A second policy experiment quantifies the impact of increasing
market competition on misallocation and aggregate productivity. In
this experiment, in addition to removing distortions, I further reduce
the entry cost to a half for each sector. Tougher competition reduces
markups across the board and further increases aggregate productivity
by 8%. This is a large effect that is comparable with the effect of elimi-
nating non-markup distortions. The policy experiment suggests a way
to improve market allocative efficiency: increasing market competition
either by lowering barriers of entry or by opening to international
trade.
To explore whether the main results are driven by model misspecifi-
cation, I perform two robustness checks. In the benchmark analysis, I
have considered two types of non-markup distortions: a tax on cap-
ital and a subsidy on output. Naturally, one may wonder whether
the small effect of removing distortions has to do with the fact that
distortions on labor costs have been omitted. In the first robustness
check, I include a labor distortion to capture these firm-specific taxes
on labor costs. The results show that including a labor distortion only
modestly increases the productivity gain (to approximately 19%).
The second robustness check concerns the production elasticity with
respect to capital. In the benchmark analysis, I have followed Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) to set sector capital elasticities to those in the
corresponding U.S. sector. This approach avoids potential mismea-
surements of capital elasticities when there are sector-specific capital
distortions. However, it also raises concern about whether using the
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U.S. capital elasticities is appropriate because production technologies
in India may differ significantly from the United States. To address
this concern, I estimate capital elasticities directly from the India data,
using the proxy method introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
refined by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The results show that using
native capital elasticities does not change the main results: the produc-
tivity gain from removing distortions is almost the same as that in the
benchmark analysis (at about 14%).
This paper is closely related to the literature on misallocation and
aggregate productivity, pioneered by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). In particular, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
find that improving misallocation to the U.S. level would increase
aggregate TFP by about 30–50% in China and 40–60% in India. The
sizable TFP gains have inspired many researchers to study the specific
factors driving misallocation. Potential sources of misallocation have
been suggested, including financial frictions (Banerjee and Duflo,
2005; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013; Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Moll, 2014),
capital adjustment cost (Asker, Collard-Wexler, and Loecker, 2014;
Gopinath et al., 2017), information friction (David, H. A. Hopenhayn,
and Venkateswaran, 2016), and markup dispersion (Peters, 2016). My
paper is closely related to (Peters, 2016), who argues that variable
markups have dynamic consequences on growth. My contribution to
this literature is demonstrating that variable markups are a significant
source of static misallocation.
This paper is also related to a branch of trade literature that theo-
retically models and empirically estimates variable markups. On the
theory front, Melitz and G. I. P. Ottaviano (2008) propose a general
equilibrium model with quasi-linear demands, and Nocco, G. I. P. Ot-
taviano, and Salto (2014) analyze the optimal allocations in this model.
Dhingra and Morrow (2016) study the optimality of market allocation
in models with addictively separable preferences. On the empirical
front, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) develop a method to estimate
markups using production data, Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015)
use this method to study the effect of trade on markup distortions
using Taiwanese data, and Peters (2016) applies this method to study
the dynamic consequences of markup distortions using Malaysian
data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 out-
lines the quasi-linear demand model and the accounting framework.
Section 2.3 discusses the data and measurement issues. Section 2.4
presents the main results regarding the effect of variable markups
on misallocation and aggregate productivity. Section 2.5 performs
robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
2.2 linear demand model and accounting framework 53
2.2 linear demand model and accounting framework
Consider an economy with one homogenous good sector and S differ-
ential variety sectors. The representative consumer has the preferences:
U = Y0+ β
S
∑
s=1
Ns
∑
i=1
Ysi− 12γ
S
∑
s=1
Ns
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i=1
Y2si−
1
2
δ
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)2
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2
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Here, Y0 is the homogenous good, which is used as numeraire. Ysi is
the differential variety i in sector s, and Ns is the number of varieties
in sector s. Think of the homogenous good sector as agriculture and
the differential good sectors as manufacturing and services. Having a
homogenous good sector ensures that the marginal utility of income is
constant, hence the allocation of expenditure among differential goods
are not affected by income.
The demand parameters β, γ, δ, and η are all positive. β and η
govern the substitution pattern between the homogenous good and
the differentiated varieties. An increase of β (or a decrease of η) shifts
out the demand for varieties relative to the homogenous good. The
parameter gamma governs the elasticity of substitution between the
varieties within a sector, and delta governs the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated variety sectors.
The consumer preferences imply a downward-sloping linear de-
mand for variety i:
Ysi =
1
γ
(Pmax,s − Psi)
where Pmax,s is the choke price for sector s and Psi is the price of the
variety i in sector s. The expression of the choke price is given by:
Pmax,s = (1−ωs)
[
δ
δ+ ηW
β+
ηW
δ+ ηW
P
]
+ωsPs
where Ps = N−1s ∑i Psi is the price index for sector s and P = W−1 ∑s ωsPs
is the aggregate price index for differentiated goods. The sector
weights are given by ωs = δNs/ (γ+ δNs) and W = ∑s ωs.
Two features of the linear demand function are particularly notewor-
thy. First, the price elasticity esi = − (∂Ysi/∂Psi) (Psi/Ysi) = (Pmax,s/Psi − 1)−1
varies across varieties. In particular, the price elasticity increases in the
level of price Psi, and thus decreases in the level of output Ysi. Larger
firms produce more outputs and also face a less elastic consumer
demand. Hence, they charge higher markups and higher prices on
their products.
Second, the choke price captures the information on consumer
preferences (β, γ, δ, and η) and market conditions (Ns, Ps, P). Since
the slope of the demand function (1/γ) is common for all differenti-
ated variety sectors, the choke price is the only source of cross-sector
heterogeneity on the demand side. This observation motivates a suffi-
cient statistic approach to quantify the impact of variable markups on
aggregate productivity in the later section.
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There are two factors of production, capital, and labor. Producing
the variety requires combining capital and labor with a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Ysi = AsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si
where Asi is the variety-specific technology, and αs is the capital share
of output which is specific to sector s.
Each variety is produced by a single firm. Firms differ in two dimen-
sions. First, each firm is endowed with a variety-specific technology
Asi. Second, each firm faces idiosyncratic distortions. Specifically,
denote the distortion that affect both capital and labor as output dis-
tortion τY, and the distortion that changes the marginal product of
capital relative to labor as capital distortion τK. For example, think of
τY as the government restrictions or taxes to the firm, and τK as the
differing costs of financing capital expenditure due to imperfect credit
markets.
Profit of the firm is given by:
pisi = (1− τYsi) PsiYsi − wLsi − (1+ τKsi) RKsi
where w is wage to worker and R is rent to capital, both of which are
common across sectors.
Markets are monopolistically competitive, implying that each firm
will maximize profit by setting input quantities and output price while
taking the consumer demand as given. Cost minimization implies that
capital intensity is determined by relative factor price:
Ksi
Lsi
=
αs
1− αs
w
R
1
1+ τKsi
Profit maximization yields the standard condition that the firm’s
output price is a markup over its marginal cost:
Psi = µsi
(
R
αs
)αs ( w
1− αs
)1−αs (1+ τKsi)αs
Asi (1− τYsi)
Here, µsi = esi/ (esi − 1) is the markup charged by the firm, and the
rest of the terms is the marginal cost Csi for the firm.
The solution for optimal markup is given by:
µsi ∝
Asi (1− τYsi)
(1+ τKsi)
αs − constant
The markup charged by firms depends not only on firm productivity
levels, but also on the output and capital distortions they face. To the
extent that markup is a function of distortions, changes in distortions
would lead to endogenous response of markups. One of the key
insights in this paper is that the endogenous response of markups
may offset the direct effect of eliminating distortions.
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The allocation of resources across firms depends on markups, firm
productivity levels, and distortions.
Lsi ∝
1
µsi
(
constant−
(
(1+ τKsi)
αs
Asi (1− τYsi)
)2)
(1− τYsi)
Ksi ∝ Lsi
1
1+ τKsi
Ysi ∝ constant− (1+ τKsi)
αs
Asi (1− τYsi)
Conditional on firm productivity level and distortions, a higher markup
implies that fewer resources will be allocated to the firm. In an ideal
world without any distortions, there is still within-sector misallo-
cation due to endogenous markups. More productive firms charge
higher markups, implying that resources are allocated away from
these firms to less productive firms, leading to inefficient outcomes. If
more productivity firms also face more distortions, then eliminating
distortions would allow them to charge higher markups. The endoge-
nous response of markups exacerbates the within-sector misallocation,
offsetting the direct effect of eliminating distortions. I will come back
to this point later.
The revenue marginal products of labor and capital are given by:
MRPLsi =
1
µsi
(1− αs) PsiYsiLsi = w
1
1− τYsi
MRPKsi =
1
µsi
αs
PsiYsi
Ksi
= R
1+ τKsi
1− τYsi
The intuition here is that the after-tax revenue marginal products of
labor and capital are equalized across firms. Hence, the before-tax
revenue marginal products must be higher in firms that face taxes and
lower in firms that face subsidies.
The revenue productivity is given by:
TFPRsi =
PsiYsi
Kαsisi L
1−αsi
si
= µsi
(
MRPKsi
αs
)αs (MRPLsi
1− αs
)1−αs
Intuitively, high revenue productivity can arise either because the firm
charges a high markup or because the firm has high revenue marginal
products. In the linear demand model, firms charge differing markups,
hence TFPR would not be equalized even if firms face no capital or
output distortions. However, regardless of the reasons, high firm TFPR
is a sign that the firm uses fewer resources and hence is smaller than
optimal (in the sense of maximizing output in the economy).
It is now ready to consider the aggregate economy. The sectoral
revenue is PsYs, and sectoral inputs are Ks and Ls. The sectoral markup
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and revenue marginal products are the weighted harmonic means of
their firm-level measures:
µs =
(
Ns
∑
i=1
PsiYsi
∑Nsj=1 PsjYsj
µ−1si
)−1
MRPLs =
(
Ns
∑
i=1
µ−1si PsiYsi
∑Nsj=1 µ
−1
sj PsjYsj
MRPL−1si
)−1
MRPKs =
(
Ns
∑
i=1
µ−1si PsiYsi
∑Nsj=1 µ
−1
sj PsjYsj
MRPK−1si
)−1
The sectoral revenue TFP is a geometric mean of the sectoral markup
and revenue products:
TFPRs =
PsYs
Kαss L
1−αs
s
= µs
(
MRPKs
αs
)αs (MRPLs
1− αs
)1−αs
Finally, the sectoral TFP can be expressed as:
TFPs =
Ns
∑
i=1
TFPR−1si PsiYsi
∑Nsj=1 TFPR
−1
sj PsjYsj
Asi
This equation illustrates how endogenous markups and exogenous
distortions affect sectoral productivity. If there were no capital and
output distortions, marginal revenue products would be equalized
and the sectoral TFP would be:
TFPs =
Ns
∑
i=1
µ−1si PsiYsi
∑Nsj=1 µ
−1
sj PsjYsj
Asi
If more productive firms face more disincentives, then eliminating
distortions induces more resources to move toward more productive
firms, resulting in a higher sectoral productivity (since weights of
more productive firms increase). However, these high productive
firms also increase their markups accordingly, resulting in a lower
sectoral productivity than optimal (since weights of more productive
firms decrease). Hence, the endogenous response of markups partially
offsets the direct effect of eliminating distortions.
2.3 data and measurement
The primary source of data comes from India’s Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI). India’s ASI is conducted annually by its Central
Statistical Organization. The basic survey unit is plant, also known as
establishment. The plant here corresponds to the firm in the model. I
have access to the cross-section data from 2001–2008. In the interest
of space, I only report results for 2001, 2004, and 2007. Results for
other years are available upon request. The raw data for 2001 contains
approximately 26 thousand plants, and the data for 2004 and 2007
each contains about 36 thousand plants.
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The variables used in the analysis include plants’ industry (4-digit
NIC), labor compensation, value added, book value of the fixed capital
stock, and profit. Specifically, the ASI reports the plant’s total wage
payments, bonus payments, and benefit payments. Labor compensa-
tion is the sum of wages, bonuses, and benefits. The novel element
here is that I also measure profit from the ASI data. The ASI reports the
plant’s depreciation of the fixed capital stock, rents paid for property,
plant, and equipment (PP&E), and interest payments. The measure
of profit is value added less the sum of depreciation, rents, interests,
and labor compensation. In addition, the ASI reports the book value
of fixed capital at the beginning and end of the fiscal year. I use the
average book value of fixed capital at the beginning and end of the
fiscal year as the plant’s capital.
The capital share of output alphas are taken from the NBER Pro-
ductivity Database (E. J. Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). This means that
I set the capital share of output to the value in the corresponding
industry in the United States. As argued by Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
it is difficult to separately identify the average capital distortion and
the capital production elasticity from the Indian data, and hence they
use the corresponding values in the United States. However, using the
capital share from the United States also amounts to assuming that
India has access to the same production technology. This assumption
may be too strong. In the robustness check, I estimate the capital
shares from the Indian data using the method proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996) and subsequently refined by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The main results in this paper do not depend on the choice of capital
shares.
To infer markups and distortions from the Indian data, I follow the
method of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The key insight is that distortions
can be inferred from the differences between observed values and the
valued implied by theory. For example, theory predicts that if there
were no capital distortions, the marginal rate of technological substi-
tution must equal the relative factor price. Any deviation from this
observation, therefore, can be inferred as capital distortion. Following
the same idea, I infer markups, distortions, and productivity for each
plant as follows:
µsi =
(1− αs)pisi
wLsi
+ 1
1+ τKsi =
αs
1− αs
wLsi
RKsi
1− τYsi = µsi wLsi(1− αs) PsiYsi
Asi = κs
(
2− µ−1si
)
PsiYsi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
The first equation infers markups on the basis of definition. The
third equation bases on the observation that if there were no output
distortion, revenue (value added) should be equal to the product of
markup and total production cost (wLsi/ (1− αs)). Deviations from
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of markup
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this observation imply there are output distortions. In the last equation,
the sector-specific constant κs = 1/Pmax,s. Although I do not observe κs,
productivity gains are unaffected by setting κs = 1 for each industry s.
The summary statistics of these variables are provided in Table 2.1.
Three points are particularly noteworthy. First, for labor input I use
the plant’s labor compensation rather than its employment to measure
Lsi. This means that labor input is measured in efficiency units rather
than raw counts. Second, here it is possible to separately infer markup
and output distortion because I also measure profit from the Indian
data. Third, it is useful to compare the approach here with that in
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), who developed a general method
to estimate markups. The key insight there is that if there were no
markups, labor production elasticity should be equal to its expenditure
share. Hence, any deviation from this observation can be inferred as
markups. This is equivalent to setting output distortion to one in
the second equation, and attributing all the variation in 1/ (1− αs)×
(wLsi/PsiYsi) to markups. By contrast, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) set
a constant markup and attribute all the variation in 1/ (1− αs) ×
(wLsi/PsiYsi) to output distortion. The approach in this paper differs
in that it attributes the variation to both markup and output distortion.
Since this is a key departure from the two papers mentioned above, it
is useful to perform plausibility checks on the key variables.
One way to check whether the inference makes good sense is to
look at the distribution of markup. Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of
markup for the year 2004. Except for a few firms, most firms charge
a gross markup that is greater than one. The median firm charges a
net markup of 60% over its marginal cost. The distribution is highly
skewed to the left, with only a few firms charging very high markups.
Another way is to examine the distributions of revenue and physi-
cal TFP. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) find that physical
productivity is more dispersed than revenue productivity. Figure 2.2
plots the distribution of the log of revenue and physical TFP. There is
clearly more dispersion of revenue TFP than physical TFP, which is
consistent with findings in the previous literature.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for relevant variables
Mean Median S.D. Min Max #obs
2001
Value added 15.710 15.490 2.103 8.293 24.146 19,559
Capital 15.200 14.996 2.447 5.814 24.893 19,559
Labor compensation 14.445 14.184 1.997 7.090 22.960 19,559
Profit 14.785 14.598 2.317 5.919 23.684 17,887
Employment 3.905 3.689 1.508 0.000 10.631 19,559
Materials 16.235 16.292 2.374 5.371 25.317 19,558
Markup 1.970 1.547 1.357 0.542 17.123 19,559
Capital distortion 1.818 1.748 1.548 -4.098 9.709 19,559
Output distortion 0.207 0.152 0.467 -1.306 3.339 19,559
Productivity 1.082 1.092 0.812 -2.022 4.378 19,559
2004
Value added 15.748 15.511 1.938 9.141 24.645 29,224
Capital 15.240 15.075 2.288 6.163 25.019 29,224
Labor compensation 14.469 14.232 1.821 8.666 23.315 29,224
Profit 14.859 14.660 2.181 5.159 24.256 27,609
Employment 3.783 3.611 1.371 0.000 10.708 29,224
Materials 16.323 16.385 2.299 5.704 25.489 29,221
Markup 2.036 1.597 1.487 0.566 21.402 29,224
Capital distortion 1.790 1.732 1.537 -4.449 9.947 29,224
Output distortion 0.213 0.155 0.437 -1.167 3.151 29,224
Productivity 1.122 1.112 0.760 -1.955 4.580 29,224
2007
Value added 15.978 15.600 2.023 8.287 24.714 25,324
Capital 15.467 15.240 2.360 5.886 25.757 25,324
Labor compensation 14.665 14.290 1.913 7.535 22.091 25,324
Profit 15.141 14.810 2.220 4.920 24.367 24,475
Employment 3.814 3.526 1.451 0.000 10.303 25,317
Materials 16.502 16.531 2.459 5.521 26.343 25,322
Markup 2.070 1.669 1.314 0.551 15.761 25,324
Capital distortion 1.753 1.696 1.505 -4.477 9.150 25,324
Output distortion 0.207 0.158 0.418 -1.155 3.104 25,324
Productivity 1.160 1.135 0.724 -1.571 3.840 25,324
Notes: All variables except markup are in log terms.
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Figure 2.2: Dispersion of revenue and physical TFP
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Table 2.2: Plausibility check
Year: 2004
(1) Markup (2) Revenue (3) Profit
Productivity 1.609∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.060) (0.096)
Capital distortion -1.009∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.042) (0.086)
Output distortion 1.800∗∗∗ 0.348∗ 1.172∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.178) (0.361)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 29224 29224 27609
R2 0.699 0.246 0.343
Notes: All variables except markup are in log terms. ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1% levels of signifi-
cance. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
An additional plausibility check is to ask whether the inferred
variables are consistent with the predictions of the model. For example,
the model implies that more productive firms charge higher markups,
earn higher revenues and profits. A firm is more productive either
because it has higher physical productivity, or because it receives
more output subsidy and pays less capital tax. Table 2.2 reports the
results of OLS regressions of markups, revenues, and profits on the
inferred productivity, and output and capital distortions for the year
2004. Column (1) shows that higher markups are indeed associated
with firms that have higher physical productivity, receive more output
subsidies and pay less capital taxes. Column (2) and (3) show that
such firms are also likely to earn higher revenues (value added) and
profits. Of course, there is no way to claim that these results are causal:
these relationships may simply hold by construction. What the results
shows is that the way of inferring variables is consistent with theory.
To summarize, the inferred variables do seem plausible. With these
variables in hand, I can now perform counterfactual experiments to
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quantify the impact of variable markups on resource misallocation
and aggregate productivity.
2.4 counterfactual experiments
The central question in the paper is: How much of the observed
resource misallocation (as measured by dispersion of TFPR) is driven
by variable markups rather than exogenous distortions? To answer
this question, I perform two counterfactual experiments. In each of
the experiments, I first measure the dispersion of TFPR in the data
as a benchmark. I then remove capital and output distortions from
the economy, and let the firms adjust their markups accordingly. After
that, I measure the dispersion of TFPR in the counterfactual data and
compare it with the benchmark value. High dispersion of TFPR in the
counterfactual data is a sign that variable markups are important for
resource misallocation.
The counterfactual experiments rely on a sufficient statistic of the
model: the industry-specific choke price for which a firm is indif-
ferent between producing and exiting the industry. As explained
in the theory section, the choke price captures the information on
consumer preferences and market conditions. It is the only source of
demand-side heterogeneity across industries. All the firm performance
variables, including price, quantity, revenue, and profit are functions
of the choke price and the marginal cost of the firm.
The choke price for each industry is determined by the correspond-
ing free-entry condition. Specifically, if the distribution of marginal
cost in sector s is denoted by Gs (Csi), then the free-entry condition for
sector s is given by:∫ Pmax,s
0
pisi (Csi, Pmax,s) dGs(Csi) = fE,s
where fE,s is the fixed entry cost as measured by the numeraire good.
The intuition here is that potential firms will enter the industry to the
point that the cost of entry equals the expected benefit of entry. The
latter is the average profit of all the firms except those whose marginal
costs are too high to survive the industry (Csi > Pmax,s).
Suppose that consumer preferences and entry cost ( fE,s) do not
change following an removal of capital and output distortions, then
the free-entry condition implies:
∫ Pmax,s
0
pisi (Csi, Pmax,s) dGs(Csi) =
∫ P˜max,s
0
pisi
(
Csi, P˜max,s
)
dG˜s(Csi)
where tilde represents counterfactual outcomes. This equation pro-
vides a way to estimate the choke price in the counterfactual data.
Specifically, first estimate the choke price as the highest price of all
firms that have non-negative profit. Then estimate the counterfactual
choke price by solving the equation above. With the counterfactual
choke price in hand, I can calculate the dispersion of TFPR in the
counterfactual data and compare it with the benchmark value.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of productivity and distortions
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To the extent that marginal cost is affected by productivity, and
capital and output distortions, the distribution of marginal cost is
determined by the joint distribution of these variables. Hence, I will
first discuss the estimation of the joint distribution of productivity,
and capital and output distortions, and then discuss the counterfactual
experiments in detail.
2.4.1 Estimation of Distributional Parameters
What distribution is appropriate to model the joint relationship of
productivity, and capital and output distortions? To motivate the
distributional assumption, it is useful to examine the data. Figure 2.3
plots firms’ productivity, and capital and output distortions in log
terms. The data seem to suggest that a joint lognormal distribution is
appropriate. Hence, I assume that firm productivity, and capital and
output distortions are jointly lognormally distributed with mean µA,
µK, µY, and variance covariance matrix: σ
2
A 0 0
0 σ2K σKY
0 σKY σ2Y

Note that I have assumed that firm productivity and distortions
are ex-ante uncorrelated. The reasons are twofold. First, the purpose
of the counterfactual experiment is to quantify the effect of variable
markups on aggregate productivity. It would be useful to compare
the counterfactual outcome of the linear demand economy versus that
of the CES economy. As shown by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), when
consumer preference is CES, the covariances of firm productivity and
distortions do not affect the aggregate productivity. However, these
covariances do affect the aggregate productivity in the linear demand
economy. Had I assumed that productivity and distortions are ex-
ante correlated, it would be difficult to assess whether the differences
in outcomes are due to variable markups or due to the correlations
between productivity and distortions.
Second, correlated distortions have larger effects on the endogenous
response of markups than unrelated ones (as will be explained later).
Assuming these away implies that the effect of variable markups will
be underestimated. Hence, the results should provide a conservative
estimate of the impact of variable markups on aggregate productivity.
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Besides the distributional assumption, there is one more compli-
cation in estimation. In particular, the counterfactual experiments
require knowing the full distribution of firm productivity and distor-
tions, whereas in the data I only observe a selected sample of firms
that choose to operate. Hence, I need to estimate the distributional
parameters while explicitly accounting for the selected nature of the
sample. The data selection rule is:
Pmax,s ≥ Csi ∝ (1+ τKsi)
αs
Asi (1− τYsi)
Intuitively, only low marginal cost firms would choose to operate in
the economy.
The set of parameters that await estimation is
(
µA, µK, µY, σ2A, σ
2
K, σ
2
Y, σKY
)
.
I estimate these parameters using a truncated maximum likelihood
estimator with the conditional density function:
f (log Asi, log (1+ τKsi) , log (1− τYsi) |Csi ≤ Pmax,s) (2.1)
=
1
σA
φ
(
ln Asi − µA
σA
)
1
στs
φ
(
ln τsi − µτs
στs
) [
Φ
(
µcs − ln Pmax,s
σcs
)]−1
where Φ is the distribution function of N (0, 1) and φ is the cor-
responding density function. For notational convenience, I define
τsi = (1− τYsi) / (1+ τKsi)αs and denote its mean and variance by µτs
and σ2τs. Think of τsi as the effective subsidy received by the firm. I
also denote the mean and variance of the marginal cost by µcs and σcs.
Before presenting the results, it is useful to discuss the intuitions
behind the estimation. The estimation is constructed in a parsimonious
and effective manner. The conditional density is a function of firm pro-
ductivity and distortions. The estimation of productivity parameters(
µA, σ2A
)
is straightforward. The estimation of parameters associated
with distortions is subtler. To estimate σ2K, σ
2
Y, and σKY from a linear
combination of capital and output distortions, I reply on the fact that
1, αs, and α2s are independent polynomials. To see how this is relevant,
notice that the estimator can determine σ2τs = σ2Y − 2αsσKY + α2sσ2K with
precision. Once this is done, στs can be decomposed into three compo-
nents (σ2K, σ
2
Y, σKY) when 1, αs, and α
2
s are independent polynomials.
This decomposition strategy also depends on the variability of
industry-specific capital share of output. Fortunately, there is a great
deal of variation in the data. Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics
of the capital shares for those industries that have a counterpart in the
United States (NBER Productivity Database). There are more than 80
matched industries in each year. Capital shares tend to center on 0.57
and have a standard deviation of about 0.17. The minimum capital
share is 0.031 and the maximum is 0.95. The large variation in capital
share reassures me that the decomposition strategy would be effective.
Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the distributional parameters. The
estimated parameters are broadly consistent with the data patterns.
In particular, both capital and output distortions (in log terms) have
a positive mean. Capital distortion is more dispersed than output
distortion. Interestingly, capital distortion is positively correlated with
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for matched capital elasticity
Year Mean Median S.D. Min Max #obs
2001 0.571 0.548 0.174 0.031 0.950 82
2004 0.572 0.550 0.173 0.031 0.950 85
2007 0.569 0.546 0.177 0.031 0.950 81
Table 2.4: Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters
Year µA µK µY σ2A σ
2
K σ
2
Y σKY #obs
2001 -0.412∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 3.237∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 17887
(0.0119) (0.0448) (0.0226) (0.0112) (0.137) (0.0238) (0.0580)
2004 -0.344∗∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 3.901∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 27609
(0.00818) (0.0333) (0.0156) (0.00765) (0.109) (0.0190) (0.0456)
2007 -0.321∗∗∗ 3.314∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 3.982∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ 24475
(0.00827) (0.0381) (0.0175) (0.00773) (0.123) (0.0192) (0.0486)
Notes: ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1% levels of significance.
output distortion, implying that firms that receive more output subsidy
also face higher capital tax. From previous regressions, we also know
that these firms tend to be low in terms of productivity and small.
Hence, the result is consistent with the observation that small firms
in India tend to receive government subsidies, but also face high cost
of financing capital expenditure due to credit frictions. Meanwhile,
productivity (in log terms) has a slightly negative mean and is more
dispersed than output distortion but less than capital distortion.
2.4.2 Experiment 1: Elimination of Distortions
With the distributional parameters in hand, I can now perform the first
counterfactual experiment. The goal of the experiment is to assess how
much of the dispersion in revenue TFP would remain after eliminating
capital and output distortions from the economy. The graphs in this
section refer to the year 2004 unless otherwise stated.
The key step of the counterfactual experiment is to estimate the
counterfactual choke prices. Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between
the actual and counterfactual choke prices for a total of 107 industries.
Clearly, choke prices tend to decrease after removing capital and
output distortions. Intuitively, firms become more productive after
the removal of distortions, and hence the industries become more
competitive.
One important statistic in the counterfactual experiment is the dis-
persion in revenue TFP. Table 2.5 reports the dispersion of revenue
TFP before and after removing distortions. It also reports the ratio of
revenue TFP dispersion before and after removing distortions. This is
reported as the fraction of revenue TFP dispersion remaining.
For the year 2004, removing distortions reduces the dispersion in
revenue TFP from 0.338 to 0.284. That is, approximately 84% of the
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
2.4 counterfactual experiments 65
Figure 2.4: Counterfactual: Choke price response to removal of non-markup
distortions
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Table 2.5: Counterfactual: TFPR dispersion upon removing non-markup dis-
tortions
TFP Dispersion 2001 2004 2007
Actual 0.362 0.338 0.330
Counterfactual 0.301 0.284 0.281
Remaining (%) 83.1 83.9 85.2
dispersion in revenue TFP remains in the economy. Hence, removing
distortions has only a modest effect in improving resource allocation.
Interestingly, although markups account for about one third of the
dispersion in revenue TFP in the data (see section 2.4.4), they alone can
generate substantial dispersion in revenue TFP. This result suggests
that distortions somehow reduce the variation in markups.
To understand the reason behind this, it is useful to examine the
raw data. Table 2.6 reports the results from OLS regressions of firm
productivity on capital and output distortions. The results show that
more productive firms tend to receive less output subsidies and face
more capital taxes.
Table 2.6: OLS regression of productivity on distortions
Dependent variable: Productivity
(1) 2001 (2) 2004 (3) 2007
Capital distortion 0.423∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.058) (0.051)
Output distortion -1.385∗∗∗ -1.493∗∗∗ -1.648∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.150) (0.146)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 17887 27609 24475
R2 0.307 0.310 0.340
Notes: All variables are in log terms. ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1% levels of significance. Standard
errors are clustered at the industry level.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
2.4 counterfactual experiments 66
Figure 2.5: Counterfactual: Marginal cost and markup response to removal
of non-markup distortions
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This observation is consistent with the predictions of the model.
In particular, the selection rule predicts that a firm chooses to oper-
ate only if its marginal cost is lower than the choke price. The firm
has a low marginal cost either because it has high physical produc-
tivity (but unfavorable distortions such as capital tax), or because it
receives favorable distortions such as output subsidy (but low physical
productivity). When distortions are removed, productive firms are
free of unfavorable distortions and therefore they charge even higher
markups.
This phenomenon can be seen clearly from Figure 2.5. Figure 2.5
(a) plots the marginal costs before and after removing distortions for
firms in industry 1513 (processing and preserving of fruit, vegetables,
and edible nuts). After removing distortions, marginal cost tends to
be lower for most of the firms in this industry. Figure 2.5 (b) plots
the markups before and after removing distortions for firms in the
same industry. Most firms increase their markups. This effect is partic-
ularly strong for productive firms which exhibit high markups before
removing distortions. Hence, removing distortions tends to increase
the dispersion of markups.
Another important statistic is the gains in aggregate productivity
(TFP gain). TFP gain is defined as the percentage change in aggregate
productivity after removing distortions, 100 times ( ˜TFP/TFP− 1).
Table 2.7 reports the TFP gains for the linear demand model (VES)
versus the CES model. It is useful to compare the results because the
CES model has no variation in markups. The data for 2004 reveals
that removing distortions enhances aggregate productivity by approx-
imately 14% (VES). The TFP gain is substantially higher (about 87%)
in the CES model because there is no resource misallocation from
variable markups. This pattern is robust across different sampling
years.
To summarize, three are two points that are particularly noteworthy.
First, variable markups are an important source of resource misal-
location. It induces resources to be allocated away from high- to
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Table 2.7: Counterfactual: TFP gain from removing non-markup distortions
TFP Gain 2001 2004 2007
VES model 16.6 14.4 13.7
CES model 88.7 87.3 86.1
Table 2.8: Counterfactual: TFPR dispersion upon removing non-markup dis-
tortions and lowering entry barriers
TFP Dispersion 2001 2004 2007
Actual 0.362 0.338 0.330
Counterfactual 0.266 0.253 0.249
Remaining (%) 73.5 74.8 75.6
low-markup firms. If productive firms charge high markups, then
variable markups imply a systematic misallocation of resources which
could substantially lower aggregate productivity. Second, variable
markups are endogenously determined by both productivity and
distortions. Removing distortions may not have the intended effect
because markups may respond accordingly. The counterfactual experi-
ment in this section shows that the effect of removing distortions is
very modest.
2.4.3 Experiment 2: Remove Distortions and Lower Entry Barriers
If removing distortions does not have a large effect as expected, what
could be done to enhance aggregate productivity? Since variable
markups affect resource misallocation, it is possible to enhance ag-
gregate productivity by reducing variation in markups. One way to
achieve this is to increase market competition by lowering entry barri-
ers.
I therefore perform a second counterfactual experiment, in which
entry costs are halved in addition to removing capital and output
distortions. The counterfactual choke prices can be estimated using
the following free-entry condition:
∫ P˜max,s
0
pisi
(
Csi, P˜max,s
)
dG˜s(Csi) =
1
2
fE,s
Table 2.8 reports the dispersion in revenue TFP before and after
the entry barriers are lowered. In 2004, the dispersion of revenue
TFP changes from 0.342 to 0.220. There is still a significant portion of
dispersion in revenue TFP remains (about 64%) but it is lower than
before (about 74%). This suggests that increasing market competition
is effective in improving resource allocation.
Table 2.9 reports the TFP gains from reducing entry barriers by a
half and removing distortions. In 2004, the TFP gain is about 22%,
which is substantially higher than before (about 14%). However, the
TFP gain is still far lower than what a CES model would predict
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Table 2.9: Counterfactual: TFP gain from removing non-markup distortions
and lowering entry barriers
TFP Gain 2001 2004 2007
VES model 25.1 22.1 22.3
CES model 88.7 87.3 86.1
Table 2.10: Variance decomposition of TFPR dispersions
Variance Decomposition Contribution (%)
Year TFPR Markup MRP Covariance Markup MRP
2001 0.475 0.257 0.349 -0.065 40.3 59.7
2004 0.419 0.231 0.331 -0.071 38.1 61.9
2007 0.392 0.209 0.324 -0.070 35.3 64.7
(approximately 87%), implying that the CES assumption may lead to
a significant over-estimation of TFP gains.
2.4.4 Naive TFPR Decomposition
In this section, I describe naive decompositions of the dispersion in
revenue TFP. The goal is to show that naive decompositions yield
misleading results, hence providing justifications for the use of coun-
terfactual experiments.
Let ˆTFPRsi denote the log deviation of revenue TFP from its indus-
try mean value. The log deviation of TFPR can be expressed as the
sum of the log deviations of markup and revenue marginal products
(MRP).
ˆTFPRsi = µˆsi + ˆMRPsi
The dispersion in revenue TFP can be measured by the variance of
ˆTFPRsi. The dispersion of revenue TFP can be decomposed into three
components: dispersion in markup, dispersion in revenue marginal
products, and two covariance terms. Revenue marginal products cap-
ture the direct effect of exogenous distortions on resource misalloca-
tion.
Var
( ˆTFPRsi) = Var (µˆsi) +Var ( ˆMRPsi)+ 2Cov (µˆsi, ˆMRPsi)
The decomposition results are reported in Table 2.10. The results
seem to suggest that deviation in markup is half as important as
deviation in revenue marginal products.
Another way to quantify the relative importance of the two sources
of TFPR dispersion is the following. Assign one of the covariance
terms to markup and the other to revenue marginal product. Then, it
is possible to decompose the TFPR dispersion in two components: con-
tribution by markup dispersion and contribution by MRP dispersion.
Using this decomposition, Table 2.10 suggests that markup accounts
for about one third of the TFPR dispersion, while revenue marginal
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products accounts for about two thirds of the TFPR dispersion. Once
again, the decomposition suggests that markup is less important than
revenue marginal products.
To summarize, naive decompositions tend to conclude that variable
markups are less important than exogenous distortions in explaining
resource misallocations.
Why do naive decompositions provide misleading results? The
reason is that they ignore the endogenous response of markups to
changes in exogenous distortions. When distortions are correlated with
productivity, endogenous response of markups could offset the direct
effect from removing distortions, as demonstrated in the previous
sections.
2.5 robustness analysis
The results are startling. Due to the endogenous response of markups,
removing non-markup distortions has only a modest impact on misal-
location and aggregate productivity, despite the fact that these distor-
tions are substantial. A natural question then is: How robust are these
findings? This section performs two robustness checks: (1) including a
labor distortion and (2) using native capital production elasticities.
2.5.1 Labor Distortions
The benchmark analysis includes two types of exogenous distortions:
a tax on capital and a subsidy on output. Is it possible that the large
role of markup is due to the omission of labor distortions? To address
this concern, I include a labor distortion 1+tau-l to the benchmark
model. The profit of the firm is now given by:
pisi = (1− τYsi)PsiYsi − (1+ τLsi)wLsi − (1+ τKsi)RKsi
The methodology spelled out in the previous section broadly goes
through, except for three amendments. First, labor distortion needs
to be added to the following expressions: optimal capital intensity,
marginal cost, revenue marginal product of capital, and labor. Second,
labor distortions must be inferred from the data. Third, the distribu-
tional assumption and the estimation procedure need to be modified.
The first modification is straightforward. I will explain the next two
modifications in what follows.
To infer labor distortions, I use the following variables from the ASI
data: labor compensation and employment. I use employment as a
measure for labor input, and labor compensation as a measure for
distortion inclusive wage payment (1 + τLsi)wLsi. Labor distortions
can be recovered by dividing labor compensation by employment.
Measuring labor input by employment means that any differences
in hours worked and human capital per worker across plants are
treated as labor distortions. Hence, the labor distortion model is likely
to overstate the effect of labor distortions.
With labor distortions in hand, I can back out other variables using
the same formula as in the benchmark analysis, except that the term
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Table 2.11: Robustness: TFPR dispersion with additional labor distortions
TFP Dispersion 2001 2004 2007
Actual 0.421 0.399 0.395
Counterfactual 0.327 0.315 0.316
Remaining (%) 77.6 78.8 80.1
Table 2.12: Robustness: TFP gain with additional labor distortions
TFP Gain 2001 2004 2007
VES model 22.5 18.8 18.4
CES model 106.3 102.4 106.2
wLsi needs to be replaced with distortion-inclusive wage payment
(1+ τLsi)wLsi.
The modification of the estimation procedure is the following. As-
sume that productivity, capital, labor, and output distortions are jointly
log-normally distributed. As before, assume that productivity is ex-
ante uncorrelated with distortions. Denote the means of the distor-
tions by µK, µL, and µY. Denote the variances of the distortions by
σ2K, σ
2
L, and σ
2
Y, and their covariances by σKL, σKY, and σLY. Then,
the set of distributional parameters to be estimated are given by(
µA, µK, µL, µY, σ2A, σ
2
K, σ
2
L, σ
2
Y, σKL, σKY, σLY
)
.
The conditional density function is still given by (2.1), except that the
second term is replaced by a tri-variate normal density for log (1+ τKsi),
log (1+ τLsi), and log (1− τYsi). The rest of the procedure is the same
as in the benchmark analysis. In the interest of space, I will not repeat
the procedure. Instead, I turn now to reporting the results.
Table (2.11) reports the dispersion of revenue TFP before and af-
ter removing exogenous distortions. It shows that after removing
non-markup distortions, approximately 80% of the TFPR dispersion
still remains in the market. Table (2.12) further reports the TFP gains
from the removal of non-markup distortions. If there were no vari-
able markups (CES), aggregate productivity would increase by more
than 100%. With variable markups, however, the TFP gains reduce to
about 18.8%. Once again, CES models with constant markups signifi-
cantly overestimate productivity gains. Also, the modest effects from
removing non-markup distortions on misallocation and aggregate
productivity are consistent with the findings in the baseline analysis.
2.5.2 Capital Production Elasticities
Now I turn to the second robustness analysis. In the benchmark
analysis, I have followed Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to use capital pro-
duction elasticities in the corresponding U.S. industry. This approach
avoids potential mismeasurement of capital elasticities when there
are industry-specific capital distortions. However, it also raises the
concern about the appropriateness of applying the U.S. elasticities
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
2.5 robustness analysis 71
Table 2.13: Summary statistics for estimated capital elasticity
Year Mean Median S.D. Min Max #obs
2001 0.525 0.530 0.118 0.231 0.806 100
2004 0.500 0.510 0.120 0.165 0.781 107
2007 0.547 0.523 0.120 0.310 0.877 112
to India. If production technology in India differs systematically to
the United States, then the benchmark analysis would overestimate
capital distortions. To address this concern, I now estimate the capital
production elasticities using the India ASI data and use these native
elasticities to perform counterfactual experiments.
To estimate capital production elasticities, I use the proxy method
developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and subsequently refined by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The starting point is the revenue function:
Rsi = Ps (Zsi) ZsiK
βKs
si L
βLs
si e
usi
Where Zsi = Asi (1− τYsi) / (1+ τKsi)αs is the effective productivity
and usi is measurement errors. For the purpose of exposition, it is
more convenient to index firms by their effective productivity rather
than marginal cost. Taking logs gives:
rsi = βKsksi + βLslsi + zsi + ps(zsi) + usi
where lower case means that the variable is in log terms.
Assume that labor is a variable input but capital is predetermined.
This means that labor is likely to be correlated with a firm’s effective
productivity. The key insight by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) is that if more productive firms also use more
materials, then it is possible to use a control function of capital and
materials as a proxy for productivity (and price). To the extent that
material costs are undistorted, the condition that more productive
firms use more materials is likely to hold. Hence, I estimate the capital
production elasticities with the following Olley-Pakes estimator:
rsi = βLslsi + φ(msi, ksi) + usi
where the control function φ is a 4th-order polynomial of capital ksi
and materials msi. The summary statistics of the estimated capital
elasticities are given in Table (2.13).
With the capital elasticities in hand, I now perform the first policy
experiment again. Table (2.14) reports the dispersion of revenue TFP
before and after removing exogenous distortions. More than 85% of
the TFPR dispersion remains in the market after the removal of non-
markup distortions. This result is even stronger than the benchmark
case. Table (2.15) further reports the resulting TFP gains. The TFP gain
with variable markups (VES) is approximately 14%, which is slightly
lower than the benchmark result. Once again, a CES model with
constant markups significantly overestimates the TFP gain, implying
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Table 2.14: Robustness: TFPR dispersion using estimated capital elasticities
TFP Dispersion 2001 2004 2007
Actual 0.306 0.284 0.297
Counterfactual 0.260 0.246 0.253
Remaining (%) 85.0 86.1 86.0
Table 2.15: Robustness: TFP gain using estimated capital elasticities
TFP Gain 2001 2004 2007
VES model 15.4 14.4 14.8
CES model 77.5 75.5 79.4
that removing distortions would enhance aggregate productivity by
76%.
To summarize, the two robustness checks reassure me that the main
findings of the paper are unlikely to be driven by model specifications.
2.6 conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that variable markups are a significant
source of resource misallocation. Not only do variable markups ac-
count for one third of the observed misallocation, but they also en-
dogenously respond to changes in the economy, offsetting gains from
removing other types of non-markup distortions. Competition poli-
cies can reduce markup dispersion and improve market allocative
efficiency. Such policies are more effective and implementable than
removing firm-specific taxes and subsidies to improve misallocation
and enhance aggregate productivity.
The study also cautions against the use of CES preferences (with
constant markups) in the context of studying misallocation. Studies
based on CES preferences may provide misleading results. In partic-
ular, models with CES preferences could significantly overstate the
gains from removing distortions. The reason is that CES models lead
to mismeasurement of non-markup distortions, and also ignore the
endogenous response of markups to changes in the economy. Instead,
models that explicitly account for variable markups should be used.
There are also limitations in the current study. Two aspects are
particularly noteworthy. First, as with many studies, this paper focuses
on a specific source of misallocation, namely markup dispersion. There
are many other potential sources too. The natural question then is:
which sources of misallocation are relatively important in explaining
variation in the data? In this regard, studies along the line of David
and Venkateswaran (2017) would be particularly useful.
Second, quantitative studies on markup distortions typically reply
on a particular form of market structure. For example, in Peters (2016)
this was Bertrand competition, in Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015)
this was oligopolistic competition, and in the current paper this is
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quasi-linear demand with monopolistic competition. This variation
raises the question regarding how much the quantitative findings
depend on the specific assumption of the market structures. A more
ambitious question is whether there is a general way to quantify
the impact of markup distortions on aggregate productivity without
specific details on the market structure. These questions are left for
future research.
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H E T E R O G E N E O U S C A P I TA L A L O N G P R O D U C T I O N
C H A I N S
Using industry-level data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Database,
this study documents three stylized facts about production chains that
substantiate the need for measuring quality differences in capital.
Firstly, downstream industries are less capital intensive. Secondly,
downstream industries are more skill intensive. Thirdly, capital share
of output does not vary systematically according to production line
position. This analysis presents a stylized model of production chains
with heterogeneous capital that can account for all of these three facts.
The developed model sheds light on the role of capital quality in
determining the pattern of and the reward to factors along production
chains. The findings have important implications for policy design
regarding how to remain competitive in the global economy.
74
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3.1 introduction
How are capital goods of differing quality allocated to production
chains? Traditionally, production chains have been studied in the
domain of international trade. Macroeconomic literature tends to treat
industries symmetrically and as abstract from the interconnection of
production. More generally, this literature places increased emphasis
on differences in human capital while treating physical capital as
homogenous goods, with only a few exceptions (Caselli and D. Wilson,
2004; Eaton and Kortum, 2001). This paper documents new stylized
facts that substantiate the need for incorporating heterogeneous capital
into production chain models.
Figure 3.1: Factor intensity and production line position
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Recent advances in measurement of production line positions make
it possible to characterize production chains. Using industry-level
data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Database (E. J. Bartelsman
and Gray, 1996), the patterns of factor allocation and factor prices
along the production chains are documented. The unit of observation
is an industry. Figure 3.1 (a) shows the relationship between capi-
tal intensity and production line position (“downstreamness”). Here,
downstreamness is measured by the average position in the produc-
tion chain at which an industry’s output is used (Antràs, Chor, et al.,
2012). Capital intensity is the log of capital per worker. The diagram
shows that capital intensity declines towards the end of the produc-
tion chain. Figure 3.1 (b) examines how skill intensity varies with
production line position. Here, skill intensity is defined as the share of
skilled labor income (non-production workers) in total labor income
(production and non-production workers). The diagram illustrates
that downstream industries are more skill intensive. These diagrams
raise the first question: Why would capital and skill intensity vary
systematically with production line position?
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Figure 3.2: Factor rewards and production line position
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Figure 3.2 examines the relationship between capital share of output
and production line position. Capital share of output is defined as pay-
ment to capital as a share of total industry value added. Surprisingly,
capital share of output does not vary systematically with production
line position. How is it possible that downstream industries use more
labor and also more skilled labor without compensating workers pro-
portionately? The only plausible explanation seems to be that capital
goods have differing quality and that downstream industries tend to
use high-quality capital goods. Here, variation in capital quality can
be interpreted as the differences in productivity or costs of capital
goods across industries.
This paper incorporates heterogeneous capital into a model of pro-
duction chains. The model builds on the previous literature on organi-
zation of firms (Garicano, 2000) and matching between heterogeneous
factors and tasks (Costinot and Vogel, 2010). The basic idea is the fol-
lowing. As moving towards downstream, products become more and
more complex. This change requires workers to solve more challeng-
ing problems. Hence, downstream industries tend to hire more skilled
workers to solve problems. Moreover, skill is strongly complementary
to the quality of capital. Thus, downstream industries tend to deploy
high-quality capital goods. My model can account for the stylized
facts discussed at the beginning of the paper.
This work’s first contribution is to substantiate the need to docu-
ment differences in capital goods. Capital can be different for many
reasons. First, there are different types of capital goods. Caselli and
D. Wilson (2004) find that there is enormous cross-country difference
in the composition of capital goods. Second, the cost of capital goods
can differ. Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that trade cost generates
substantial variation in the cost of capital goods across countries. To
the extent that different industries have different composition of capi-
tal goods, there is substantial variation too in the cost of capital goods
across industries. Third, capital goods can have different productivity
across countries and industries. For example, in Australia, land is
more productive for producing wine than rice, while in Thailand the
reverse is true.
The second contribution of this analysis is to highlight the role of
capital quality in shaping the pattern of and the reward to factors along
production chains. Specifically, it is shown that downstream industries
tend to use more skilled labor and high-quality capital goods. This
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observation is particularly relevant today as countries are increasingly
specializing in global production chains. The proposed model predicts
that countries with more high-quality capital goods tend to specialize
in downstream industries. Since capital is more mobile than labor
across countries, my model also predicts that high-skilled countries
tend to attract more investments in high-quality capital goods (while
specializing in downstream industries).
This paper builds upon a rapidly growing body of literature using
assignment models in various contexts. The central theme of these
papers is to offer specific comparative static predictions under strong
functional form assumptions on the pattern of substitution across
goods. Assignment models have been used in the context of interna-
tional trade (Costinot, 2009; Costinot and Vogel, 2010; Sampson, 2014,
2016; Yeaple, 2005), offshoring (Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg,
2006; G. M. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), and management
(Garicano, 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Among previous
papers, this one is most closely related to the work by Costinot and
Vogel (2010), who analyze the determinants of factor allocation and
factor prices in economics with a large number of goods and factors.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is to study a new assign-
ment problem: how capital goods of differing quality are allocated
to different positions of production chains. The results are useful for
understanding how countries specialize in global production chains.
This paper is at the cross-roads of several other works. It is clearly
related to the literature on global production chains. A first strand of
this literature has developed methodologies for credibly estimating
the volume of cross-border production activity by combining data
on trade and input output tables (R. C. Johnson and Noguera, 2012;
Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei, 2014), as well as for measuring the
positions of countries and industries in the production chains (Antràs,
Chor, et al., 2012; Fally, 2012). A second strand this literature has
developed is the theoretical models of production chains to account
for firms’ location decisions (Antràs, Fort, and Tintelnot, 2017; Antràs
and Gortari, 2017) and internalization decisions (Alfaro, Antràs, et al.,
2017; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Fally and Hillberry, 2015), volume of
trade (Yi, 2003), and pattern of trade (Costinot, Vogel, and S. Wang,
2013). This paper’s contribution to this literature is to develop a new
model of production chain based on assignments of heterogeneous
factors to production line positions.
This work is related to the tradition on embodied technology, which
emphasize differences in R&D contents across different types of capital
(Caselli and D. Wilson, 2004; Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Sampson, 2016;
D. J. Wilson, 2002), or differences in the efficiency units delivered
by different vintages of capital (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell,
1997; Jovanovic and Rob, 1997; Solow, 1960). The analysis substantiates
the need to document differences in the quality of capital goods. It
is shown that the homogenous capital assumption, which is used
extensively in the literature, is unlikely to be consistent with new
stylized facts about production chains.
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This work is also related, though less closely, to recent literature
on macroeconomic implications of intersectoral input-output linkages.
The presence of multi-sector linkages tends to amplify the effect of
resource misallocation (Jones, 2011, 2013), generate aggregate fluctua-
tions from microeconomic idiosyncratic shocks (Acemoglu, Carvalho,
et al., 2012; Baqaee, 2017; Gabaix, 2011), and transmit financial shocks
across the economy (Altinoglu, 2017; Bigio and La’O, 2016). While
the presented work also emphasizes the interconnection of industries,
it takes a different approach by visualizing the production process
as a chain rather than a network. Both approaches are useful for
understanding the nature of production processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 documents
the stylized facts in details. Section 3.3 presents a basic model of pro-
duction chains with homogenous factors and discusses its usefulness
and limitations. Section 3.4 extends the basic model to allow for het-
erogeneous capital goods to account for the stylized facts. Section 3.5
concludes. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.1.
3.2 empirical motivation
The main data source is the NBER CES Manufacturing Industry
Database (E. J. Bartelsman and Gray, 1996; Becker, Gray, and Mar-
vakov, 2016). The data set provides information on total value added,
capital stock, and labor income at the industry level. It also breaks
capital stock down into plant and equipment, and labor income down
into skilled labor income and unskilled labor income. The data is
highly disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level, with a total of 473 in-
dustries. Data from 2002 are used, for which a measure of production
line position at the same industry level is obtained.
Recent advances in measurement of production line positions make
it possible to characterize production chains. This paper follows
Antràs, Chor, et al. (2012) to construct a measure of industry “up-
streamness” as the average distance of an industry’s output from final
use. It then normalizes the upstreamness measure to unit interval and
computes the industry “downstreamness” as one minus the normal-
ized upstreamness. This measure is constructed using the 2002 US
Input-Output Tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). The 2002 I-O Tables report information on production link-
ages at a highly disaggregate level, namely 6-digit I-O industry codes.
There are altogether 426 industries in the I-O Tables, of which 279 are
manufacturing industries.
BEA provides a concordance between the codes used in the I-O
tables and the Census NAICS industry classification. This enables
merging of the two data sets. The merged data set has a total of 279
manufacturing industries. The summary statistics of key variables
are given in Table 3.1. Using the merged data set, three stylized facts
regarding production chains are documented.
Fact 3.1. Downstream industries are less capital intensive.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean Median S.D. Min Max N
Capital intensity 4.721 4.607 0.828 2.370 7.360 279
log Plant per worker 3.602 3.518 0.779 1.573 6.199 279
log Equipment per worker 4.298 4.244 0.896 1.771 6.993 279
Skill intensity 0.401 0.375 0.139 0.003 0.809 279
Capital share of output 0.664 0.658 0.111 0.412 0.967 279
Rent to capital 0.845 0.744 0.518 0.133 4.966 279
Downstreamness 0.699 0.699 0.223 0.000 1.000 279
Notes: Data for all variables except downstreamness are from the NBER CES Manu-
facturing Industry Database (E. J. Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). Capital intensity is
the log of capital per worker. Skill intensity is the share of skilled (non-production)
labor income in total labor income. Capital share of output is defined as payment to
capital as a share of total industry value added. Rent to capital is payment to capital
divided by capital stock. Downstreamness is measured by the average position in the
production chain at which an industry’s output is used (Antràs, Chor, et al., 2012).
Table 3.2: Capital intensity
(1) (2) (3)
Capital intensity log Plant per worker log Equipment per worker
Downstreamness -1.545∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -1.752∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.223) (0.234)
Constant 5.802∗∗∗ 4.455∗∗∗ 5.524∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.168) (0.170)
N 279 279 279
R2 0.173 0.122 0.190
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
Capital intensity here is defined as log of capital per worker. This is
a widely used proxy for how intensively capital is used in production.
Within manufacturing, downstreamness is negatively correlated with
physical capital intensity (Table 3.2). This observation is also true
when capital is broken down into plant and equipment. Both log plant
per worker and equipment per worker are negatively correlated with
downstreamness.
Fact 3.2. Downstream industries are more skill intensive.
Following the previous literature, skill intensity is defined as the
share of skilled (non-production) labor income in total labor income.
Note that skilled and unskilled labor is measured by labor income
rather than employment, because hours worked per worker may
vary systematically across production line positions. Think of labor
income as the efficiency unit of labor. Table 3.3 shows that within
manufacturing, downstreamness is positively correlated with skill
intensity.
Fact 3.3. Capital share of output does not vary systematically according to
production line position.
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Table 3.3: Skill intensity
(1)
Skill intensity
Downstreamness 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0358)
Constant 0.310∗∗∗
(0.0240)
N 279
R2 0.043
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
Table 3.4: Capital share of output
(1) (2)
Capital share of output Rent to capital
Downstreamness -0.00603 1.009∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.112)
Constant 0.668∗∗∗ 0.139∗
(0.0222) (0.0739)
N 279 279
R2 0.000 0.188
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.
Since downstream industries employ less capital and more labor,
particularly more skilled labor, one would expect that capital share of
output (value added) decreases with the downstreamness of industry.
Surprisingly, as shown in Table 3.4, capital share of output does not
vary systematically according to production line position. To under-
stand the reason behind this, the rent paid to capital is computed
and correlated with downstreamness. Table 3.4 shows that the rent
is increasing in the downstreamness of industry. This result suggests
that the efficiency embodied in capital is different across industries.
In particular, the efficiency of capital goods is increasing in the down-
streamness of industry.
In the next two sections, two stylized models will be presented
to rationalize these stylized facts. In section 3.3, a model with ho-
mogenous factors is presented and discussed regarding its usefulness
and limitations. In section 3.4, a model with heterogeneous capital is
presented and shown to be consistent with the stylized facts provided
here.
3.3 homogenous factor model
All markets are perfectly competitive. There is only one final good,
which is used as numeraire. Producing this final good requires a
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continuum of stage inputs indexed by m, m belongs to [m, m]. The
final good producer assembles these inputs using a CES technology:
Y =
(∫ m
m
yρmdm
) 1
ρ
Here, ym is input at stage m, and 1/ (1− ρ) > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution across inputs.
Producing stage goods requires capital and labor. The economy
is endowed with a mass K of homogenous capital and a mass L of
homogenous labor. Output of stage m is given by:
ym =
[
kσm + (Amlm)
σ] 1σ
where km and lm are the capital and labor employed at stage m,
1/ (1− σ) > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor, and Am is the labor productivity at stage m. Labor productivity
is determined as follows.
Producing stage goods requires solving problems indexed by zm.
Problems are ordered so that the easiest problems correspond to the
lowest value of zm. The cumulative distribution of problems is given by
F (zm), which is twice continuously differentiable and has a positive
density f (zm) on the support [0, z]. Production requires that problems
zm be drawn and solved. Workers can solve the problem at a time cost
that is proportional to the interval of know-how required [0, zm]. For
example, the producer can have a fraction zm of the workers focus on
solving problems and the rest of 1− zm workers produce the output.
The frequency of problems that may arise is proportional to the
number of stage, m. A worker at stage m confronts a mass m of
problems. All of these problems must be solved to produce an input
that is compatible with the inputs in the previous stages. The expected
labor productivity at stage m is given by:
F (zm)
m (1− zm)
The stage producer chooses know-how zm to maximize labor pro-
ductivity. The first order condition with respect to zm is:
m
f (zm)
F (zm)
=
1
1− zm
The key assumption here is that the cumulative distribution of
problems is log-concave. Under this assumption, the left-hand side of
the equation above decreases in zm while the right-hand side increases
in zm. Hence, there is a unique solution for optimal know-how zm.
Furthermore, an increase of stage m shifts the left-hand side upward,
which results in a greater value of zm. The intuition is that downstream
producers are likely to confront more problems and therefore allocate
more workers to solve those problems. Since downstream producers
allocate fewer workers to production, the labor productivity Am is
declining in stage m.
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Cost minimization of the stage m producer gives the optimal capital
to labor ratio:
km
lm
=
( r
w
) 1
σ−1
A
σ
σ−1
m
where r is the rent paid to capital and w is the wage paid to labor.
When σ < 0, that is the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is less than one, capital intensity decreases in stage m.
Hence, capital and labor are strong complements. Since downstream
producers have lower labor productivity, they find it optimal to employ
more labor to compensate for the productivity loss. It is evident that
the capital share of output also declines in stage m.
The limitations of the homogenous factor model are apparent. If
σ < 0, so that capital and labor are strong complements, both capital
intensity and capital share of output decline in stage m. If σ > 0,
both capital intensity and capital share of output increase in stage
m. To account for the stylized facts, it is necessary to have σ = 0.
However, if σ = 0, so that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is one, then neither capital intensity nor capital share of
output varies with stage m because factor prices are constant across
production line positions. Since labor is measured by efficiency units,
capital used in different production stages must be different. The next
section presents a model with heterogonous capital goods.
3.4 heterogeneous capital model
The economy is endowed with a mass K of capital goods with differing
quality, θ. Let the K (θ) be the mass of capital goods with quality
less than θ and suppose K has support on
[
θ, θ
]
. Think of θ as the
input augmenting productivity term which captures the technology
variation across different types of capital goods. Alternatively, consider
θK′ (θ) to be the quantity of capital goods measured in efficiency units
and 1/θ as the cost per efficiency unit of capital.
The most important insight from the basic model is that production
know-how z increases in stage m. The final good will be rewritten
as an aggregate in terms of z instead of m, while maintaining the
key insight that z increases with m. In what follows, production line
position will be indexed by z instead of m. z will also be referred to as
both know-how and production line position.
Y =
(∫ θ
θ
y (z)ρ µ (z) dz
) 1
ρ
(3.1)
Here, y (z) is the output of stage z, and µ (z) is the measure of stage z.
Producing stage goods requires physical inputs and production
know-how. The production function of stage z good is given by:
y (z) =
[∫ θ
θ
A (θ, z) k (θ, z) dθ
]α
l (z)1−α (3.2)
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Here, k (θ, z) is the mass of quality theta capital, and l (z) is the amount
of labor employed at stage z. A (θ, z) is the Solow-neutral technology
term, which is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in
both its arguments, and strictly log supermodular.
The key assumption here is that A is strictly log supermodular in θ
and z:
∂2 log A (θ, z)
∂θ∂z
> 0
The intuition here is that capital quality and production know-how are
strong complements. Higher quality capital goods can make better use
of otherwise the same production know-how. For a CES function, log
supermodularity requires that the elasticity of substitution between
two inputs is less than one.
Strong complementarity between quality and know-how implies
that in equilibrium, there is a strictly increasing matching function T
mapping know-how to quality such that k (θ, z) > 0 if and only if z =
T (θ). In other words, there is positive assortative matching between
capital quality and production know-how. High quality capital goods
are associated with better production know-how. This result is formally
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. In the competitive equilibrium, there is positive assortative
matching between capital quality and production know-how.
Given the matching function, the output of stage m is given by:
y (z) =
[
A
(
T−1 (z) , z
)
k
(
T−1 (z) , z
)]α
l (z)1−α (3.3)
The matching function must ensure that capital markets clear. Obvi-
ously, it satisfies T (θ) = z and T
(
θ
)
= z. The market for quality theta
capital clears when:
K (θ) =
∫ T(θ)
z
k
(
T−1 (z) , z
)
µ (z) dz
Differentiating the equation above with respect to theta and using
equations (1) and (3) gives a differential equation for the matching
function:
T′ (θ) =
r (θ)K′ (θ)
αµ (z) p (z)
ρ
ρ−1 Y
(3.4)
where r (θ) is the rent paid to capital with quality θ, and p (z) is the
price for output at stage z.
Two features of the matching function are particularly noteworthy.
First, the matching function depends on supply of capital goods K′ (θ)
and demand of capital goods µ (θ). Second, the matching function
affects the relative factor price w/r (θ). In later part of the section, it
will be shown how changes in capital supply and demand affect the
matching function, which in turn affects equilibrium relative factor
price and factor intensity.
[ June 25, 2018 at 11:05 – classicthesis v4.6 ]
3.4 heterogeneous capital model 84
How is the equilibrium rent schedule determined? Since there is a
one-to-one matching between capital quality and production know-
how, it is possible to characterize the rent schedule by studying pro-
ducers’ choices of capital goods. In particular, the producer at stage z
chooses capital with quality θ to minimize the unit production cost:(
1
A (θ, z)
r (θ)
α
)α ( w
1− α
)1−α
The first order condition is given by:
θ
r′ (θ)
r (θ)
= θ
Aθ (θ, z)
A (θ, z)
(3.5)
The intuition here is that return to quality θr′ (θ) /r (θ) reflects how
much quality has contributed to the increase of productivity.
Strong complementarity between quality and know-how implies
that return to quality increases when workers have more production
know-how:
∂
∂z
(
θ
r′ (θ)
r (θ)
)
= θ
∂2 log A (θ, z)
∂θ∂z
> 0
Proposition 3.2. In a competitive equilibrium, the matching function and
rent schedule satisfy (3.4) and (3.5).
The Cobb-Douglas production function implies that capital intensity
k (θ, z) /l (z) is proportional to the relative factor price w/r (θ), which
decreases in know-how z. Since z is also an index of the production
line position, it follows that capital intensity is lower in downstream
industries.
To summarize, the basic model has been extended to incorporate
heterogeneous capital goods. The new model is consistent with all
stylized facts discussed at the beginning of the paper. In particular, the
model predicts that downstream industries hire more and pay more
to skilled workers (z), operate at lower capital intensity (k (θ, z) /l (z)),
and that capital share of output does not vary across production line
positions.
Let us now investigate how exogenous changes in factor supply
and demand, captured by K and µ, affect factor allocation and factor
prices. In each case, this work first analyzes how exogenous affects
the matching function. The rent schedule is then used to analyze how
changes in the matching function affect the variation of factor intensity
along the production chain.
First, consider an exogenous change that increases the relative sup-
ply of high quality capital goods. Specifically, consider a shift in the
distribution of capital quality K to K˜ such that:
K˜′ (θ′)
K˜′ (θ)
≥ K
′ (θ′)
K′ (θ)
, ∀θ′ > θ
The intuition here is that the proportion of capital goods with quality
above theta is always higher under K˜ than under K, and therefore, the
proportion of capital goods with quality below theta is always lower
under K˜ than under K.
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Proposition 3.3. An increase in the relative supply of high-quality capital
goods shifts the matching function downwards and implies less variation in
capital intensity.
Moving from K to K˜ shifts the matching function downwards. This
flattens the matching function at low quality levels and makes it
steeper at high quality levels. The intuition is that the increase in high
quality capital goods must be absorbed in the production chain, and
hence there is quality upgrading at each production line position.
The downward shift in the matching function implies that return
to quality increases at a slower pace. Intuitively, holding fixed the
demand for quality, an increase of the relative supply of high-quality
goods lowers the relative return to high-quality capital goods. Hence,
there is less variation in return to quality along the production chain.
Since capital intensity monotonically depends on relative factor price
w/r (θ), there is also less variation in capital intensity across produc-
tion line positions.
Second, consider an exogenous change that increases the relative
demand for high-quality capital goods. In particular, consider a shift
in the distribution of know-how µ to µ˜ such that:
µ˜ (θ′)
µ˜ (θ)
≥ µ (θ
′)
µ (θ)
, ∀θ′ > θ
Think of this as a technological change that increases the demand for
downstream output and hence for high-quality capital goods.
Proposition 3.4. An increase in the relative demand of downstream goods
shifts the matching function upwards and implies more variation in capital
intensity.
Moving from µ to µ˜ shifts the matching function upwards. This
shift flattens the matching function at high quality levels and makes
it steeper at low quality levels. Intuitively, an increase in the relative
demand of downstream goods means that more capital goods must
be allocated to produce downstream goods. Hence, there is quality
downgrading at each production line position.
The upward shift in the matching function implies that return to
quality increases at a faster speed. Therefore, there is more varia-
tion in return to quality along the production chain. Once again, the
Cobb-Douglas production function implies that capital intensity is
proportional to relative factor price w/r (θ). It follows that there is
more variation in capital intensity across production line positions.
3.5 conclusions
Accounting for quality differences in capital goods could be impor-
tant for understanding production chains. This work has shown that
incorporating heterogeneous capital into production chain models is
necessary to rationalize the stylized facts. The developed model also
implies that countries with more human capital tend to attract more
high-quality capital goods and specialize in downstream industries.
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This implication is particularly relevant to policy because countries
are becoming increasingly specialized in global production chains.
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A P P E N D I X T O C H A P T E R 1
a.1 proofs of propositions
a.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Total differentiating the expression of σ gives
d ln σ = − ψV
ψV − ψO Bd lnψO +
fV
fV − fO Bd ln fO,
where B = θ (1− α) /α. Total differentiating the expression of ψO
yields
d lnψO =
ψS
ψO
d
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 d lnλ− ψSψO d
( 1−λ
λ
)[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 d ln d,
where ψS = (1− α) (1− β). Total differentiating the expression of fO
gives
d ln fO =
1
fO
µ f e
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 d lnλ+ 1fO d
( 1−λ
λ
)2
µ f e[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 d ln d− 1fO
( 1−λ
λ
)
µ f e
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)d ln µ
Substituting and collecting terms,
d ln σ = −ϑ1d lnλ+ ϑ2d ln d− ϑ3d ln µ
The coefficients ϑ’s are ϑ1 =
ψV
ψV−ψO
ψS
ψO
Bd
λ[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 − fVfV− fO 1fO
Bµ f e
λ[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 ,
ϑ2 =
ψV
ψV−ψO
ψS
ψO
Bd( 1−λλ )
[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 +
fV
fV− fO
1
fO
Bd( 1−λλ )
2
µ f e
[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 , and ϑ3 =
fV
fV− fO
1
fO
Bµ( 1−λλ ) f e
1+d( 1−λλ )
.
It is evident that ϑ2 and ϑ3 are strictly positive. It remains to show that
ϑ1 is also strictly positive. Note that σ ∈ (0, 1) implies ψVψV−ψO >
fV
fV− fO .
Furthermore, Assumption 1.2 implies that equilibrium cutoff exceeds
the ideal cutoff for which financial market is perfect. This in turn
implies ψf >
ψO
fO
, where ψ = 1− α (1− β). Applying these two inequal-
ities gives
ϑ1 >
ψV
ψV − ψO
Bd
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 { ψSψO − 1fO µd f e
}
>
ψV
ψV − ψO
Bd
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 {ψSψ − 1f µd f e
}
> 0
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.2.
I then show that σ is log-supermodular in λ and µ, ∂
2 ln σ
∂µ∂λ > 0.
Since ∂
2 ln σ
∂µ∂λ =
∂
∂λ
(
∂ ln σ
∂λ
)
= − 1λ ∂ϑ3∂λ , it suffices to show that ∂ϑ3∂λ < 0.
Differentiating the expression of ϑ3 gives
dϑ3
dλ
=
fV
( fV − fO)2
1
fO
Bµ
( 1−λ
λ
)
f e
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
) d fO
dλ
− fV
fV − fO
1
fO
Bµ f e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 − 1fO ϑ3 d fOdλ
87
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Since the third term is negative, it suffices to show that the sum of the
first two terms is negative. Substituting the expression of ϑ3 yields
dϑ3
dλ
<
fV
( fV − fO)2
1
fO
Bµ
( 1−λ
λ
)
f e
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
) d fO
dλ
− fV
fV − fO
1
fO
Bµ f e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2
=
fV
( fV − fO)2
1
fO
Bµ
( 1−λ
λ
)
f e
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
) µ f e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2 − fVfV − fO 1fO Bµ f
e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2
=
fV
fV − fO
1
fO
Bµ f e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2
{
d
( 1−λ
λ
)
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
) 1
fV − fO
µ
d
f e − 1
}
Denote by zS the cutoff productivity for the supplier. By Assumption
1.2, zS < zV , which in turn implies
ψS
ψV−ψO − 1fV− fO
µ
d f
e > 0. Hence
dϑ3
dλ
<
fV
fV − fO
1
fO
Bµ f e
λ2
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]2
{
d
( 1−λ
λ
)
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
) ψS
ψV − ψO − 1
}
Since ψV > ψ ≥ ψO, we have
ψS
ψV − ψO <
ψS
ψ− ψO =
ψS
ψS − ψS/
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)] = 1+ d ( 1−λλ )
d
( 1−λ
λ
)
It follows that dϑ3dλ < 0.
Finally, it remains to show that σ is log-submodular in λ and d,
∂2 ln σ
∂d∂λ < 0. It suffices to show that
∂ϑ1
∂d > 0. Proving this inequality
is difficult; therefore, I provide sufficient conditions under which it
holds. Differentiate ϑ1 with respect to d gives
dϑ1
dd
=
ψV
ψV − ψO
ψS
ψO
B
[
1− d ( 1−λλ )]
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]3 + fVfV − fO 1fO 2B
( 1−λ
λ
)
µ f e
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]3
+
(
1− ψO
ψV − ψO
)
ψV
ψV − ψO
(
ψS
ψO
)2 Bd ( 1−λλ )
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]4
+
(
1− fO
fV − fO
)
fV
fV − fO
(
1
fO
)2 B [( 1−λλ ) µ f e]2
λ
[
1+ d
( 1−λ
λ
)]4
Assume λ > 12 so that d
( 1−λ
λ
) ∈ (0, 1). Applying the inequalities
ψV
ψV−ψO >
fV
fV− fO and
f e
f <
d
µ
ψS
ψ gives a lower bound for the sum of
first two terms, fVfV− fO
1
fO
B µd f
e
λ[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 . Assume also that ψV > 2ψO and
fV > 2 fO. If follows that
ψO
ψV−ψO < 1 and
fO
fV− fO < 1, and the last two
terms are strictly positive. Hence the set of sufficient conditions for
∂2 ln σ
∂d∂λ < 0 are λ >
1
2 , ψV > 2ψO, and fV > 2 fO. This completes the
proof of Proposition 1.1.
a.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Totally differentiating the expression of Me gives
d ln Me =
Lp
L
(
d ln φO − d ln
(
Ωp
Ω
))
+
f
Ω fO − f
(
d lnΩ− d ln
(
f
fO
))
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First consider the terms in the second parentheses,
d lnΩ− d ln
(
f
fO
)
= ∆
(
B− 1
B
d ln σ− D
D− 1d ln φO
)
−Θ
(
d ln σ− fV/ fO
fV/ fO − 1d ln fO
)
= ∆
(
B− 1
B
d ln σ− ψV
ψV − ψO d ln φO
)
−Θ
(
d ln σ− fV
fV − fO d ln fO
)
where ∆ = (
D−1)σR
1+(D−1)σR , D =
φV
φO
(q (1− β))− α1−α , and Θ = ( fV / fO−1)σ1+( fV / fO−1)σ
for notational convenience. Note that
(
D− 1) σR = (ψVψO − 1) σ1− 1B =(
f V
f O − 1
)
σ implies ∆ = Θ. We can now collect terms
d lnΩ− d ln
(
f
fO
)
= ∆
(
B− 1
B
d ln σ− d ln σ− ψV
ψV − ψO d ln φO +
fV
fV − fO d ln fO
)
= ∆
(
B− 1
B
d ln σ− d ln σ+ 1
B
d ln σ
)
= 0
Next consider the terms in the first parentheses,
d ln φO − d ln
(
Ωp
Ω
)
= d ln φO − ∆pd ln σR − ∆
(
d ln σR − DD− 1d ln φO
)
=
(
1− ∆ D
D− 1
)
d ln φO −
(
∆p − ∆
) B− 1
B
d ln σ
where ∆p =
(Dp−1)σR
1+(Dp−1)σR , and Dp =
α
α(1−β) (q (1− β))−
α
1−α . Note that
1− ∆ D
D−1 =
1−σR
(1−σR)+DσR > 0. By assumption 1.3, ∆p > ∆ always holds.
It follows from the proof of Proposition 1.1 that all statements in
Proposition 1.2 are true.
a.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Totally differentiating the expression of sector price gives
d ln P = − (B/θ) d ln Me + d ln
(
zBO z˜
−1
)
By Proposition 1.2 the first term has the expected signs. It remains to
show the second term also has the expected signs. Totally differentiat-
ing the second term gives
d ln
(
zBO z˜
−1
)
= (B− 1) d ln zO +
(
∆˜B/θ
)
d ln σR
where ∆˜ = (D−1)σR1+(D−1)σR , D˜ = (q (1− β))
− α1−α . Totally differentiating the
expression of zO gives
d ln zO = −B
θ
d lnψO +
B
θ
d ln fO
whereas totally differentiating the expression of σR yields,
d ln σR = − ψV
ψV − ψO (B− 1) d lnψO +
fV
fV − fO (B− 1) d ln fO
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Substituting and collecting terms yields,
d ln
(
zBO z˜
−1
)
= (B− 1) B
θ
{
−
(
1− ∆˜ψV
ψV − ψO
)
d lnψO +
(
1− ∆˜ fV
fV − fO
)
d ln fO
}
Substituting and using the expressions of d lnψO and d ln fO gives,
d ln
(
zBO z˜
−1
)
= −ξ1d lnλ+ ξ2d ln d− ξ3d ln µ
where the coefficients are given as follows: ξ1 =
(
1− ∆˜ψVψV−ψO
)
ψS
ψO
Bd
λ[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 −(
1− ∆˜ fVfV− fO
)
1
fO
Bµ f e
λ[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 , ξ2 =
(
1− ∆˜ψVψV−ψO
)
ψS
ψO
Bd( 1−λλ )
[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 +
(
1− ∆˜ fVfV− fO
)
1
fO
B( 1−λλ )
2
µ f e
[1+d( 1−λλ )]
2 ,
and ξ3 =
∆˜ fV
fV− fO
1
fO
B( 1−λλ ) f e
1+d( 1−λλ )
. Note that φV > φO implies D˜ < D, which
in turn implies ∆˜ < ∆. It follows that 1 − ∆˜ fVfV− fO > 1 −
∆˜ψV
ψV−ψO >
1− ∆ψVψV−ψO > 0. It follows from the proof of Proposition 1.1 the all
three coefficients ξi’s are positive numbers. This completes the proof
of Proposition 1.3.
a.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Totally differentiating the expression of sector TFP gives
d ln TFP = d ln TFPR− d ln P
By Proposition 1.2 the second term has the expected signs. It remains to
show the first term also has the expected signs. Totally differentiating
the first term gives
d ln TFPR = − α (1− β)Ωp
α (1− β)Ωp + φOΩ
(
∆p − ∆˜
)
d ln σR− φOΩ
α (1− β)Ωp + φOΩ
(
∆− ∆˜) d ln σR
By assumption 1.3, ∆p > ∆ always holds. Note φV > φO implies
D˜ < D, which in turn implies ∆˜ < ∆. It follows from the proof of
Proposition 1.1 the first term has the expected signs. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.3.
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a.2 extensions
In this section, I develop three extensions of the benchmark model
in the main text. The purpose here is not to developed a full-fledged
model, but to check whether the mechanism of the baseline model
continue to hold in different settings. The first extension considers
the case when investments in inputs are partially contractible. The
second extension goes beyond the transaction costs approach and
adopts the more sophisticated property rights approach. The third
extension allows the firm to outsource a fraction of its inputs while
integrating the rest of them.
a.2.1 Partial Contractibility
In the baseline model, we have assumed that investments in inputs are
fully noncontractible under outsourcing. Here, we consider the case
when investments in inputs are partially contractible as in Acemoglu,
Antràs, and Helpman (2007). Firm faces the demand y = Ap−1/(1−α)
which implies the revenue function R = A1−αyα = A1−αzαxα. The
intermediate input x is produced by assembling a continuum of dif-
ferentiated inputs using the Cobb-Douglas production function,
x = exp
[∫ 1
0
ln x (k) dk
]
.
Assume that input k ∈ [0, η) is fully contractible, while input k ∈
[η, 1] is non-contractible. An integrating firm solves the same problem
as in the benchmark model. Hence we focus on the case of outsourcing.
Under outsourcing, the supplier solves the problem:
piS (z) = max
{x(k)}1k=η ,F(z)
(1− β) A1−αzαxα −
∫ 1
η
x (k) dk− (1− d) T (z)− λF (z)− (1− λ) µ f e.
s.t. (1− β) A1−αzαxα −
∫ 1
η
x (k) dk− (1− d) T (z) ≥ F (z) ,
λF (z) + (1− λ) µ f e ≥ dT (z) .
The firm offers a contract that specifies the amount of transfer
T (z) and the investment levels in contractible inputs {x (k)}ηk=0. The
transfer ensures the supplier can obtain external funds at minimum
cost. Investments in contractible inputs maximize the profit of the
firm while taking into account the under-investment problem of non-
contractible inputs:
piF (z) = max
{x(k)}ηk=0
βA1−αzαxα −
∫ η
0
x (k) dk− f + T (z) .
Solving this program yields the profit function of the firm under out-
sourcing piO (z) = ψOz
α
1−α − fO, where ψO = (1− α) A
[
αα (1− β)α(1−η)
(
φO
1−α(1−η)
)1−α(1−η)] 11−α
,
φO = β+
(1−α(1−η))(1−β)
1+d( 1−λλ )
, and fO = f − (
1−λ
λ )µ f e
1+d( 1−λλ )
. Since ψO ∝ φ
1−α(1−η)
1−α
O
and 1−α(1−η)1−α > 1, we conclude that Proposition 1.1 continue to hold
in the case of partial contractibility.
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a.2.2 Property Rights Approach
In the benchmark model, suppliers are the only agents undertaking
relationship-specific investments. Here, we follow the property rights
approach which allows the firm to also make relationship-specific
investments. Since neither the firm nor the supplier is the full residual
reclaimant of the output gains derived from their investments, both
agents tend to withhold investments. Ownership is assigned to the
agent that undertakes the most important investment to mitigate the
overall under-investment problem.
Firm faces the demand y = Ap−1/(1−α) which implies the revenue
function R = A1−αyα = A1−αzαxα. The intermediate input x is pro-
duced with a Cobb-Douglas technology,
x =
(
h
η
)η ( m
1− η
)1−η
.
The firm is responsible for undertaking investment in headquarter
service h, and the supplier is responsible for making investment in
component m. Investment are relationship-specific in the sense that
agents cannot costlessly switch to alternative trading partners and are
partially locked in the bilateral relationship. Hence the two agents
negotiate the division of output gains derived from the investments,
with the firm receives a fraction βk of the gains. The division of gains
depend on the organizational forms k ∈ {V, O} where V refers to
integration and O refers to outsourcing. For our purpose, it suffices to
assume βV > βO.
The firm’s problem with organizatinal form k is:
piF (z) = max
h
βk A1−αzαxα − h− f + T (z) .
The supplier’s problem is:
piS (z) = max
m,F(z)
(1− βk) A1−αzαxα −m− (1− d) T (z)− λF (z)− (1− λ) µ f e.
s.t. (1− βk) A1−αzαxα −m− (1− d) T (z) ≥ F (z) ,
λF (z) + (1− λ) µ f e ≥ dT (z) .
The firm and the supplier choose investments in h and m simuta-
neously. Solving the intersection of the their best response func-
tions and using the optimal investments gives the profit function
under organizational mode k, pik (z) = ψkz
α
1−α − fk, where ψk =
φk A
(
1
zβηk (1−βk)1−η
)− α1−α
, φk = βk (1− αη) + (1−βk)(1−α(1−η))1+d( 1−λλ ) and fk =
f − µ(
1−λ
λ )
1+d( 1−λλ )
f e. It is straightforward to verify that financial develop-
ment has a greater effect on ψV than ψO, and has the same effect on fV
and fO. The same statement is true for external financial dependence
and asset tangibility. It follows that Proposition 1.1 continue to hold
with the property rights approach.
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a.2.3 Input-level Model
In the baseline model, firms’ sourcing decisions are a binary choice:
either outsource all of inputs or integrate all of them. This section
extends the baseline model to allow the firm to outsource a fraction of
the inputs while integrating the rest of them. The purpose here is to
derive predictions on the prevalence of outsourcing at the firm level,
which will be tested with firm-level data in the next section.
Firm faces the demand y = Ap−1/(1−α) which implies the revenue
function R = A1−αyα = A1−αzαxα. The intermediate input x is pro-
duced by assembling a continuum of differentiated inputs using the
CES production function,
x =
(∫ 1
0
x (k)ρ dk
)1/ρ
, where 0 < α < ρ < 1.
Hence competiting inputs are more substitutable than differenti-
ated products. Each input k is produced by a distinct supplier who
faces a downward-sloping demand x (k) = Bp (k)−1/(1−ρ), where
B = Ap
ρ−α
(1−ρ)(1−α) . The supplier can transform raw input l into input x
with productivity ϕ, x (k) = ϕ (k) l (k). Assume that suppliers draw
productivity from a common distribution Gx (ϕ). As all suppliers with
the same producitivity behave symmetrically, I will index suppliers by
productivity ϕ from now on.
The firm can integrate the supplier ϕ, solving the problem:
pixV (ϕ) = max
l
B1−ρϕρlρ − ql − fxV .
Here, fxV is the fixed overhead cost for integrating supplier ϕ. This pro-
gram delievers a profit function pixV (ϕ) = (1− ρ) B (q/ρ)−
ρ
1−ρ ϕ
ρ
1−ρ −
fxV = ψxVϕ
ρ
1−ρ − fxV . The firm can also outsource the production of
input to the supplier, in which case the supplier solves the problem:
piS (ϕ) = max
l,F(ϕ)
(1− β) B1−ρϕρlρ − l − (1− d) Tx (ϕ)− λF (ϕ)− (1− λ) µ f e.
s.t. (1− β) B1−ρϕρlρ − l − (1− d) Tx (ϕ) ≥ F (ϕ) ,
λF (ϕ) + (1− λ) µ f e ≥ dT (ϕ) .
Solving this program yields the profit function of the firm from input
ϕ, pixO (ϕ) = ψxOϕ
ρ
1−ρ − fxO, where ϕxO = φxOB
(
1
ρ(1−β)
)− ρ1−ρ
, φxO =
β+ (1−ρ)(1−β)
1+d( 1−λλ )
, and fxO = fx − (
1−λ
λ )µ f e
1+d( 1−λλ )
.
Assume the distribution of input productivity is Gx (ϕ) = 1 −
(bx/ϕ)
θx , then the measure of integrating inputs is:
σx =
[
ψxV − ψxO
ψxO
fxO
fxV − fxO
]θx(1−ρ)/ρ
.
It is straightforward to verify that Proposition 1.1 continue to hold at
the input level. In particular, firms are more likely to outsource inputs
when financial development is high, when the supplier less rely on
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external finance and has more collateralizable assets. Furthermore, the
first order effects of external financial dependence and asset collater-
alizability fall with financial development. These predictions can be
tested with firm-level data.
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b.1 proofs
b.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Define the following correspondence
T :
[
θ, θ
]→ [z, z] , T (θ) = {z : k (θ, z) > 0}
Goods market clearing implies that final good producer has non-zero
demand for all stage goods. Capital market clearing implies that all
stage goods have non-zero demand for capital. It follows that T is
surjective.
The next step is to show that T is non-decreasing. I proceed by
contradiction. Start with producer z’s problem:
max
{k(θ,z)},l(z)
p (z)
[∫ θ
θ
A (θ, z) k (θ, z) dθ
]α
l (z)1−α−
∫ θ
θ
r (θ) k (θ, z) dθ−wl (z)
The first order condition for l (z) is
(1− α) p (z) y (z) = wl (z)
And for k (θ, z) is
αp (z)
[∫ θ
θ
A (θ, z) k (θ, z) dθ
]α−1
l (z)1−α A (θ, z) ≤ r (θ) , with equality iff k (θ, z) > 0
Combining the two conditions implies
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z)
1
α A (θ, z) ≤ r (θ) , with equality iff k (θ, z) > 0
Now suppose T is not non-decreasing, implying that there exists
θ1 < θ2 and z1 > z2 such that z1 = T (θ1) and z2 = T (θ2). The
condition above implies
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z1)
1
α A (θ1, z1) = r (θ1)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z1)
1
α A (θ2, z1) ≤ r (θ2)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z2)
1
α A (θ2, z2) = r (θ2)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z2)
1
α A (θ1, z2) ≤ r (θ1)
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It follows that
A (θ2, z1)
A (θ1, z1)
≤ r (θ2)
r (θ1)
≤ A (θ2, z2)
A (θ1, z2)
But this contradicts A is strict log-supermodular in θ and z. Hence, T
is non-decreasing.
The final step is to show that T is a single-valued, strictly increasing
and continuous function. Suppose T is multi-valued, implying that
for some θ, there exist z1, z2 in T (θ) with z1 < z2. Since T is non-
decreasing, for any z in [z1, z2], z must be in T (θ). But this contradicts
there is no mass point in the quality distribution. It follows that
T is single-valued, well-defined function. Similar reasoning can be
combined with the assumption that there is no mass point in the know-
how distribution to show that T is strictly increasing. Combining this
result with the fact that T is surjective implies that T is continuous.
b.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The first step is to derive the differential equation for matching func-
tion. Capital market clearing implies
K (θ) =
∫ T(θ)
z
k
(
T−1 (z) , z
)
µ (z) dz
Differentiating this equation with respect to theta implies
K′ (θ) = k (θ, z) µ (z) T′ (θ)
Cobb-Douglas production of stage good implies capital demand
k (θ, z) =
αp (z) y (z)
r (θ)
CES production of final good implies demand for stage good z
y (z) = p (z)
1
ρ−1 Y
Combining the four equations above implies
T′ (θ) =
r (θ)K′ (θ)
αµ (z) p (z)
ρ
ρ−1 Y
The next step is to show the differential equation for rent schedule.
Reproduce the combined first order condition for producer z’s problem
below:
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (z)
1
α A (θ, z) ≤ r (θ) , with equality iff k (θ, z) > 0
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It follows that
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ))
1
α A (θ, T (θ)) = r (θ)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ))
1
α A (θ + dθ, T (θ)) ≤ r (θ + dθ)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ + dθ))
1
α A (θ + dθ, T (θ + dθ)) = r (θ + dθ)
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ + dθ))
1
α A (θ, T (θ + dθ)) ≤ r (θ)
Hence,
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ))
1
α
A (θ + dθ, T (θ))− A (θ + dθ, T (θ))
dθ
≤ r (θ + dθ)− r (θ)
dθ
≤ α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
p (T (θ + dθ))
1
α
A (θ + dθ, T (θ + dθ))− A (θ + dθ, T (θ))
dθ
Now taking the limit as dθ → 0 implies that the rent schedule is
differentiable and satisfies the differential equation (5).
b.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The first step is to show that an increase of quality abundance shifts
the matching function downwards. That is,
K˜′ (θ′)
K˜′ (θ)
≥ K
′ (θ′)
K′ (θ)
, ∀θ′ > θ
implies T˜ (θ) ≤ T (θ) for all θ in [θ, θ] ∩ [θ˜, θ˜].
Suppose for some θ in
[
θ, θ
] ∩ [θ˜, θ˜], T˜ (θ) > T (θ). Obviously,
z = T˜
(
θ˜
) ≤ T (θ˜) and T˜ (θ) ≤ T (θ) = z. Since both T and T˜ are
continuous, T˜ must move above T and then move below T at least
once. Hence, there exists θ˜ ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ and z ≤ z1 ≤ z2 ≤ z such
that (i) T˜ (θ1) = T (θ1) = z1, T˜ (θ2) = T (θ2) = z2, (ii) T˜′ (θ1) ≥ T′ (θ1),
T˜′ (θ2) ≤ T′ (θ2), (iii) T˜ (θ) > T (θ), for all θ in (θ1, θ2).
Condition (ii) implies
T˜′ (θ2)
T˜′ (θ1)
≤ T
′ (θ2)
T′ (θ1)
Condition (i), the differential equation for matching function and the
unit production cost together imply(
r˜ (θ2)
r˜ (θ1)
)1+α ρρ−1 K˜′ (θ2)
K˜′ (θ1)
≤
(
r (θ2)
r (θ1)
)1+α ρρ−1 K′ (θ2)
K′ (θ1)
By assumption,
K˜′ (θ2)
K˜′ (θ1)
≥ K
′ (θ2)
K′ (θ1)
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It follows that
r˜ (θ2)
r˜ (θ1)
≤ r (θ2)
r (θ1)
This equation cannot hold because of condition (iii), the strict log-
supermodularity of A, and the differential equation for rent schedule.
The next step is to show that downward shift of the matching func-
tion implies less variation in capital intensity. Combining condition
T˜ (θ) < T (θ) for all θ, the strict log-supermodularity of A, and the
differential equation for rent schedule, I obtain
d log r˜ (θ)
dθ
=
∂ log A
(
θ, T˜ (θ)
)
∂θ
≤ ∂ log A (θ, T (θ))
∂θ
=
d log r (θ)
dθ
Integrating the above inequality implies
r˜ (θ′)
r˜ (θ)
≤ r (θ
′)
r (θ)
, ∀θ′ > θ
Let R and R˜ be the distributions induced by r (θ) and r˜ (θ) respec-
tively. That is,
R (x) = Pr {r : r ≤ x} = Pr
{
θ : θ ≤ r−1 (x)
}
= K
(
r−1 (x)
)
R′ (x) dx = K′ (θ)
1
r′ (θ)
dθ
Similarly,
R˜ (x) = Pr {r˜ : r˜ ≤ x} = Pr
{
θ : θ ≤ r˜−1 (x)
}
= K
(
r˜−1 (x)
)
R˜′ (x) dx = K˜′ (θ)
1
r˜′ (θ)
dθ
To show there is less variation in capital intensity, it suffices to show
that R˜ second-order stochastically dominates R. Combining the above
three equations implies
R˜′
(
x′
)
R′ (x) ≥ R˜′ (x) R′ (x′)
Integrating both sides over x from r to x′ implies
R
(
x′
)
R˜′
(
x′
) ≥ R˜ (x′) R′ (x′)
Integrating both sides over x′ from x to r implies[
1− R˜ (x)] R′ (x) ≥ [1− R (x)] R˜′ (x)
The x and x′ in the above two equations are arbitrary. Combine these
equations by letting x = x′ = r, I obtain
1− R˜ (r)
1− R (r) ≥
R˜′ (r)
R′ (r)
≥ R˜ (r)
R (r)
This implies
R˜ (r) ≤ R (r) , ∀r
Hence, R˜ first-order stochastically dominates R. The conclusion that
there is less variation in capital intensity follows from the fact that
first order stochastic dominance implies second order stochastic domi-
nance.
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b.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
The first step is to show that an increase in the relative demand of
downstream goods shifts the matching function upwards. That is,
µ˜ (z′)
µ˜ (z)
≥ µ (z
′)
µ (z)
, ∀z′ > z
implies T˜ (θ) ≥ T (θ) for all θ in [θ, θ].
Suppose for some θ in
[
θ, θ
]
, T˜ (θ) < T (θ). Obviously, z = T˜ (θ) =
T (θ) and T˜
(
θ
)
= T
(
θ
)
= z. Since both T and T˜ are continuous, T˜
must move below T and then move above T at least once. Hence,
there exists θ ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ and z ≤ z1 ≤ z2 ≤ z such that (i)
T˜ (θ1) = T (θ1) = z1, T˜ (θ2) = T (θ2) = z2, (ii) T˜′ (θ1) ≤ T′ (θ1),
T˜′ (θ2) ≥ T′ (θ2), (iii) T˜ (θ) < T (θ), for all θ in (θ1, θ2).
Condition (ii) implies
T˜′ (θ2)
T˜′ (θ1)
≥ T
′ (θ2)
T′ (θ1)
Condition (i), the differential equation for matching function and the
unit production cost together imply(
r˜ (θ2)
r˜ (θ1)
)1+α ρρ−1 µ˜′ (z1)
µ˜′ (z2)
≥
(
r (θ2)
r (θ1)
)1+α ρρ−1 µ′ (z1)
µ′ (z2)
By assumption,
µ˜ (z1)
µ˜ (z2)
≤ µ (z1)
µ (z2)
It follows that
r˜ (θ2)
r˜ (θ1)
≥ r (θ2)
r (θ1)
This equation cannot hold because of condition (iii), the strict log-
supermodularity of A, and the differential equation for rent schedule.
The next step is to show that upward shift of the matching function
implies more variation in capital intensity. The result follows logically
from the proof of the second part of Proposition 3.3.
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